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“… the real science of political economy, which has yet to be distinguished from the bastard science, 
as medicine from witchcraft, and astronomy from astrology, is that which teaches nations to desire 
and labour for the things that lead to life: and which teaches them to scorn and destroy the things that 







This thesis has its foundations in a 2007 master’s research on the political economy of 
“illegal” gold panning in central Zimbabwe. A book chapter (Moore and Mawowa, 2010) and 
a journal article (Mawowa, 2013) have since resulted from that work. The former work 
argues that illegal gold panning demonstrates a distinctive pattern of accumulation 
characterising post-2000 Zimbabwe. Four aspects of this pattern are identified namely, i) the 
link between coercion, chaos and disorder and wealth accumulation and political power 
retention, ii) the role of the state in this imbroglio, in particular, its pervasiveness and 
centrality, iii) that this pattern was shaped by and has remodelled the acquisitive instincts of 
Zimbabwe’s ruling elite and iv) a culture of ‘strategic contradictions’ within ruling elites 
abets this pattern of accumulation.  
This thesis does not move substantially from this premise. Instead, it recasts these 
observations within a much broader scope. While the Masters work was restricted to a very 
small area, this work looks at a much bigger area and in fact much further away from the area 
of MA research. While retaining the focus on political economy of mining, this work goes 
beyond illegal gold panning to encompass what is generally defined as artisanal and small 
scale (gold) mining (ASM) in the Chegutu Mhondoro area. Since this is an area where 
successful platinum mining is also taking place, it was opportune and indeed relevant to 
extend the question of political economy to this sector. This is not to suggest that there is a 
direct link (formal or informal) between ASM and platinum mining other than proximity. 
However, evidence presented in this thesis is telling in terms of the commonality between the 
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PART	  ONE:	  SETTING	  THE	  STAGE	  
	  
Part One (Chapters One and Two) of this work sets the foundations for the study. It outlines 
the research problem, the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of the study. The 
opening chapter briefly makes a situational analysis of Zimbabwe and the study area, 
discusses research questions and objectives and the methodology and concludes with an 
overview of the entire study. Chapter Two seeks to locate the study within the broader 
discourse of development and political economy. It combines a literature review, a reflection 




Chapter	  One:	  Introduction:	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  Liberating	  
Ourselves?	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  
 
In 2007, while studying for my Master’s degree in the Economic History and Development 
Studies I was fortunate to tutor a second year module entitled Southern Africa and the 
Changing World Economy (ECHS204) by Professor David Moore.  One of the three sections 
of the course looked at Zimbabwe and was entitled, Zimbabwe: An Economic History of 
Liberating “Ourselves”. It is from this that I derive the title for this chapter. The photo 
below, taken from the first page of the referred section, summed up the crux of the course, the 
problematic (or irony) of Zimbabwe’s recent economic history.  It is a history of the “Third 
Chimurenga”, meaning a third phase of Zimbabwe’s liberation war, one that focuses on 
“black (economic) power” as opposed to political liberation which supposedly was attained 
through the second Chimurenga1. Under this third Chimurenga, the Zimbabwe government— 
led by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front2 (ZANU-PF)—supported the 
violent takeover of white owned farms by “poor landless” blacks. At the time of writing, the 
third Chimurenga had spread to the mining sector, with government requiring that at least 51 
percent of all mining companies be in the hands of black indigenous Zimbabweans.  
Figure 1: Signpost on one of the occupied farms in 2000 
 
Original source unknown 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chimurenga is Shona term which refers to the war of liberation. The First Chimurenga refers to the initial wars 
2 ZANU-PF is the nationalist party that spearheaded the struggle for Zimbabwe’s independence from colonial 




But Zimbabwe’s economic history of liberating “ourselves” in fact instigated and perpetuated 
a serious economic and political crisis. Ironically, the arrow on the “Black Power Farm” 
signage in the photograph is not so helpful in directing a visitor to the farm as it suggests one 
can go either way. Between 1999 and 2008 the economy suffered a cumulative annual 
decline of 54,8 percent (Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (Zimstat), 2010). By the end 
of 2008 Zimbabwe had the worst human development indicators (2010 Human Development 
Report (HDR). The period was characterised by an authoritarian populist public discourse. As 
the economy deteriorated, force was used to enforce price controls, mining companies were 
forced to surrender foreign currency earnings, the country’s central bank resorted to extensive 
printing of money to aid the cash strapped government, force and threat of force was used to 
get businesses to comply with the government’s sometimes illegal directives. All this was 
justified as necessary in pursuit of the third Chimurenga, for “extraordinary times required 
extraordinary measures” (see Gono, 2010). Violent clampdown on opposition was justified as 
necessary, first to protect the gains of third Chimurenga and secondly, to ensure that the 
struggle is carried to its logical conclusion3.  
 
In a big sense, this thesis deals with this problematic, that is, Zimbabwe’s recent “economic 
history of liberating ourselves”. While this “war” is being waged, Zimbabwe’s human 
development indicators have been plummeting. Thousands have died from preventable 
diseases such as cholera and typhoid and millions are now economic refugees in South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and other countries. Some scholars have argued that something 
meaningful and progressive may be coming out of Zimbabwe’s economic history of 
liberating “ourselves” (Moore, 2007; Mamdani, 2008; Scoones et al, 2011). Scoones et al 
point to what they say are examples of increased productivity among some resettled black 
farmers (in Masvingo, South East of Zimbabwe. Without necessarily going into this debate at 
this early stage, it is perhaps safe to say that time will tell if this is true and, if so, how 
sustainable it will be. The economy-wide impacts of Zimbabwe’s crisis-ridden political 
economy have so far been devastating.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In 2002 and subsequent election some senior members of Zimbabwe’s security forces vowed to ensure that 
Mugabe remains in power and threatened to carry out a coup if he loses the election, because a loss for Mugabe 
constituted a threat to the gains of Zimbabwe’s “liberation”. The fear is that land reform and other policies such 
as indigenisation and economic empowerment will be reversed if the MDC comes into power (Thornycroft and 




Indications are that since 2000, a few powerful and politically connected individuals have 
managed to tap into the crisis (see Mawowa, 2007) and become super rich. For the better part 
of this period, smuggling and looting of diamonds from the Marange fields in eastern 
Zimbabwe was receiving a lot of attention from both media and academia (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009). The country’s top politicians and security officials were implicated in the 
smuggling of diamonds (Global Witness, 2012). However, despite this fixation with 
Marange, the same phenomenon was obtaining in Zimbabwe’s chrome, granite, gold and 
other mining activities in what typifies the informality and crisis accumulation of the time 
(Mawowa, 2007). Yet Zimbabwe’s crisis and the political economy that characterised it 
produced mixed accumulation outcomes. The platinum sector, for example, has remained 
largely efficient and viable when all else was failing. This owed to a combination of factors 
ranging from the ability to negotiate a good mining lease to managing the nuances of ZANU-
PF’s authoritarian populism.   
 
Though this is largely the case, successful accumulation in the ASM has not only been 
limited to those with direct access to state power, but, intriguingly, includes some in the 
margins of the state. There is an interesting story to relate concerning the artisanal and small 
scale gold mining, a key feature of Zimbabwe’s crisis period. The state’s attitude towards 
ASM gold miners has been contradictory at best. Small scale gold miners, registered or 
unregistered, informal or formal and legal or illegal have often been victims of legal and 
policy inconsistencies and violent clampdowns by the police and military. Perhaps nowhere 
is the Zimbabwe state’s populist rhetoric more exposed than in the state’s dealing with small 
miners. Yet some, by carefully exploiting horizontal and vertical networks, managed also to 
tap into the chaos and accumulate significantly. The story is far from being one of 
overwhelming success but provides useful insights on how certain things work in an 
apparently dysfunctional and hostile environment. The sustainability of crisis accumulators is 
uncertain, but where profits from mining have been invested in other more sustainable 
ventures, prospects may not be so bleak.    
 
2.	  Zimbabwe’s	  Paradox:	  A	  Declining	  Mining	  Sector	  in	  the	  Midst	  of	  a	  Global	  Minerals	  Boom	  	  
 
By the end of 2011, mining had overtaken “land” as the single most prominent sector 




whose subject of inquiry was decided in early 2007.  By 2010, mineral prices had recovered 
from a two-year slump and were reaching record levels again. For Zimbabwe’s public and 
more importantly the inclusive government (IG), composed of the country’s three main 
political parties namely ZANU-PF and two formations of the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC)4 formed in 2009, and whose main task was to recover an economy which had 
been in free fall for over a decade, this was seen as a boon. The cash-strapped government 
looked towards mining as a potential revenue source. Beyond this, ZANU-PF looked to score 
political points by demanding the transfer of mining ownership to indigenous Zimbabweans. 
This approach was vigorously contested by MDC formations that argued that such a policy 
was suicidal and would discourage the much-needed foreign investment.  
 
While the prominence of the mining sector in Zimbabwe appears to be a more recent 
phenomenon, the sector occupies a special place in the country’s history. Territorially, 
modern day Zimbabwe is a direct product of colonial mining interests. Mining has 
consistently been the economy’s biggest foreign currency earner. If one includes artisanal and 
small scale mining, it is probable that the sector has been the biggest employer since the early 
1990s. The fact that by end of 2008 nearly all of Zimbabwe’s mines where either closed or 
under care and maintenance illustrates the extent of Zimbabwe’s economic decline and the 
socio-economic ramifications thereof.  However, after the official dollarisation and formation 
of IG, Zimbabwe’s economy was on the mend, growing annually by 9.5 percent on average 
between 2009 and 2011 (Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Finance, 2012 (a)). Year on Year inflation 
plunged from 89.7 trillion percent at the end of 2008 (Hanke and Kwok, 2009, 355)5 to -7.7 
percent in December 2009 and stabilised at 2.91 percent as of December 2012 (RBZ, 2013). 
Mining sector recovery was buoyant,  recording an annual growth of 60 percent in 2010 
before slowing down to 25 percent and 10 percent in 2011 and 2012 respectively (Ministry of 
Finance, 2012 a). Mineral exports rose by 230 percent between 2009 and 2011 (Ibid).  
 
Two periods stand out in the history of Zimbabwe’s economic decline. First is the early 
1990s liberal reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank known as Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) (Carmody, 1998, 320; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In 2005, MDC, then Zimbabwe’s main opposition party split into two factions, one main wing led by the 
party’s founding President Morgan Tsvangirai and the small wing led by Arthur Mutambara.  
5 This is perhaps the last known attempt to measure Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation before official dollarisation in 
2009. By this time official statistics were no longer available. Hanke and Kwok arrived at this figure by closely 
tracking Old Mutual shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and applying the principle of purchasing 




Gibbon, 1995, 8-10). The opening up of the economy affected manufacturing more than any 
other sector (Bond and Manyana, 2002). In fact, despite the economy-wide negative effects 
of ESAP, mining enjoyed steady growth during the 1990s. On the whole, the economy’s 
precarious position was worsened by a costly military intervention in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and unbudgeted financial hand-outs to the liberation war veterans 
in 1997. The second decisive moment was the violent takeover of white commercial farms 
from 2000 onwards.  
 
Indeed when compared to the 1990s, the post 2000 period represents an anti-climax for 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector. In the 1990s investment in gold mining had elevated the country 
to the third biggest exporter of gold in Africa and among the world’s top ten. The country 
was leading in ferro-chrome production. By June 1994 the African Business was reporting a 
“New Gold Rush” in Zimbabwe. A policy shift towards deregulation in the early 1990s 
resulted in the proliferation of small players (Ncube, 1991, 85; Phimister, 1988, 46). This saw 
the number of gold panning participants totalling about 100 000 by end of 1992. By the mid 
1990s cooperatives along the Great Dyke6 attracted a membership of more than 20 000 while 
semi-formalised gold mining employed “as many as 40 000 part-time workers,” mostly 
women (Chachage, 1993, 20). This may have been abetted by the scattered nature of 
Zimbabwe’s mineral deposits. In 1993 according to the Scandinavian Institute for African 
Studies, Zimbabwe had the largest number of mining companies in Africa excluding South 
Africa.  
 
Considering the general boom in global commodity prices in the 2000s, the decline of 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector during this period presents a paradox. Official figures show that, 
except for platinum and diamonds, Zimbabwe’s mining sector experienced a general decline 
between 2000 and 2008. “Copper production collapsed from about 15 000 tonnes in 1990 to 
barely 2000 in 2001 and ferrochrome, which peaked in 1995 at nearly 300 000 tones, fell to 
218 000 tonnes ten years later” (Saunders, 2007, 3). Between 2000 and 2001 alone, 14 gold 
mines were closed or placed under care and maintenance. In November 2008 alone, 
Zimbabwe’s leading producer of gold at that time, Metallon Gold, closed five mines 
(Business Times, 2008: 1). Official gold deliveries declined drastically, as did nickel and 
other minerals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Great Dyke is a 450km-long and 11km wide rock rich in mineral deposits that runs through central 





While the decline in agricultural output and its impact on the agro-industrial complex can be 
traced to the violent takeover of white owned farms in 2000, the same cannot be said of the 
mining sector. Saunders (2008) observes that by 2008, despite ZANU-PF’s militant rhetoric 
around "indigenisation" and black empowerment, “The transfer of ownership to 
Zimbabweans by legal or violent means seen in some other sectors had not happened in 
mining”. It was only from 2009 that ZANU-PF started to vigorously enforce an early 2008 
law requiring foreign mining companies to transfer majority shares to the state or to 
individual black Zimbabweans. When one considers this, and the relatively high international 
mineral prices dominating the better part of post 2000 period, the decline is cause for 
questioning, prompting Saunders (2008) to describe this situation as a “painful paradox”. In a 
small but important way, this thesis assists in unlocking this paradox.  Evidence of vertical 
mobility among the ASM and the generally successful performance of the large scale 
platinum sector suggest that mining sector performance was not all gloomy as official figures 
and general trends would lead one to believe.  
 
Zimbabwe’s crisis, like any crisis, appears not to have been without beneficiaries. While 
official gold production has reportedly been declining, ASM and smuggling activities have 
been increasing. Over 15 000kg of gold (valued over US $400 million), diamonds worth over 
US $800 million and other minerals to the tune of about US $200 million were smuggled out 
of the country annually between 2002 and 2007 (Gono, 2007). The magnitude of smuggling 
renders official production figures a massive understatement. By 2001 a local newspaper in 
central Zimbabwe, Midlands Observer, estimated that as many as 600 000 people were 
involved in gold panning in central Zimbabwe alone (24 October, 2001: 1). Thus 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector performance during the period cannot simply be generalised. The 
contradictory outcomes of Zimbabwe’s crisis call for a more nuanced analysis of 
“Zimbabwe’s plunge” (Bond and Manyana, 2002), in particular the role of mining in 
Zimbabwe’s political economy, emerging accumulation paths and the country’s development.  
 
3.	  The	  Study	  Area	  and	  Research	  Methodology	  
	  
The thesis largely derives from an intensive and investigative field work around the Chegutu-




capital Harare in 2010 and 2011. Geographically this covers Chegutu Town and its periphery 
which includes Chegutu rural and Mhondoro. Since Chegutu is the dominant administrative 
centre, I generalise my reference to the entire area for the study as Chegutu unless indicated 
otherwise. Formerly an agricultural hub before 2000, and traditionally an important gold and 
chrome producing region, the area is currently dominated by artisanal and small scale gold 
mining and large scale platinum mining. The once significant industrial base has been eroded 
by Zimbabwe’s economic decline. The thesis looks closely at platinum mining on one hand 
and ASM on the other. In the wake of economic decline, these thriving sectors have become 
very important.   
 
Chegutu was formerly known as Hartley and initially was settled after the discovery of gold. 
As early as 1901 a railway line had reached Chegutu (from Bulawayo) and with the shift of 
the settler economy towards farming, the area became an important farming area. Through 
the 1990s Chegutu’s population grew steadily, by 4.32 percent for the entire period between 
1988 and 1993 and 3.5 percent between 1993 and 1998 (Madzorera, 1999). Increased 
employment of males in the informal sector was recorded between 1993 and 1998 as 
increasing from 55 percent to 60 percent respectively, whereas the percentage of total formal 
unemployed men increased from 13 percent in 1993 to 15 percent in 1998 (Ibid). Despite the 
decrease in formal employment during this period, local government revenues and 
expenditures between 1993 and 1998 rose from US $16 028 170 to US $108 260 364 in 1998 
(Ibid).  
 
In the post 2000 period the town has been experiencing considerable urban expansion. The 
population for urban Chegutu, which stood at 22 726 as of 2002 (Zimstat, 2004), more than 
doubled to 49 842 as of 2012 (Zimstat, 2012). The Chegutu rural and urban population 
combined increased from about 100 000 to 149 025 over the same period. Thus clearly the 
biggest net gain was in the urban area. These figures are synonymous with observable 
changes in economic base (increased reliance on mineral extraction as opposed to rural 
peasant agriculture) and evidence of urban expansion, i.e. development of new houses and 
new suburbs. Some 80 percent of artisanal and small miners considered in this research 
claimed to be domiciled in Chegutu town though conducting operations in the rural 
periphery. Moreover, up until the construction of employee houses at the mine by Zimplats 
from 2009 onwards, a considerable number of Zimplats employees were commuting from 




indicated that they were failing to cope with demand for new housing space. This appears 
ironic for a town whose economy is supposedly shrinking (deterioration in service delivery 
seems to confirm this) due to the death of the formal economy.  
 
The studied area exemplifies the economic quagmire that is post 2000 Zimbabwe and the 
subsequent socio-economic outcomes. The town’s role as a traditional agricultural hub 
exposed it to the worst of the effects of the massive expropriation of white owned farms in 
the 2000 and aftermath. Most of the surrounding farms were taken over by senior figures 
from the dominant political party, ZANU-PF. The most notable ones include Chigwell Estate 
also known as Big Orange, half of which was taken over by Bright Matonga7, Stockdale 
Estate, now owned by the son of Senate President Edna Madzongwe8, and Hippovalle farm 
taken over by Emilia Zindi, a chief reporter with the state-run Zimpapers (The Zimbabwean, 
19 December 2010). Farms in Chegutu were known for producing oranges, beef, vegetables 
and other crops. None of these farms has remained productive. If anything, machinery and 
other equipment have been removed and sold. Plant and livestock produce has been 
plundered. Pre-existing infrastructure has been vandalised and neglected. Former farm 
workers have found themselves either jobless or having to do with far little and unreliable (if 
any) remuneration. Big Orange alone employed up to 1400 people (Phil Matibe, SW Radio 
Africa, 6 January 2013). Residents from the old Pfupajena Township used to find seasonal 
employment grading oranges and other crops for export at the farms. Some of these have now 
been pushed to join the growing army of gold panners and “sex panners”9.  
 
The impact of the land seizures is not only felt by former direct employees of the farms. 
Agro-industries such as Chegutu Canners, Heinz, Bonzim and retail shops that have long 
relied on the surrounding farms have had to scale down and rely on imports. Then there are 
individual traders who made a living from buying and selling farm produce. Some of these 
traders had been victims of growing unemployment resulting from liberal reforms in the 
1990s. The Chegutu market (musika) adjacent to the town’s main bus terminal used to be 
abuzz with traders and was popular with travellers who saw it as a place to buy cheap farm 
produce. The terminal is strategic in that it serves as a transport intersection (both rail and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bright Matonga is a Zanu-PF MP for Mhondoro Ngezi and former Deputy Minister of Information and 
Publicity 
8 Big Orange and Stockdale Estate are orange estate formerly owned by white farmers Thomas Beattie and Peter 
Etheredge. Thomas Beattie retained a portion of his farm owing to his links with ZANU-PF.  




road) between Harare, Bulawayo and Chinhoyi10. During its peak, Chegutu drew traders from 
as far as Zambia to buy oranges from the Big Orange for resale. Musika is now a ghost of its 
former self. The national passenger rail is no longer working and large buses are no longer 
the main mode of public transport since people are relying more and more on small busses 
and hitch-hiking which avoids the bus terminal. Ironically, one of the most prominent 
ZANU-PF politicians and businessman, Philip Chiyangwa, is celebrated as hailing from this 
historic musika and having been a trader of farm produce. Yet the political system of which 
he is a member has presided over the demise of the market. 
 
The seizure of foreign and white owned entities has not been restricted to farms. In the name 
of indigenisation and empowerment of blacks, other economic sectors have been affected too. 
In 2008, David Whitehead (DWH), a textile company with a presence in Zimbabwe’s main 
cities, issued additional shares in order to facilitate an indigenisation transaction. Under the 
deal, Elgate Holdings owned by one Andrew Toendepi acquired 51 percent of the firm valued 
at US $5.4 million supposedly to recapitalise the company. In Chegutu DWH employed over 
600 people. The promised US $5.4 million was never paid (The Standard, 10 April 2010). 
Instead, the takeover was followed by plunder and stripping of company assets, labour unrest 
over non-payment of salaries and eventually more job losses. The media reported that scrap 
metal from the company plant and equipment was sold in South Africa. On 30 May 2011, 
The Herald reported; 
David Whitehead Textiles finance director Zivainashe Mangena has been arrested for allegedly stealing 
company property that includes a bus, three vehicles, four milling machines and a compressor. The 
property, worth several thousand (us) dollars, was allegedly stolen at the company's branches in 
Chegutu, Kadoma and Gweru and used to open an engineering company in Harare.  
At the time of writing DWH was filing for liquidation (The Herald Online, 20 December 
2012). The story of DWH’s demise thus echoes that of farms around Chegutu. As this 
plunder was taking place, several gold mines in Chegutu were closing down adding to the 
economic squeeze.  
  
Geologically, Chegutu forms part of what is referred to as the Midlands Greenstone Belt, a 
portion of the Great Dyke stretching from Shurungwi to Chegutu. Despite traditionally being 
an agricultural hub, the area has been described as having the highest concentration of mines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 By linking with Harare, Chinhoyi and Bulawayo, Chegutu is a transit town for travellers from the east of 
Zimbabwe (Mutare via Harare), Botswana and South Africa via Bulawayo and from the resort town of Kariba 




in Zimbabwe. Chegutu district has traditionally accounted for about 30 percent of 
Zimbabwe’s annual gold output (A – Z Environmental Consultancy, 2008). Chegutu has been 
a host to several medium to large scale mines. However, these have followed a national 
trajectory of decline and closure.  By 2008, RioTinto’s Cam and Motor Mine, arguably the 
largest gold producer in Zimbabwe’s history, was effectively under care and maintenance. 
Dalny Mine, owned by Falcon Gold, closed much earlier. At the time of writing, wholly state 
owned Elvington Mines and Jena Mines (50 percent state owned) were both operating at 
below 40 percent capacity. A massive investment in platinum mining 30km north-east of 
Chegutu (Makwiro Platinum Mine) in the late 1990s by the world’s largest platinum miner 
Broken Hill Property (BHP) Billiton and Delta Gold saw a momentary revival of the town 
away from the decline of the late 1990s. This was short lived as Makwiro Platinum mine 
shutdown in 1999.  
 
The decline of state owned Elvington Mine has been particularly devastating since the mine 
employed hundreds of employees resident in Chegutu. In fact, one of the townships in 
Chegutu is named ZMDC (in reference to Zimbabwe Mining Development Company 
(ZMDC) the state company that operates the mine) because it was built mainly to provide 
housing for the mine’s employees. At the time of writing most houses in ZMDC had been 
sold or rented out to non-employees as the company scaled down on its workforce. Other 
struggling mines around the town include Butterfly Mine, Gadzema Mine, Giant Mine and 
Pickstone, all owned by Africa Consolidated Resources (ACR). To add to this, a combination 
of unreliable rainfall, poor prices for main crops like cotton, failure by government to pay for 
maize deliveries and lack of inputs and other supply side constrains pushed rural farmers 
around the area to venture more and more into gold panning which hitherto has been a 
seasonal and subsidiary activity.  
 
Platinum mining was resuscitated after some massive capital injection by South Africa’s 
Impala Holdings which has since managed to set up a viable mining operation - Zimplats. 
Some of BHP’s former employees have since been re-employed at Zimplats while others 
went into ASM gold mining and other informal economic activity. By the time of writing 
Zimplats employed over 3000 people directly and an additional 2000 through sub-
contractors. More than a thousand houses had been constructed at Turf Village near the 
company’s main operations, thus moving away a considerable number of its employees from 




making Zimplats Zimbabwe’s single biggest investment. Though celebrating Zimplats’ 
contribution to the economy, the company was the target of a vicious indigenisation 
onslaught. It is how the company dealt with this apparently hostile political economy and 
retained viability that this thesis considers in great deal.  
 
This thesis also looks at ASM’s dynamic relationship with the state, the economic crisis and 
the outcome thereof. In this thesis, ASM (gold) is used to refer to four distinguishable 
phenomena namely: registered small claims, informal/unregistered small claims (usually run 
by a family, individual or a syndicate), illegal gold panning along reefs and abandoned shafts 
(associated with gold rushes) and river bed alluvial panning. The focus is mostly on the first 
three, since river bed panning has declined due to stringent environmental policing in the 
area. Though a distinction can be made, in practice, the lines between formal and informal, 
legal and illegal are blurred. In distinguishing what is formal and what is not and for the 
purposes of analysis, I adopt Feige’s distinction of formality and informality.   
…whether the activity adheres to established and prevailing rules of the game... Adheres to the 
established rules constitutes participation in the formal economy... whereas noncompliance or 
circumvention of established rules constitutes participation in the informal economy. 
That ASM registered players often engage in informal/illicit economic activity will be 
discussed as such and will not affect this categorisation. The key word from the definition is 
‘participate’, hence a formal business may ‘participate’ in informal activity. 
 
Before the suspension of the Zimbabwe dollar, gold trade fed into illegal foreign currency 
trade and vice versa (Mawowa, 2010). As confidence in the Zimbabwe dollar ebbed, miners 
traded their gold in foreign currencies. This had an effect similar to Zimplats’ special facility 
to bank outside the country. The switch to the multiple currency system has thus been 
seamless to most gold miners in Chegutu. It is perhaps this sort of economic activity that has 
helped to mitigate the economy-wide liquidity crunch wrought by the adoption of foreign 
currencies. For an economy that did not receive any external financial support to back its 
dollarisation, Zimbabwe’s liquidity levels were quite astounding.  Yet, at the end of 2010 the 
Bankers Association of Zimbabwe still estimated that 52 percent of the country’s liquidity 






Figure 2: Zimbabwe Map Locating the Study Area 
 
 
The research used a combination of observations, desk material, in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. Forty-three in-depth interviews were conducted with a range of 
respondents who included local and central government officials, ASM miners, gold buyers, 
company officials and mining communities between 2010 and 2012. Two focus group 
discussions were conducted with communities around Zimplats. This is in addition to several 
observations and informal conversations with individuals involved and observers. Interviews 
often posed a particular difficulty as Zimbabwe’s political environment is often dominated by 
fear and secrecy. Understandably some respondents requested anonymity and confidentiality. 
The secrecy and sensitivity poses challenges in verifying some of the information; for that 
reason, where verification could not be obtained this is made explicit in this thesis. 
 
Desk material on Zimplats was relatively easy to access through the company’s website, 
company reports, media releases and news reports. Government documents such as laws, 
policy documents and promotional material were also very useful for both the Zimplats 
aspects of the study and the artisanal and small scale gold miners. The researcher also 
benefited from workshops, conferences and seminars on mining in Zimbabwe in some of 
which he had opportunities to present papers on the subject.  
 
In the case of ASM miners, the initial intention was to use both participatory and non-
participatory observations and complement these with in-depth interviews and desk 




participatory observations. Instead, only observations, site visits and interviews were 
conducted. From observations and interviews it was possible to trace the gold value and 
trade chain as it moved through various stages from the pit in rural Chegutu to some 
flamboyant buyer in Harare – what Gereffi et al. (2001) calls the product chain analysis. 
This made it possible to assess how wealth is transmitted from stage to stage and provide 
some technical insights on the process. Considering the “conditions of hostility and mutual 
suspicion” (Spencer, 1986, 28), this investigative approach proved vital. This, together with 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, became the primary method with regards to ASM. 
 
Interviews were important in supporting observations. This is by no means unique; “… 
field researchers (usually) complement observations by conversation, informal/unstructured 
interviews, formal interviews, by surveys, by collecting personal documents (written, oral 
and photographic evidence)” (Burgess, 1986, 2). In the case of panning and small scale 
mining, observations made it easy to identify respondents for interviews and determine 
their accessibility. This enabled in-depth information, contextual and other information 
from participants (Wisker, 2001, 165). 
 
For analysis, constant comparative analysis was used with data, thematically coded as soon 
as possible after collection. The codes were in line with research questions, themes and 
issues and in line with envisaged thesis chapters. Transcribed interviews were thematically 
annotated on the sides. In collecting data and eventually analysing it, research questions 
were always borne in mind so as to guard against too much deviation. Due to the volume of 
data collected I have had to be selective and focus on what is most relevant. Some of the 
sifted out information I believe, can be useful for further analysis.  
4.	  Research	  Problem	  and	  Objectives	  
 
Given the growing importance of mining wealth in African development once again, how do 
we evaluate its contemporary role in Zimbabwe? Over Zimbabwe’s crisis period it became 
increasingly necessary for those intending to conduct mining activity successfully to carefully 
navigate an increasingly pervasive and authoritarian state. This owes partly to the breakdown 
in the rule of law and norms of liberal governance. The lack of consistency in the application 
of laws and what appears to be multiple centres of power at local level meant that businesses, 




remain in the game. This is apparent when one considers ZANU-PF’s attempts to control 
Zimplats in the name of indigenisation and economic empowerment, and the company’s 
response to this and the patronage driven small scale mining in the studied area. Mining and 
accumulation in Zimbabwe is heavily securitised.  
 
The thesis considers the impact, opportunities and constraints presented by Zimbabwe’s 
political and economic crisis on mining activities in Chegutu and Mhondoro area. This is 
looked at in the context of expanding ASM that characterised the crisis on one hand and the 
continued viability of one big scale mining venture on the other. This work unpacks mining 
activities in this part of Zimbabwe within the context of accumulation strategies dominating 
this period. It looks at:  
i. How the mining industry in Chegutu has been affected by and responded to the crisis 
and the outcomes thereof, 
ii. The extent to which the mining industry maintained a level of efficiency and know-
how, 
iii. The relationship between mining, accumulation, crisis and the state, 
iv. The horizontal and vertical networks that exist to maintain viable accumulation 
v. The system of regulation (official and extra-legal) governing ASM, the property 
issues and conflicts arising and how these are resolved. 
 
5.	  Overview	  of	  Study	  and	  Summary	  of	  Main	  Arguments	  	  
 
The thesis is divided into five parts subdivided into nine chapters. The current chapter has set 
out the economic, socio-political and geographical context for the study. It has summed up 
the main argument of the thesis and summarised key findings. The following chapter (two) 
continues the aim of part one, setting the stage for this thesis. It engages with contemporary 
development thinking and the mining’s place in the development process. The chapter draws 
analogies between the processes taking place in Zimbabwe and other developing parts of the 
world on one hand, and the historical processes of state capitalist development in the 
developed worlds on the other. It also analyses related literature and shows how the work taps 





Chapter Two makes a case for the importance of the extractive sector in Africa and 
(narrowing down to) Zimbabwe’s development process.  Using development literature to 
interact with evidence presented in this thesis, it is argued that development around mining is 
perhaps feasible but there is a resource curse problem and notably in Africa. Debate in South 
Africa on the mineral energy complex (MEC) (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996) is equivocal and it 
is never entirely clear whether the MEC continues to be a viable development path. 
Contextual constrains that make it difficult for the sector to play a developmental role in 
Zimbabwe are identified. These constraints are dealt with in greater depth in the proceeding 
chapter.  
 
Part Two is both historical and analytical – providing a broad historical context of the 
Zimbabwe crisis to the present as well as the history of mining in that country. This is traced 
from the development of settler mining capital and the nature of colonial capitalism, from 
early gold rush, through the years of slumps and booms in Chapter Three. In this historical 
survey, a deliberate attempt is made to understand mining at the two levels of interest to this 
study, namely: large scale corporate ventures focussed on platinum and ASM with a bias 
towards gold mining. Chapter Three thus identifies some structural factors impacting mining 
at the dawn of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.  
 
Chapter Four traces mining development through the relatively stable years of 1980 to 2000 
and the post 2000 volatile situation. The chapter unpacks Zimbabwe’s paradox, an apparently 
declining mining sector in the midst of a global commodities boom. The chapter discusses a   
“paradox” within Zimbabwe’s paradox: the exceptional performance of platinum and ASM. 
The chapter provides a broad synopsis of the Zimbabwe crisis economy and state of mining 
at present with an emphasis towards unpacking the state’s coercive modus vivendi, 
accumulation and informality.   
 
Part Three, composed of Chapters Five and Six, form the first of the two parts of the thesis 
that focus on evidence concerning Chegutu. At a time when Zimbabwe’s mining sector has 
been in decline, the platinum sector dominated by Zimplats and Mimosa thrived. Zimplats, 
together with Mimosa, represented the most significant investment of South African capital 
in Zimbabwe. This part shares some insights on how Zimplats managed to navigate a 




managed to adapt successfully to Zimbabwe’s political context to ensure survival in an age of 
populism and policy uncertainty.  
 
Chapter Five looks at Zimplats in the context of Zimbabwe’s general economic crisis and 
political economy, while Chapter Six looks specifically at how the company was able to 
negotiate a winning situation in light of government attempts to force the company to dispose 
a majority stake to indigenous Zimbabwe. The basic argument in both chapters is that 
carefully managing power networks dispersing political and economic rents was crucial. 
Though the situation was hostile, the profitability probably made the investment worthwhile.  
 
Part Four (Chapters Seven and Eight) looks at the political economy of ASM gold mining in 
Chegutu. It is argued that the outcomes of Zimbabwe’s crisis have not been linear, and this is 
most eloquently proved by looking at ASM. It is in this section that crisis accumulation 
networks are most evident. By crisis accumulation networks, the thesis refers to the crisis 
specific horizontal and vertical (power) connections that actors relied upon in order to adapt 
to the political, legal and economic barriers and to successfully remain in the game. In a 
sense, being in a network distinguished those who succeeded from those outside the network 
who failed. Successful accumulation for the most part relied on both horizontal and vertical 
networks.  
 
Chapter Seven shows how Zimbabwe’s crisis has brought about a highly informalised regime 
of accumulation. This is as true for street commodity trade, informal currency trading, cross 
border trade amongst other phenomena as it is with informal and formal small scale gold 
mining. At face value, one can easily define these activities as survivalist, never to go beyond 
assisting the poor to make ends meet and cope with the economic crisis. While this is true to 
some extent, to simply state thus would be too simplistic and risks masking an important 
dimension to these activities. This thesis brings out two important aspects in this regard.  
 
Firstly, business and political elites have been part of, and often sponsored, the highly 
informal panning and smuggling activities. Secondly, there is a significant incidence of 
medium size business ventures emerging out of ASM even where the primary focus was 
survivalist. In this sense, informal and sometimes illicit mining activity has provided capital 
finance for other economic activities – a role that might otherwise be played by banks or 




actors during the period. Evidence of upward vertical mobility and perhaps horizontal 
mobility (in the sense of investing in other economic activity away from mining) is discussed 
in Chapter Eight, showing that ASM can act as an enabler for other economic activity. It may 
be a form of what Karl Marx termed “primary accumulation”. While the majority of activity 
in this category remains survivalist, the total income levels are substantial.  
 
The last section, Part Five, consists of just Chapter Nine. Being the concluding chapter it 
attempts to answer the main questions of the research as well as to raise questions for 
potential future research. It argues that political economy is central in understanding the 





Chapter	  Two:	  Mining,	  Development	  and	  the	  Post	  -­‐	  Colonial	  State	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
This chapter considers development literature and theory with particular emphasis on the role 
of the extractive sector in the development process, potential for accumulation, political 
economy and how this relates to Zimbabwe’s crisis situation. Generally, Africa’s minerals 
and development discourse is dominated by the resource curse literature (Collier, 2000; Sachs 
and Warner, 1999; Mähler, 2010; Rosser, 2006; Richard, 1996). It is perhaps true to say that 
the emphasis on the developmental potential of the extractive sector that now dominates 
Zimbabwe’s policy discourse represents something other than resource curse pessimism. 
Though this thesis is not so much a discussion on the plausibility or otherwise of the resource 
curse analysis, its conclusions call for a rethink of the overly pessimistic views on mining 
sector performance, its contribution to economic development, accumulation from below and 
human welfare. It is a view different from the one that sees the resource trap as all-defining, 
but at the same time avoids going too far the other way. Accumulation from below in African 
conditions is not without limitations and ought to be qualified. 
 
This work is an attempt at moving away from generalisations that tend to dominate 
development theory and literature. Indeed Padayachee and Hart decry the fact that “Most of 
the writing on economics and economic development problems and theory is usually 
presented in general terms applicable to all the (sic) world or to all the underdeveloped 
world” (2010, 4). Recourse curse literature, for instance, tends to focus on the nexus between 
mineral wealth, power, economic choices and developmental outcomes. The thrust, thus, is 
on the way that states or groups with power manage these resources and towards what ends, 
which risks overlooking social phenomena in resource rich countries where private 
individuals or groups have access to mineral wealth outside of the formal economy and 
state/power structures.  
 
This thesis takes a slightly different angle from the state-centric approach. It approaches the 
development question by examining the intersection of a post-colonial state in a political and 
economic crisis, the historic importance of mining, the apparent emergence of an important 
ASM sector on one hand and the emergence of a thriving highly corporatised platinum sector 




development process, capital accumulation and in particular the role of mining, ii) 
informality, economic growth and development, iii) the nature of the post-colonial state and 
its role in governing accumulation and development, and lastly (since Zimbabwe is a crisis 
and conflict situation), iv) the political economy of conflict. The suitability of some of these 
theoretical lenses for analysing the Zimbabwe situation is considered below.  
 
I start below by making a comment on development and political economy literature specific 
to Zimbabwe. This will be followed by a discussion of what may be defined and 
distinguished as “mining Afro-pessimism” and “mining Afro-optimism”. It is argued that, 
broadly, one may look at developmental and political economy literature on mining in Africa 
and the developing world as falling within either of these classifications. This will be 
followed by a rather general discussion on the mining-development nexus, focusing strongly 
on the contemporary literature and theory that has attempted to understand and prescribe a 
suitable development path for mineral rich economies.   
 
Since this thesis also looks at Zimbabwe’s highly informalised ASM, the problematic of 
measuring informality, growth and development is considered briefly. Lastly, the chapter 
concludes by discussing theoretical postulates that are more relevant to understanding the 
conjuncture between crisis, (post-colonial) state formation, accumulation, conflict and 
development. This, it is argued, is particularly relevant in order to understand the nature and 
growth of ASM in Zimbabwe’s Chegutu area. It is this political economy approach that better 
explains the Zimbabwe state’s interaction with the highly corporatised platinum sector.  
 
2.	  Literature	  on	  Mining	  and	  Zimbabwe’s	  Development	  
	  
With a few exceptions, historically, literature on Zimbabwe’s political economy has tended to 
have an agrarian bias (Herbst, 1990; Phimister, 1988). This is partly due to the historical 
dominance of farming capital in the development of the colonial economy, and its role in 
domestic politics and policy formulation (Arrighi, 1966). Post-2000 accounts almost 
invariably focus excessively on land and democratisation since the controversial land reform 
program by the Zimbabwe government, and the political crisis characterising the period. Yet 
mining occupies an important position in the political economy of not only Zimbabwe but 
many developing countries (Bosson and Varon, 1977; Hamilton et al, 2006) both historically 




employed more people than any other sector of the Zimbabwe’s economy. Generally, a 
comprehensive discussion on the sector, its contribution to socio-economic transformation 
and political economy appears lacking in the post Second World War period, specifically 
from 1953 onwards.  This is despite some outstanding works on the subject in the preceding 
period since 1900, most notably van Onselen’s (1980) Chibaro, Phimister’s PhD thesis 
(1975) and several journal articles (Phimister 1992, 1977, 1976 and 1973). The following 
chapter has been greatly enriched by these works.  
 
In the post-colonial period, studies that have looked at mining in Zimbabwe hardly do so 
from the stand point of political economy. Semi-journalistic accounts on diamond mining in 
the east of Zimbabwe in the 2000s (Sokwanale, 2007; PAC, 2011; Global Witness, 2012) and 
my own 2007 master’s work represent the closest there is to a political economy of mining. 
Several works on mining have concerned themselves with environmental impacts of mining 
(Hilson, 2002; Zwane et al, 2006), policy formulation (Spiegel, 2008; Herbst, 1990; 
Hollaway, 1997; Maponga and Ngorima, 2003), globalisation and international capital 
(Chikowore et al, 2002; Chifamba, 2000; Herbst, 1990) and even foreign relations (DeRoche, 
2001) among others. Despite the resurgence of interests in Zimbabwe’s mining post 2006, 
particularly around Marange diamonds and the country’s economic recovery in the aftermath 
of 2009, there is yet to be a serious attempt at either ethnography of and/or political economy 
of mining. 
 
Notwithstanding this limitation, this thesis has benefited immensely from several great works 
on the capitalist development of both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. Stoneman’s 
(1988) essays on the challenges and nature of Zimbabwe’s capitalist accumulation in the first 
decade of independence are particularly insightful. Mandaza’s (1986, 2007) description of 
Zimbabwe as a “schizophrenic state” and Dashwood’s (1996) analysis on the role of class in 
Zimbabwe’s development strategy demystify the Zimbabwe state class’ empty anti-
imperialist rhetoric. Other equally important works include Phimister (1983, 1988), Arrighi 
(1966), Carmody (1998), Gibbon (1995), Hammar et al 2004, John Moore (2003), Nest 
(2001), Scott (2002) and Sachikonye (2005). Phimister’s work on capital accumulation and 
class struggle (1988) and Thompson and Woodruff’s account on Economic Development in 






Other than these writings specific to Zimbabwe, it is necessary at this stage to explore other 
literature that has shaped the theoretical landscape on mining and development and political 
economy of mining. In the discussion below, these are classified as developmental literature 
and political economy categories. Because this thesis takes an explanatory, rather than a 
prescriptive approach, a political economy bias is inescapable.  
3.	  Minerals	  and	  Afro-­‐Optimism	  
 
The importance of the mining sector in Zimbabwe’s and indeed Africa’s development is 
widely acknowledged. A global commodity price boom and the scale of Africa’s endowment 
with minerals have awakened a degree of optimism about Africa’s development prospects. 
Oil rose from less than US $20 a barrel in 1999 to more than US $145 in 2008. Between 2000 
and 2010, gold and platinum prices shot up by more than 400 percent. The continent 
experienced an average annual growth rate of nearly 5 percent over the same period (World 
Bank, 2011). Of course this growth has not been homogenous and one needs to guard against 
generalisation. Zimbabwe and Eritrea for example had negative averages of -5.9 percent and -
0.6 percent, respectively, while Seychelles, Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, Central African Republic 
and Ivory Coast all had less than 2 percent growth (World Bank, 2011, 10). In fact, 
Zimbabwe has often been noted as an anomalous case despite its rich potential. It is perhaps 
true to say that, other than these few cases, in terms of growth, the outlook has been bright for 
most of Africa.  
 
Despite what appears to be a degree of optimism, literature on mining in Africa has been far 
from being entirely optimistic. If anything, Carlos Oya’s (2010) description of Africa’s 
development literature — falling along the lines of “agro-afro-pessimism” on one hand and 
“agro-afro-optimism” on the other — can be applied to demarcate literature on mining and 
Africa’s development. According to Oya ‘agro-afro-pessimism’ literature emphasises what is 
regarded as the general failure of African agriculture.  On their part, the Agro-afro-optimists 
celebrate the continent’s potential while stressing the necessity for an “African green 
revolution” and its implication for a dramatic shift to private land tenure on a big scale (Oya, 
2010, 85).   
 
With regards to the extractive sector, it is possible to distinguish between extractive-Afro-




exemplified in the “resource course” literature (see for example Sachs and Warner, 1999).  
There are both economic and political explanations for the resource curse. From an 
economics perspective, resource rich countries tend to be overly dependent on mineral wealth 
at the expense of other economic activities also known as the Dutch disease. Reliance on 
mineral exports has been found to result in an overvalued exchange rate which impinges on 
the growth of other sectors particularly manufacturing and services (Collier and Goderis, 
2007). To this extent, Fine and Rustomjee’s (1996) diagnosis of South Africa’s problematic 
minerals-driven industrialisation as linked to the “mineral energy complex” (MEC) can be 
said to represent a resource curse in verity. However, the MEC debate in South Africa is far 
from conclusive and it is hard to say whether the MEC path is either good or bad 
(Padayachee, 2010).  
 
Development literature points to a series of political and economic distortions that undermine 
mining’s contribution to development. An abundance of mineral resources tends to impact 
growth and equity. Dependence on mineral exports is said to over-expose resource based 
economies to external shocks associated with commodity price volatility, thus reducing 
“possibilities for capital accumulation” (Lawrence, 2010, 32, Karl, 1997). Between 1965 and 
1999 OPEC11 countries	   experienced an annual GDP per capita decline of 1.3 percent 
(Robinson et al., 2006, 448). Incidentally, 1998 represents a sharp downturn in commodity 
prices. Post 2000, Africa has been the fastest growing region in the world thanks to the rising 
commodity prices. But the problem of volatility means that mineral resource dependent 
economies may not be sustainable.	  Poor countries export raw minerals to advanced rich 
nations and in turn import finished goods from the same, which benefits the rich nations and 
a handful of powerful local individuals and companies connected to mineral exports, creating 
wide disparities between the rich and the poor.   
 
Countries that fall into a resource trap lack diversification and have a high preponderance of 
conflict and rent seeking. Oil producing Nigeria has received a lot of attention as 
exemplifying the resource curse, which manifests itself by way of conflict and rent seeking 
(Collier, 2000, 2003; Le Billion, 2001; Fairhead, 2000). The Niger Delta region has 
experienced massive violence and conflict while the Nigerian state gets entwined in ethnicity 
and religious conflict (Ejobowah, 2000; Watts, 2004). The Democratic Republic of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent intergovernmental organisation of 




Congo is another example of how the intersection of resource abundance, a weak and 
somewhat fragmented state, competing international mining interests, a history of 
exploitation and ethnicity conflict can produce a toxic outcome (Hochschild, 1998; Kennes, 
2002; Cornwell, 2007). Some have stressed the importance of institutions, transparency and 
accountability. According to one such proponent, it is better to keep minerals in the ground 
until institutional conditions are made right (Stiglitz, 2007; also see Martinez, 2007).  
 
Without necessarily over-generalising, the historical relationship between the state’s source 
of legitimacy, rent seeking and resource led conflict raises the fear of a resource curse type of 
conflict in Zimbabwe. Since a referendum defeat in early 2000 and the subsequent disputed 
elections, it may be said that ZANU-PF can no longer convincingly claim to derive its 
legitimacy from popular support through elections. Repressive laws, violence, liberation war 
credentials and history and patronage politics around land, food hand outs and (as this thesis 
will show) “indigenisation and empowerment” in the mining sector became new sources of 
legitimacy. As Phillipe Le Billion contends in the case of Angola, rents created from 
resources “allow(ed) ruling groups to dispense with economic diversification and popular 
legitimacy often resulting in rent seeking, poor economic growth, and little social mobility 
outside politics and state patronage” (2001, 561). However, the Asian experience shows that 
outcomes are not pre-determined. Very substantial growth has been able to embody all these 
things without being eviscerated; the state effectively has created some agencies that avoid 
these patterns or rather channels rents into effective new forms of accumulation (Khan, 
2009).  
 
Within the context of Zimbabwe’s IG, where the two dominant political parties are wrestling 
for political dominance, it is easy to see why the diamonds in Zimbabwe have triggered much 
contestation. By the time of writing, Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields were controlled by 
the ZANU-PF party and the country’s military. The Mines and Minerals Development 
ministry was also in the hands of ZANU-PF. Revenue for diamonds was circumventing the 
treasury, which was under the control of ZANU-PF’s nemesis, the MDC. Reports suggested 
that the revenue was going straight into the accounts of the military and security sector, in 
essence a “parallel government” (Global Witness, 2012).  The same military and security 
forces vowed to carry out a coup if MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirayi won a pending 2013 election 
to become president (Newsday, 19 October 2012). As the case of ASM and indeed the state’s 




security sector and ZANU-PF dominate the country’s political economy. The quest for 
political survival and patronage-based accumulation converge.  
 
The phrase “too rich to be poor” in Zimbabwe’s political lexicon demonstrates the optimism 
tempered with disappointment over the country’s failure to make the best out of its mineral 
wealth. It is generally accepted that, like most of Africa, Zimbabwe’s considerable 
endowment in mineral wealth has produced very few positive developmental outcomes. 
While diamond mining has received most of the attention, some argue that Zimbabwe’s 
prospects lie with other minerals such as gold, platinum, coal, nickel, chrome and copper 
(Interview, DFID Official, 3 August 2011). Yet even with these other minerals, the historical 
evidence is far from reassuring. Several once-thriving mining urban centres have for instance 
decayed into ghost towns (Kamete, 2012). Despite the pessimistic outlook, a strong sentiment 
still persists that the country’s and indeed Africa’s development rests in its ability to make the 
best out of its mineral wealth (Breckenridge, 2008). Innis (1956) shows the importance of 
resource exploitation in Canada’s development path. Australia, New Zealand, Sweden and 
Iceland show the same, while the USA (unlike Europe) historically remains a major exporter 
and producer of a variety of natural products. 
4.	  Mining	  and	  Development	  
 
 Debates surrounding natural resources and development have not only considered the role of 
resources in economic development and social transformation, but the relationship with other 
economic activities in the long run.  In a 2006 study entitled Where is the Wealth of Nations? 
the World Bank notes that:  
…as countries become richer, the relative importance of produced and intangible assets rises in ratio to 
natural assets … Exhaustible resources, once discovered, can only be depleted. Consuming  rents from 
exhaustible resources is, therefore, literally consuming capital, which motivates the Hartwick policy 
rule for sustaining development— invest resource rents in other forms of capital (Hamilton,	  et	  al, 
2006, 7; also see appendix 1).  
This fits very well the classic economic development literature of writers such as W. A. 
Lewis (1970) or W.W. Rostow (1971) and their models for how economies transform and 
develop. Yet in spite of this observation borne out by so much historic evidence, the main 
thrust of World Bank advice, especially during the structural adjustment period, has been 
Ricardian (Ricardo, 1926) urging African countries to focus more and optimise on natural 




contradictory; the bank would argue that the declining share of natural assets is (and should 
be) a function of markets rather than state intervention. 
 
The bank’s prescriptions to developing countries have often led to deindustrialisation and 
increased reliance on foreign aid and primary sectors, in particular mining. Since the guiding 
principle of the bank’s reforms was comparative and competitive advantage (Ricardo, 1926) 
— that is, a country should specialise on what it can do best — this was promoted as 
desirable. In Zimbabwe’s case, following the liberal reforms in the early 1990s, the relative 
contribution of primary export commodities to GDP increased (Mawowa, 2011). This is the 
exact opposite of the development process as experienced by the now advanced rich 
countries. Ironically, in 1996, the bank hailed its interventions in Zimbabwe as a success 
(Jones, 2001). The disastrous effects of the bank’s advice for Zimbabwe are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter Four. Such an indiscriminate approach to economic planning and 
choice of economic activities is challenged by a growing scholarship of heterodox 
development economics (Chang, 2002; 2003; 2008; Wade, 2003; Reinert, 2008). Reinert 
argues that “… no country has been able to get rich without an industrial and an advanced 
service sector,” and the countries that produce only raw materials are doomed to stay poor 
(2008, 150). He contends that “… of all the blind spots of standard economics, the most 
important of all its assumptions was the ‘equality assumption’: that all economic activities 
were qualitatively alike as carriers of economic development” (2008, 276).  
 
While heterodox economists agree with the observable trend that the relative importance of 
resource sector declines as countries develop, they argue that such outcomes are a result of 
conscious state decisions. Reinert cites the Spanish example to show how different economic 
activities have different developmental outcomes, hence the need for conscious economic 
choices. From an industrial hub in the 1500s to 1700s, Spain’s reliance on agricultural and 
mineral12 exports led to deindustrialisation and impoverishment.  
 It was clear to the observers at the time that enormous wealth, all the gold and silver flowing into 
Spain, just flowed out again and ended up in a couple of places - Venice and Holland. Like a slow-
moving tsunami, it is possible to study the giant wave of inflation that spread through Europe with its 
epicenter in Southern Spain. But why did this flow of gold and silver finally end up in very limited 
geographical areas? What distinguished Venice and Holland, where so much of the flow of Spanish 
gold and silver came to a halt, from the rest of Europe? The answer was that they had extensive and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




diversified industry … The realisation spread through Europe that the real gold mines of the world 
were not physical gold mines, but manufacturing industry (2008, 86). 
Giovanni Botero’s 1589 work notes, “Italy is a country in which … there is no important gold 
or silver mine, and so is France: yet both countries are rich in money and treasure thanks to 
industry (Ibid; Botero, 1589, English translation 1956).” A memorandum to King Phillip II 
by Spain’s Minister of Finance in 1558 reads like one of an African resource minister today. 
“… by buying back their own raw materials (processed into finished goods) at an exorbitant 
price, the Spaniards are made a laughing stock of all Europe” (quoted in Reinert, 2008, 87).  
 
The World Bank, a key shaper of Africa’s development strategy, sees natural wealth as key to 
the continent’s development. This is because natural wealth constitutes a very significant 
share of total wealth in low income countries. The bank’s estimates of wealth stocks indicate 
that natural capital constitutes 26 percent of the total in low income countries compared to 2 
percent in high income countries and the 4 percent global average (Hamilton et al., 2006). 
These estimates seem to buttress Reinert’s argument that “as countries become richer, the 
relative importance of produced and intangible assets rises in ratio to natural assets”, (Ibid) 
(also see Appendix 2). Custers and Mattysen observe that although “oil, gas and metals are of 
strategic importance, they do not even account for 5 percent of the world production… (and) 
in most cases, the heart of the extractive industries lies outside Africa” (2009). This poses a 
question as to the development path of most poor but resource rich countries whose 
development so far has been underpinned by tapping into their natural wealth. What can be 
considered to be the strategic role of mineral wealth in social transformation? 
 
In most policy papers, at both national and continental level “diversification” and “value 
addition” are the buzzwords. The New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), a flagship program of the African Union (AU) aimed at the economic regeneration 
of Africa and AU’s Mining Vision 2050, emphasises the need for value addition and 
diversification. Nationally, Zimbabwe’s Medium Term Policy and fiscal policy statements 
also allude to the need for diversification. These stress the logic of value addition in a 
balanced economy, the finite character of natural resources and commodity price volatility. 
At the time of writing, the Zimbabwe government had announced the banning of semi-
processed platinum exports from 2014, having previously banned exports of raw chrome with 





To be fair, the World Bank has lately been taking a more nuanced view on the role of natural 
resources. Beyond the growth emphasis, natural resources are also seen i) as a basis of 
subsistence in poor societies and ii) as a source of development finance.  
Exhaustible resources, once discovered, can only be depleted. Consuming rents  from exhaustible 
resources is, therefore, literally consuming capital, thus the need to— invest resource rents in other 
forms of capital (Hamilton et al., 2006, 7).  
The bank points out that “… it is possible to transform one form of wealth—diamonds in the 
ground—into other forms of wealth, such as buildings, machines, and human capital” 
(Hamilton et al., 2006, 7). For NEPAD and the African Union, natural wealth is to provide 
the foundation for development and industrialisation.  
 
While there is a point in suggesting that rents from natural resource should be invested in 
other forms of capital, the reality is that the World Bank’s policy preferences constrain most 
poor countries from doing so. Most resource companies are foreign-owned and states have to 
fight for tax revenue (though oil is the important exception). The Open Society of Southern 
Africa estimates that in 2008 low royalties rate cost treasuries in South Africa, Ghana and 
Tanzania US $359 million, US $68 million and US $8 million annually respectively (Kato, et 
al., 2009). Even though mining companies in South Africa are not generally foreign-owned, 
the state has began minimising tax burdens on private enterprise. Tax aversion, mispricing 
and under invoicing by mining companies further compound the problem. The Global 
Financial Integrity estimates illicit financial flows from developing countries at between US 
$859 billion to US $1.06 trillion a year from 2002 to 2006 and US $15 billion for Zimbabwe 
between 1980 and 2008 (GFI, 2011). On the whole it appears that those countries that have 
capitalised on natural wealth have relied on shared ownership rather than tax revenue 
(Nattrass, 1996)13.  Botswana, cited by the bank as a diamond success story, has a unique 
ownership structure where the state has direct equity in the mining venture. Zimbabwe has 
the potential to collect 49 percent of gross diamond earnings, where it has 50 percent shares 
in diamond mining through ZMDC, compared to less than 10 percent tax revenue it gets from 
the platinum sector (Mawowa, 2011b).  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations and challenges associated with reliance on mineral wealth, 
the sector remains of strategic importance. Freund observes that while, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




...industrial products are indeed the main source of wealth and commerce in our time; however, control 
over key raw materials with probably oil as the most dramatic case, is far from finished  as an 
important motive for powerful global actors (2010, 43). 
It is thus not surprising that the Chinese advances on Africa’s mineral resources have 
engendered a negative reaction from European and other developed countries.  In October 
2010, The New York Times reported that Germany was raising concern over Chinese 
dominance, control and access restrictions to rare-earth minerals crucial for high-technology 
industries. Rare earth minerals contain one or more of the earth’s rare elements such as 
scandium (used in some aerospace components), yttrium (used in microwaves and energy 
efficient bulbs), promethium (used in nuclear batteries) and lanthanum (used in camera 
lenses, batteries and oil refineries) among others.   
 
In Africa, the development potential of mineral wealth when looked at in terms of rents 
accrued and managed by the state has been far from convincing. By shifting focus beyond the 
state and big mining ventures to look at small-scale and individual actors with access to 
mining activity, it is possible to consider the potential role of mining rents at a micro-level. In 
this light, I wish to build on a key point:  access to mining activity has not only provided a 
survival enclave for the poor but a means for capital accumulation. This ought to have 
implications on the way we perceive the development process in a particular society and in 
approaches to development policy. It appears that, although existing on the margins of formal 
state planning, informal mining activities have in some cases provided finance capital for 
other activities, perhaps just as primitive accumulation provided a base for other forms of 
accumulation (Marx, 1972). To varying degrees, this has had to do with the nature of the 
Zimbabwe state in the post-2000 period. Particular aspects of the Zimbabwe state that have 
either abetted or inhibited vertical mobility in the mining sector in the Chegutu-Mhondoro 
area will be discussed below.  
 
In as far as this work encompasses an analysis of ASM gold mining in the context of a 
declining economy and a repressive state regime, it is a story of resilience and determination 
to survive. It is also a story of adaptation to changing socio-political and economic realities. 
In this sense, Schumpeter’s (1959) notion of “creative destruction” as part of the inherent 
logic of capitalist accumulation becomes relevant. In light of the violent clampdown by the 
police and military as well as policy ambiguities, ASM miners came up with innovative ways 




manipulate the crisis political economy and the pervasive system of patronage.  Thus the very 
reasons for the demise of other players in the sector became the same reasons for the 
successes of other players. This analogue can apply to the platinum sector’s ability to manage 
demands for political and economic rents by ruling elites in the name of indigenisation and 
empowerment through a combination of appeasement and resistance. 
5.	  Informality,	  Growth	  and	  Development	  
 
Overly pessimistic views of Africa have largely been a product of the positivist approaches 
which look at development in terms of verifiably quantifiable data in the first few post-
independence decades. Reliance has thus been placed on official statistics, although most 
developing countries have poor statistical data (the past 10 years or so are an exception). The 
less pessimistic view has, by and large, been a product of historical and anthropological work 
– especially Africanist historiography. That anthropological study on resettled farmers’ 
productivity in Zimbabwe’s land reform has shown a more positive picture than is widely 
thought, and exemplifies this methodological divergence (Scones et al., 2010; 2011; 
Mavedzenge et al., 2008). Freund notes that;  
 African societies have changed rapidly over this time period (since the 1950s) but … indices have 
captured relatively little of this; … they have largely demonstrated the ups and  downs on global 
markets of the resource commodities mined and export crops grown in  Africa. As a result, they tell us 
relatively little about development understood in a more holistic and structural sense (Freund, 2010, 
39).  
Some economic anthropologists have expressed their dissatisfaction with the conventional 
economic analyses of African development. A notable figure here is Janet MacGaffey. 
MacGaffey calls for the introduction of a new conceptual framework: that of the ‘Real 
Economy’, which includes the totality of economic activity, and not just its component parts. 
She argues, with the example of the DRC,  that the division of the economy into formal and 
informal sectors is arbitrary and unrealistic, and that ‘what has previously been thought of as 
a marginal sector of the economy is in fact the principal means by which it operates’ 
(MacGaffey 1991, 7). 
 
Developments in Zimbabwe’s mining sector during the crisis period show the limitations of 
relying solely on verifiable and quantifiable data as a measure of economic and social 
change. While evidence shows a positive correlation between economic growth in mineral 




1999; Raddatz, 2007), and indeed Zimbabwe’s growth prior to 1999 followed a similar 
pattern, the picture is contradictory post 2000. Post 2000, Zimbabwe’s economy shrunk at a 
time when global commodity prices and most mineral economies were booming. The 
exceptions of platinum and ASM gold mining have of course been already highlighted. 
Though seeds of Zimbabwe’s decline were sown in the early 1990s, and indeed the economy 
started to show symptoms of sickness in the late 1990s, mining had until then remained 
strong. By the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007, Zimbabwe’s economy had shrunk 
by a third (since 1999).  The same period was characterised by a pervasive informalisation of 
the economy. This research shows that the majority of people involved in gold digging, 
panning and trade in the study area started doing so after 2000.  
 
As is the case with most informal activity, it is difficult to quantify production and trade 
volumes. What is clear is that formal figures on gold production and exports over this period 
can only be a gross under-estimation. Such a conclusion is exemplified with estimates by 
Zimbabwe’s central bank that, between 2002 and 2007, the country was losing US $1.4 
billion annually through the smuggling of diamonds, gold and minerals (Gono, 2007, 4-6). 
This figure was more than the value of the country’s total annual exports. The implication of 
this to development planning cannot be overlooked. To be fair “… it is misleading to 
overemphasise the bleak picture and ignore the progress made despite enormous challenges 
and constraints” (Oya, 2010, 87). But as observed, the emphasis on the bleak picture is partly 
a result of the orthodoxy’s own handicap in understanding and measuring the development 
process in Africa. While it is true that Zimbabwe’s economy has declined, the reality is more 
nuanced.  
 
In searching for answers to Africa’s development stalemate, there is little focus on the 
informal sector. Despite providing employment to more than 70 percent of Africa’s 
population (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Union 
Commission (AUC), 2010) the informal sector is often discussed as an anomaly that needs 
correcting and formalising. Intellectual discussion and development policy formulation with 
regards to informality tends to be concerned with widening the tax base and extracting 
revenue from the sector. For example, the UN Economic Report – Africa 2011 describes the 
informal sector in Africa as a challenge to be addressed. It notes: 
Although the informal sector provides a gateway to employment and income for  the poorest segments 




social costs. The majority of workers and firms that operate informally are trapped in a low 
productivity environment. Besides restraining private sector development in general, informality 
imposes many direct and indirect economic and social costs (117). 
Among the costs pointed out in the report are exploitation of workers, poor health conditions 
and safety standards, corruption, production of sub-standard goods and tax evasion. Poor 
environmental practice is also another problem often ascribed to informal sector. Seldom is 
the sector approached from the standpoint of developmental potential. Of course formality is 
no ticket to the good life if it is not accompanied by union rights and a social wage, among 
other things. Yet even the private sector, where it has led, has always begun from an informal 
situation, to pioneer development as the historical development of  now-rich nations shows.  
 
Without necessarily being over optimistic or skating over many negative aspects, 
developments in the ASM in the Chegutu area during Zimbabwe’s crisis period provide an 
opportunity to question negative attitudes towards the informal sector and small scale 
enterprise. To start with, the UN report cited above acknowledges the role of small scale 
family enterprise (which often starts as an informal business) in East Asian economies in 
domestic capital accumulation and development of a national entrepreneurial class. This 
observation seems to contradict the report’s own overwhelmingly negative view of Africa’s 
informal economy dominated by small scale actors. As the report points out, active state 
support in East Asia was instrumental in the transformation of family enterprises to big 
economic players. Strategy to support or develop the same is either weak or absent in most 
African countries’ national development plans.  
 
By contrast, Peter Lawrence cites the absence of an “accumulating and investing local 
capitalist class” (2010, 28), as one of the reasons why Africa was left behind, despite having 
a GDP per capita comparable to East Asia in 1950. Despite prescribing support for local 
business as part of development strategy premised on the development of a national 
bourgeoisie in African countries, it seems the UN report does not see the informal and small 
scale enterprise as a base from which such a class can develop. Far from being an inhibitor of 
private sector development, this research aims to shows that the informal sector has potential 
to support domestic private sector development. Cases where informal mining has provided 





The failure to see the informal enterprise in Africa in terms of developmental potential stems 
from the limited assumption that these sectors are primarily subsistence orientated and 
survivalist. It is probably true that for the most part access to informal economic activity 
provides a survival mechanism for the poor, particularly for individual and family ventures. 
However, to generalise this as applicable to all informal activity fails the test of evidence 
when it comes to Zimbabwe’s crisis period (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). In this crisis, 
unprecedented opportunities for some arose. This is true even where at face value the activity 
appears survivalist, as in the case of artisanal gold mining, panning and trading in the studied 
area. Furthermore, the primary intention being subsistence and survivalist does not 
necessarily preclude capital accumulation as an outcome. This ought to have developmental 
policy implications for a country such as Zimbabwe where, as of 2011, 60 percent of the 
country’s economic activity was taking place in the informal sector. The absence or lack of 
clear policy strategy to support informal accumulation does a disservice to Africa’s 
development.  
 
Apathy towards informality in Africa may also be due to the “grip of western economic 
models” on development thinking.  Rather than foreground diagnosis and prognosis of 
Africa’s development challenge in “local conditions”, development practitioners have sought 
to follow ‘the mainstream’ (Padayachee and Hart, 2010, 1; also see Chang, 2003). There are 
several studies which show that accumulation processes are by no means homogenous and 
can be locally, historically and culturally shaped. Though not necessarily focusing on mining, 
several studies, among them Hart’s (2002) study of two former white towns and black 
townships in post-apartheid South Africa’s KwaZulu Natal Province, Chari’s study of India’s 
knitting factory town Tiruppur (2004), Kabamba’s PhD study on the Nande community in 
DRC and MacGaffey’s 1987 and 1989 works on DRC come to mind. Through ethnographic 
observation, these studies have been able to monitor and observe accumulation processes at 
local levels often unacknowledged and uncounted in official documentation and statistics.  
 
In so far as this study looks at accumulation in a situation of political and economic crisis 
attended by informalisation of both the economy and the state, MacGaffey’s work on the 
former Zaire deserves particular reflection. MacGaffey was intrigued by the levels of 
entrepreneurialism in the former Zaire during times of political and economic strife. In her 
1987 book optimistically titled Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous 




In 1979 reports on the drastic decline of Zaire’s economy and the situation of appalling hardship 
for ordinary people made the prospect of ten months in Kisangani a grim one. But the reality turns 
out to be that in an apparently impossible situation not only were people surviving but some were 
doing well for themselves. The city … is a thriving business centre; all sorts of people are running 
successful and substantial enterprises, despite the shortage of goods, the deterioration of 
infrastructure and rampant bribery and corruption. …In the midst of irrationality and 
unpredictability some things work in an organised and efficient way and some individuals engage 
in rational enterprise. Zaire’s failures are amply documented; its successful elements are less well 
known (1).  
Such a description might pass for some of Zimbabwe’s gold dealers, diggers and small scale 
miners during the crisis period.  
 
Yet, in hindsight, this optimism about the DRC seems to have been a mirage. In DRC the 
emergence of sustainable indigenous capital which would carry with it the promise of an 
alternative development path seems far from imminent. The net effect seems to be to 
exonerate Afro-pessimism and affirm orthodoxy as the panacea to Africa’s development 
stalemate. However, this failure represents neither defeat for alternative approaches to 
Africa’s development, nor is it a vindication for the mainstream. A more constructive course 
would be one that seeks to understand why, besides clear signs of upward mobility, these 
accumulation processes did not lead to the emergence of sustainable domestic capital. There 
is probably not a single answer to this question.  A combination of the incompetent, 
dysfunctional state and the dependence on foreign advice which does not grasp or understand 
what is going on at ground level and probably could never do so, may be at the heart of the 
problem. Initiatives from below are crippled.  
 
The vertical dimensions of Zimbabwe’s informality pose analytical challenges to traditional 
conceptualisations of the phenomenon. For example, the Marxist critique rejects the whole 
concept of “informal sector”, preferring the term ‘petty commodity production’. It argues that 
though these activities exist at the margins of the capitalist mode of production they are in 
fact integrated into, and subordinate to it (Birkbeck 1979; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Moser 
1994; Castells and Portes, 1978). Unlike the UNECA view that the “informal sector restrains 
capitalist development”, the Marxist view perceives the sector as playing a supportive role. 
By providing a pool of cheap and flexible wage labour through self-exploitation and enabling 




ventures (Allen, 1998, 9). This postulation is based on an assumption of obvious and direct 
core-periphery linkage. The difficulty in applying this to Zimbabwe’s case is two-fold.  
  
Firstly, informality has ascended during the crisis period, while formal economic activity has 
been diminishing. If the relationship is supportive as is assumed this should hardly be the 
case. There has also been an emphasis on horizontal networks as opposed to vertical in 
several studies on informality. But in Zimbabwe’s case the later appears more salient, as 
evinced by the Zimbabwe state actors’ involvement, their attitude and consequent regulation 
and manipulation of informal activities, be it in mining or informal currency trade (Mawowa 
and Matongo, 2010). While there are of course linkages with global capitalism through trade 
(as in the case of mineral exports, smuggling and consumption-led imports), the “informal 
periphery – formal core relationship” does not come out in an obvious way at national level. 
It may be that the “core-periphery” approach to informality is ill-equipped for crisis 
economies. 
 
In addition to these unique aspects, it is necessary to distinguish different kinds of 
informality. Castells et al. identify two types namely, “informal activities subordinate to 
production and marketing in the formal sector, and autonomous informal enterprises with 
modern technology and some capacity for capital accumulation” (Bernabe, 2002, 9). The 
subsistence role of informality is well documented. This work is more interested in 
accumulation outcomes — how these have taken place with and without the state. It 
investigates the role of the so called “shadow economy” (Reno, 1998) to the socio-economic 
sustenance and reproduction of social and power structures and networks at both local and 
national levels. 
 
6.	  Entangling	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Crisis	  	  
 
This thesis is an attempt at situating Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis in the context of 
the mining sector focusing on mining activities in the specified area. What is referred to here 
as the “political economy of crisis” has many resemblances with Reno’s “political economy 
of conflict”. However, Reno applies the notion of “political economy of conflict” to weak and 
failed states characterised by civil war.  Zimbabwe does not qualify as such. In spite of being 
the fastest shrinking economy ever outside of war situations from 2000 to 2008, Zimbabwe 




spiked out of control, for example, where gold panners clash with police or vigilante groups 
go on the rampage, this only goes as far as the state or elements within it can tolerate. Once 
the police and military decide enough is enough, such resistance is dealt with easily. The 
official state appears to have been turned into a vehicle for private accumulation, behaving 
like Reno’s “shadow state”, enforcing and refraining from enforcing legal provisions to 
regulate accumulation for the benefit of members of the ruling elite, or their connections.  
 
ZANU-PF’s attempt to “empower by dispossession” in wresting control of mining ownership 
from “foreigners” or excluding and driving away those who are politically undesirable from 
accessing small gold mining claims has some of its roots in Zimbabwe’s racialised history of 
dispossession and uneven development.  Thus Zimbabwe’s crisis political economy and its 
violent currents suggest a society struggling to deal with its past.  In this regard, questions 
may be raised along the lines of Cramer’s (2006) emphasis on conflict as a banal way of 
approaching transformative processes, and/or Karl Marx’s (1972) primitive accumulation. 
One is made to recall how capitalism was (is) conceived with “blood dripping from its pores” 
(primitive accumulation) (Anderson, 1974; Perelman, 2000). The violence in mining could at 
first sight remind us of identical types of violence that characterised Anderson’s “absolutist 
states” and social conflicts that emerged during Western Europe’s long periods of primitive 
accumulation (1974). Historically, conflict has been part of the birth pangs of capitalist 
development. For example the l7th century overthrow of the Stuarts in Britain, or the US 
Civil War, or the imperial struggle against the feudalists that ensured the victory of the Meiji 
Revolution in Japan; all laid the foundations for capitalism to develop in these places.  
 
Yet unlike in Western Europe the Zimbabwean process does not seem always to encourage 
more productivity. David Moore (2011) has suggested that in the absence of a state capable 
of enforcing and maintaining a specific property regime, this process may go on for long 
unabated. He has gone as far as suggesting that this process in most of what we call the 
developing world today might have stagnated or reached a state of permanent primitive 
accumulation maintained by and feeding into the global capitalist system: hence blood 
continues to flow. Those involved in the often violent illegal gold panning, and in the absence 
of an international gold smuggling policing mechanism, are able to continue doing so because 
they have access to the international market. The work of Rosa Luxemburg suggests that 
primitive accumulation is not “primitive” but must recur in order to revive capitalism. To this 




force”, the high levels of informality, economic disorder and “accumulation by 
dispossession” are not in the larger perspective necessarily anti-capitalist.  
 
The question about the potential for accumulation by a national bourgeoisie and state 
involvement in mining necessitates an examination of the state and how it goes about 
governing the accumulation process. Four aspects stand out with regard to accumulation in 
post 2000 Zimbabwe: i) use of disorder and/or violence as a “driver of wealth accumulation” 
and the concomitant political project, ii) the centrality of the state in driving this form of 
accumulation but not necessarily in a progressive or developmental sense; iii), “a distinctive 
acquisitive culture14 peculiar to the period in question”, iv) policy ‘contradictions’ within 
Zimbabwe’s governing party and the use of “patriotic history” to abet this pattern of 
accumulation (Mawowa, 2007). 
 
It is observed that this argument is in a way a comment on Moyo and Yeros’s claim that the 
“revolutionary situation” of the late 1990s has produced a radicalised state. They note what 
they observe to be a shift from the left towards the right as signified by the “policy of 
normalisation with capital” since 2003 epitomised by Operation Restore Order (demolition of 
informal strictures) in June 2005 as marking an “interrupted revolution” (Moyo and Yeros, 
2007). Here we have an example of the state moving against informal accumulation quite 
sharply; its prerogatives are not really shaped with much sophistication at accumulation and 
especially by those not tied to the purse strings of ZANJU-PF. It is argued that, rather than 
these shifts pointing to an “interrupted revolution,” they actually betray the post-2000 
ZANU-PF as moving with two sets of dialectical policies, interchanging them whenever it is 
expedient to do so. No wonder despite the post-2003 “policy of normalisation with capital” 
the land invasions continued, and from September 2007 the state moved towards passing an 
indigenisation bill to reduce the foreign stake in the mining industry.  
 
The fact that violence characterising the crisis period demonstrates a strong economic 
dimension just as much as a political one is hardly emphasised. In any case it was the land 
occupations that marked this period as an era of violence and (dis)orderly accumulation. It is 
true to say that disorder and violence were used as political and economic instrument. There 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This acquisitive culture refers to having a tendency to accumulate and engage in profit driven commercial 




is a strong resemblance to the descriptions in Bayart et al., Criminalisation of the State in 
Africa (1999) and Bayart’s The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly (1993).  The state appears 
to tolerate and even encourage ASM, yet it uses brutal force in enforcing laws that prohibited 
these activities. This phenomenon has become commonplace in Africa as states become 
wealthier and more competent after the disastrous structural adjustment period. But the lack 
of policy and legal clarity is exploited by the power elites to apply the law selectively and cut 
deals with miners in return for political protection. Thus legal and policy disorder are 
important political and economic instruments of the elites. This is buttressed by liberation 
war credentials and “patriotic entitlements” discourse (Kriger, 2005) that saves to exclude 
those not aligned to ZANU-PF from meaningful accumulation.  
 
Literature on the post-colonial state has enriched scholarly understanding on the nature of the 
Zimbabwe state and its ruling elite. This in turn casts some light on the state’s attitude and 
involvement in accumulation in both formal and informal mining. Works by Alavi (1972), 
Saul (1979), Leys (1975) and several of their contemporaries argue that the “anti-colonial” 
struggle in most parts of Africa including Zimbabwe was in fact a “bourgeois revolution” 
which produced a “bourgeois state” that replicated the superstructure of the colonial state. It 
may thus be said that Zimbabwe’s state bourgeoisie was happy up to 2000 (in spite of internal 
contradictions) to maintain an orderly accumulation regime as long as it safeguarded its 
acquisitive interest and political dominance.  
 
The acquisitive propensities of Zimbabwe’s ruling elites are well documented.  In a 1996 
article in the Southern African Report, Brian Raftopolous notes:  
 During the formative years of Nationalist politics in Southern Rhodesia, in the 1950s, a central 
 concern for emerging nationalist intellectual elite was its desire for upward mobility. Through its 
 educational achievements, professional aspirations, and social and cultural practices a significant 
 number of this elite sought to establish themselves, and to be seen as, an emergent middle class, even 
 as they sought, and succeeded in presenting themselves as a nationalist leadership (2). 
Thus the early phases of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, like elsewhere in Africa, were 
characterised by a conflation of demands for space in the mainstream commerce and 
nationalist politics. Some scholars have cited the participation of the likes of Joshua Nkomo 
(late vice president of Zimbabwe) “in the advocacy for African capitalism as chairperson of 




the extent that Nkomo was referred to as a businessman. Arrighi describes ZANU in the 
1960s as a “faction of educated, middle class, rather elitist elements” (Ranger, 1980, 72). 
 
It is through the lens of the political economy of crisis that this work looks at the state’s 
attitudes towards both large scale platinum mining and ASM in the studied area, how this was 
shaped by the acquisitive instincts of ruling elites and the outcomes thereof. It is argued that 
within the context of a growing economic crisis and with it declining opportunities for rent 
seeking, Zimbabwe ruling elites grew increasingly conscious of the utilitarian value of 
managing appropriation as a method of personal accumulation, control and buying the 
electorate. While the pillage and plunder taking place in the diamond fields of eastern 
Zimbabwe show this intersection between crisis, private economic interests and politics, the 
same can be said about the state’s dealings with ASM and the “indigenisation” of the 




The Zimbabwe crisis cut through the cake of custom: dispossession of whites and 
informalisation opened the door to new possibilities for black accumulators and a few white 
ones with an ambivalent relationship to an unsteady state with weak institutions on the whole. 
Blacks could take over the state but with the prevailing rule of law post-1980 they actually 
found the road to wealth and success — beyond what state office or professional 
qualifications allowed — to be a very steep and difficult one. After 2000 new possibilities 
arose. However, the conflicted nature of the post-2000 accumulation outcomes renders these 
possibilities uncertain. It is argued here that the multi-dimensional nature of the crisis and 
developments in the mining sector, namely state pervasiveness of power, use of coercion, 
informality and disorder, necessitates the combining of several theories on political economy. 
The theories that focus on both the horizontal and vertical aspect of conflict and accumulation 
appear to be more relevant.   
 
Part Two that follows looks at the historical development of mining in Zimbabwe, 
accumulation processes and development. It traces this from 1890 to the post-2000 period. 





PART	  TWO:	  HISTORICAL	  OVERVIEW	  
 
This part sets the broad historical context of the Zimbabwe crisis to the present as well as the 
history of mining since 1890. Two chapters are covered here. Chapter Three traces the 
development of settler mining capital and the nature of colonial capitalism from early gold 
rush through the years of slumps and booms. Initially, much attention was placed on 
establishing large scale mining due to the huge anticipation of rich gold deposits. In the early 
years of colonial rule, speculation played a big part in attracting investments in the mining 
sector but it soon became clear that gold fields in then-Rhodesia were not as rich as 
anticipated.  
 
Though the bias towards promoting big capital remained, since this was consistent with the 
interests of the British South Africa Company (BSAC); the scattered nature of gold reefs led 
to the emergence of a strong small scale mining sector. Despite the notable improvements 
post company rule, exploitation of cheap African labour remained a central part of the 
accumulation strategy throughout most of the colonial period. Tied to this was the deliberate 
crowding out of independent African economic activities. The state played a critical 
interventionist role supporting white miners with finance, technical assistance and labour 
recruitment. Chapter Three ends by showing that the colonial policies designed to benefit 
whites through economic exploitation and exclusion of blacks generated contradictions which 
made the colonial accumulation pattern difficult to sustain in the long run.  
 
Chapter Four shows that, like the colonial state, the post-colonial state viewed mining as 
strategic not only in purely economic terms but political as well. The state’s interventions in 
the sector were justified as necessary to correct the colonial imbalances but were hardly 
successful. The removal of the cheap labour policy presented unique challenges for a sector 
that had historically relied on cost minimisation and output maximisation measures to 
circumvent pervasive geological limitations. Growth in the first decade of independence was 
slow (but above Africa’s average) and stagnated towards the late 1980s. In the early 1990s 
the Zimbabwe state adopted liberal economic reforms meant to attract foreign direct 
investment and boost export sectors. This led to new investments in the mining sector, but 




ASM due to a combination of factors ranging from increase in unemployment and state 
support. However, at least until 2000 (and arguably beyond), Zimbabwe’s economic base 
remained unchanged from the colonial set-up, dominated by a rural white bourgeoisie and 
international capital.  
 
2000 was a turning point: a political and economic crisis characterised an “economic history 
of liberating ourselves”, billed a redistributive authoritarian populist rhetoric, though in actual 
fact was elite driven and focussed on patronage accumulation. Chapter Four ends with a 
broad synopsis of this discourse, Zimbabwe’s crisis economy and state of mining at present 
with an emphasis towards unpacking the violent accumulation, patronage, informality and 
smuggling associated with it and what appears to be an emerging mining nationalism. This 




Chapter	  Three:	  Mining	  and	  Colonial	  Development	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
While land and agriculture have assumed an unparalleled political importance in 
contemporary Zimbabwe, much of the country’s historical development has to do with 
mining. Despite the failure to find as much gold as expected, mining and in particular gold 
mining dominated the first fifty years of colonial development. Even with the rapid growth of 
manufacturing in the aftermath of the Second World War, mining continued to dominate the 
country’s exports. Moreover, much of the manufacturing depended on this sector for raw 
materials. Official statistics suggest that mining has been the second biggest employer after 
agriculture for most of the country’s history.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, 1890 is a sensible date to trace back the economic 
development of modern day Zimbabwe. It is in this year that the Pioneer Column founded by 
Cecil John Rhodes and his BSAC occupied the area between rivers Limpopo in the south and 
Zambezi in the north; the plateau that was to be named Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). 
Up until 1923 the new colony was administered by the company through a British charter. 
The expedition and conquest was motivated by the quest for a second gold reef of a 
magnitude similar to one discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Having missed out on the 
latter, Rhodes and BSAC’s move to the north was purely speculative. Stories emanating from 
travellers, fortune seekers and accounts by early Portuguese traders suggested that “legendary 
riches of Ophir had long been rumoured to lie between the Limpopo and the Zambezi” 
(Phimister, 1988, 5; see for example Ellert, 1993). It however soon became clear that the new 
territory was a far cry from the rich deposits of Witwatersrand.  
 
It is these geological limitations, in particular the scattered and thin nature of mineral 
deposits, that led to a propensity towards small mines. For the purpose of analysis, this 
chapter distinguishes mines as being large, medium or small. This distinction is 
impressionistic rather than strict or technical. This approach is consistent with that of leading 
economic historians on Zimbabwe’s mining (Phimister, 1976; Thompson and Woodruff, 
1953; van Onselen, 1980). Below, Phimister uses output of over 10000 ounces, between 
1000-10000 ounces and less than 1000 ounces to distinguish between large, medium and 




size of the workforce. Colonial legislation governing mining accommodation suggests that 
the colonial administration defined large mines as those employing over 300 people.  From 
this and works cited above, medium sized mines can be said to have employed anywhere 
between 50 and 300 workers. Both large and medium mines were characterised by the 
establishment of mining compounds to accommodate the large population of workers (van 
Onselen, 1980, 37). It appears small mines were dominated by self-proprietorship and 
syndicates. These were made up of “individual small producers” and “self-works” and 
employed too few people to warrant constructing compounds.   
 
While relatively small capital requirements associated with small mines provide an 
opportunity for entry of more players, accumulation in this sector among Africans was 
limited during the colonial period. Alluvial gold mining and trade which had existed before 
colonisation in 1890 was discouraged, and by 1910 had ceased.  Copper and iron smelting 
was halted as Africans were either forced into wage labour or opted for other economic 
opportunities. Accumulation by Africans, where it took place, was usually in the agriculture 
and retail sectors. Generally, African-owned economic activities were only treated as 
legitimate so long as colonial capital had not started participating in them. African economic 
activities, especially those that competed with white settler interests, were discouraged, 
denigrated as backward, wasteful and inefficient, and often outlawed.  
	  
2.	  Colonial	  Mining’s	  Early	  Years:	  From	  Speculation	  to	  Reconstruction	  
	  
There is evidence of widespread gold, copper and iron mining in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, 
albeit these works appear to have been small in scale. In so far as pre-colonial states such as 
Great Zimbabwe and Mutapa were trade economies (trading mostly with the Portuguese and 
Arabs via the east coast), gold mining in particular occupied a special place. So widespread 
and rich were these old works that most colonial and modern day mines have either followed 
these pre-colonial mining sites or what is simply referred to as “migodi yemaJerimani” 
(German mines)15 in the local expression. However, by the advent of colonial rule, and unlike 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Local oral accounts suggest pervasive involvement of Germans in early mining. However, I am not aware of 
any in-depth study into this aspect of Zimbabwe’s mining history.  Indeed oral accounts on early mining history 
are very intriguing and have the ring of myth. An example is the story of a “murungu’ (European white), 
presumably a treasure hunter, said to have come with an old map reportedly passed on from a great-grandparent 
or uncle who once prospected in the area. The map would have detailed information (sometimes coded) about a 
rich gold vein or gold left in a shaft. Informal mining and panning in Chegutu-Mhondoro area is highly 




the Ndebele state led by Lobengula, the Shona tribes lacked a centralised political system to 
organise trade. Notwithstanding, the pre-colonial mining and trading practices persisted into 
the early 1900s and were nearly assimilated into the colonial economy when Africans were 
allowed to pay taxes in gold (van Onselen, 1980, 12). This was truncated when the colonial 
administration tightened measures to force Africans into wage labour. By the end of 1910, all 
ancient mining works had been obliterated and replaced by settler mining.  
 
In anticipation of finding “several new Johannesburgs” (rich gold veins), Rhodesia’s early 
economic planning was built around large mining capital. The BSAC expected the scale of 
gold deposits to be far beyond what individual prospectors and syndicates could capitalise. 
While avoiding direct involvement, the BSAC secured interests by prescribing that 50 
percent of the vendor’s script of every mining company operating in the country be controlled 
by the BSAC. In these early stages it turned out that a lot of money was to be made through 
rumour and speculation.  Rapid urbanisation followed as Europeans flooded the new 
investment frontier. However, these “extravagant hopes disappointed by the results of early 
exploration and mining work, and the growing realisation of the comparative poverty of the 
region's gold deposits” (Phimister, 1976, 466) were dashed. As a result speculative and often 
fraudulent share-dealings followed. For most of this period, mining companies derived 
income from subsidiary activities, among them rent collecting, land speculation and trading 
(van Onselen, 1980, 15), “but this income could not hide the basic unprofitability of 
companies supposedly engaged in mining” (Rhodesian Herald, 23 October 1913). Only a 
propaganda overdrive by the company could sustain investment inflows and continue to 
encourage white migration into the country. “The whole country ‘it was claimed’, was one 
vast gold-reef” (Phimister, 1988, 7). In addition to propaganda, settlers turned to looting 
indigenous Shona and Ndebele economies especially of their cattle16.  
 
Despite the propaganda, by 1900 the mining industry was on its knees. General 
disillusionment led to a speculative burst. The Shona and Ndebele resistance wars of 1893 
and 1896 had increased the cost of occupation. The BSAC administration responded by 
putting measures in place to promote genuine mining activity and discourage speculative 
holding of mining claims. An example of these is the enforcement of the Mines and Minerals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
especially from his book on tin mining in Nigeria (Freund, 1981) that mining ventures everywhere are rife with 
superstitious belief just as is professional sport. This he suggested is because luck is so important in the process. 




Act of 1895 after 1900. The development of a railway was seen as crucial for mining to take 
off. So by 1902 Mutare (then Umtali) was linked to Bulawayo via Harare as well as to the 
east coast. The completion of the railway line triggered yet another speculative bubble but 
this was short-lived. Gold production increased from less than 198 kilograms to over 1 843 
kilograms in 1899 and 5 070 kilograms by 1902 (Phimister, 1988, 22). This boom was 
however truncated by the ripple effects of the 1899 South African War. On the whole, the 
enduring effect of rail would be its positive impact on industrial capital.  Indeed, for the better 
part of its existence, the fortunes of Wankie (Hwange) colliery (one of the big employers in 
the mining industry), lay with the railway both as a consumer and transporter of coal.  
 
However, the completion of rail and institution as measures to end speculation were not 
enough to salvage mining. In the absence of big reefs, the mining industry was faced with a 
crisis of overcapitalisation. Several mining companies reported that their reefs had been 
exhausted. Sir Lewis Michell concluded, “… the scattered and often lenticular17 formation of 
the reefs in Rhodesia, leads me to think that the interests of the gold industry … will best be 
served by the encouragement of small and economically worked concerns”, (Phimister, 1988: 
46). By 1903 the London market for Rhodesian mining stock had collapsed. What followed 
in response to this was a phase of reconstruction for Rhodesia’s mining industry from 1903 to 
1911. Mining capital’s resentment of BSAC’s 50 percent clause grew, leading to a reduction 
to 30 percent and later withdrawal altogether. The company was also forced to reduce the 
scale of royalties and encourage development of small mines through the Mines and Mineral 
Ordinance of 1903 (Phillips, et al, 1962: 349). Small mines made it possible for the industry 
to develop with limited capital, moreover the company provided loans and mortgages to 
small workers.  
 
Despite these efforts, working mining capital blamed the company for its poor success citing 
several problems, among them a failure to solve the labour crisis, “extortionate system of 
royalties” and failure to attract settlers (Phimister, 1988, 29). The company’s position was 
further weakened by its poor relations with imperial Britain. Changes by the BSAC 
administrators in the early 1900s had however set the country’s gold mining sector on course 
to restructuring. Two aspects of this reconstruction were to become a permanent feature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Rhodesia’s mining industry; the preponderance of small scale mining on one hand and the 
emphasis on production maximisation and cost minimisation on the other.  
 
3.	  Development	  of	  the	  Mining	  Industry	  
	  
Despite the ending of company rule in 1923, there was no end in reconstruction momentum 
set underway. Between 1905 and 1953 gold producers increased from 76 to 360, most of 
them being small mines. The number of small mines in this category rose from 419 in 1924 to 
a peak of 1442 before declining gradually to 580 in 1948. The fluctuations in the number of 
players were in tandem with surges and lows in gold prices. It is worth noting that small scale 
miners had the strongest reaction to prices, with the number of players more than doubling 
between 1930 and 1932. Over the same period, the sector’s contribution to national gold 
output increased from 9.85 percent to 18.58 percent.  The negative impact of the depression 
on agriculture and base metals meant that gold mining was the only available employment. 
This in turn lessened labour costs for the sector. Moreover Britain’s abandonment of the gold 
standard on the 19th of September 1931 resulted in the rocketing of global bullion prices. 
Output increased from 532 111 ounces in 1931 to 814 078 in 1938. The number of mines 
increased from 449 to 1570. Phimister observes that virtually all new miners were small 
workers, 90 percent of whom had an output of less than 500 ounces per annum (1988: 178)   
 
Since capital for these small mines was largely sourced locally, there was an emergence of 
local capital within the gold mining industry,	  “a feature which sharply distinguished Southern 
Rhodesian mining from both the South African Rand and the later development of the 
Zambian Copperbelt” (Phimister, 1976, 465).  This entailed a new interest, distinct from that 
of large and usually foreign capital. Undercapitalised small workers often had to compete 
with big mines for labour. The latter could afford to pay slightly higher wages. The varying 
interests within the sector are reflected in the fact that at least five different organisations 
represented the industry.  
 
In fact, several associations existed to represent interests of small miners. Of these the most 
vociferous was the Rhodesian Tributors’ and Small Workers’ Association representing 
miners in the Hartley (now Chegutu) district. Big miners had their associations too, which 
seem to have enjoyed more support from the state. The Rhodesia Chamber of Mines (RCM) 




sister organisation, the Salisbury Chamber of Mines based in Harare, represented most BSAC 
and medium-sized mines interests18. In 1939 the RCM was officially instituted through an act 
of parliament.  It was aimed at “…promoting, encouraging, protecting and fostering the 
mining industry of Southern Rhodesia,” (Incorporating Act, Chapter 199, 1939). Though the 
chamber drew membership from interested individuals and companies working in the mining 
industry, its outlook remained largely pro-big capital. 
 
At the onset the large mines did produce most of the gold but from the 1930s this started to 
change as shown in the table below. Despite the increased involvement of smaller mines, 
colonial policy remained largely biased towards large scale and international capital.  For 
example the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) remained principally a recruiting 
agent for big capital, a cause for consternation among small miners. This bias owed itself to a 
variety of reasons, not least the massive interests of the BSAC.  Phimister observes that by 
1923 the economy was dominated by “… practically one capitalist – the powerful financial 
group which comprise (d) of the BSAC and its subsidiary” (1988, 118). BSAC controlled 
most of the country’s mineral rights and railway. In 1925 the company had about 70 percent 
shares in Wankie Colliery, owned Mazoe Citrus and a huge 2.5 million acre cattle ranch, 
Nuanetsi. It also held considerable interests in chrome, asbestos and gold mining and 
exploration companies. Small scale miners often raised concerns about how colonial policy 
was biased towards big international capital, from infrastructural development to labour 
recruitment. While big mines tended to enjoy close proximity to road and rail, this was not 
the case with small mines.  
 
Table 1: Gold Mines by Scale and Output 1925-1948 
Year Large Mines (+ 10 000 oz.) Medium Mines (1000 0 - 
10 000 oz.) 
Small Mines (- 1000 oz.) 
No. % of Total 
output 
No. % of Total 
output 
No. % of Total 
output 
1924 10 67.56 59 21.07 419 11.37 
1925 8 67.89 45 19.18 428 12.93 
1926 9 71.33 43 17.02 431 12.65 
1927 9 75.50 39 14.52 326 9.98 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Besides these two there was also the London based Rhodesian Land and Mine Owners’ Association which 
represented big capital, in particular of London based shareholders and financiers. This suffered decline due to 




1928 9 77.31 33 14.01 258 8.68 
1929 9 73.59 32 17.15 249 9.26 
1930 9 74.65 36 15.50 286 9.85 
1931 9 68.93 39 18.66 401 12.41 
1932 10 61.41 50 20.01 722 18.58 
1933 10 52.34 - - - - 
1934 10 43.47 - - - - 
1935 8 38.06 95 30.25 1650 31.69 
1936 10 37.19 114 32.37 1583 30.44 
1937 11 39.12 121 32.18 1440 28.70 
1938 12 40.04 127 34.40 1431 25.56 
1939 11 38.00 117 37.33 1442 24.67 
1940 13 39.74 113 34.84 1351 25.42 
1941 14 43.51 112 33.22 1050 23.27 
1942 15 44.87 119 35.59 877 19.54 
1943 14 46.97 88 32.22 690 20.81 
1944 12 46.29 77 33.78 613 19.93 
1945 12 46.42 70 33.82 650 19.76 
1946 12 44.98 69 35.12 687 19.90 
1947 9 39.80 68 38.30 706 21.90 
1948 10 42.90 75 37.70 580 19.40 
Source: Phimister, 1988 
 
In 1947 the government made legislative changes to encourage large scale prospecting. These 
measures were influenced by developments in the global market. Mining of base metals 
became far more profitable and African sources took off as important in the post-second 
World War decades. Earlier, coal and iron ore, among others, were too expensive to bring to 
Europe, while asbestos and cobalt were not yet in very general use. Calls were made by the 
mining industry for the state to plough back to the industry part of the revenue it obtained 
from the sector. From 1959 to 1960 total expenditure on mining department was £340 000 
while revenue from royalties amounted to £550 000 (Ibid, 355). Prospecting rights were 
granted for areas over 1000 square miles for oil, coal and natural gas and 500 square miles for 
other minerals. Between 1947 and 1961, 100 new Exclusive Prospecting Orders were issued 
(Ibid: 354). An exploration section was established in the Geological Department. This 
resulted in the opening of new mines such as Mangula (Mhangura) and Alaska Mine. The 
Mineral Marketing Act of 1960 was amended to attract more mining investment. After 1965, 




Beneficiation was promoted through a selective royalty regime. In 1969, the Mining 
Promotion Corporation and the Institute of Mining Research at the University of Rhodesia 
(now the University of Zimbabwe) were established.  
 
Government’s attitude towards small scale mining was anything but supportive. The 
following quote sums it up.  
 While we are fully aware of the difficulties facing the smaller mines in raising their capital 
 requirements, it is our view that the capital resources required by such mines should, in general, be 
 obtained from the customary channels. Where assistance is granted by the Government there is 
 always the danger of abuse, therefore such loans should be extended under the most restrictive 
 conditions and as an exceptional measure (Phillips, et al, 1962, 355). 
There were complaints by small miners that statutory commissions that were set up to 
develop the industry were paying more attention to the concerns of large miners. The two 
four-year development plans that were implemented from 1949, worth £68 million and £94 
million respectively reflected this bias. 
 
Besides the scattered nature of the gold reef, another factor that led to more players becoming 
active in Southern Rhodesia’s mining industry was the wide range of minerals the colony 
offered. From 1890 to 1953 forty minerals were produced in the country and six more were 
known to exist but had yet to be produced19. Gold has been without doubt the main mineral 
but its dominance was never exclusive. In fact by 1952, asbestos overtook gold as the main 
mineral in terms of output and value. Yet by 1960 copper was the third most important 
mineral. But the high noon of copper production in Southern Rhodesia was probably the 
period stretching 1965 to 1975, a phase of excellent prices for copper followed by a stark 
downturn. Indeed the prevalence of small mines in gold production shown in Table One 
above does not necessarily represent the pattern for the whole industry. Big miners dominated 
coal, copper, chrome and asbestos mining. 
 
Copper was dominated by big capital. Notable names include the Rhodesia Copper Company 
formed 1902, Lomagundi Development Company, the Northern Copper Company and the 
Consolidated African Copper Trust Ltd.  Though interest in copper remained far from 
impressive until after World War Two, the colonial state relentlessly tried to attract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Compare this to Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) which had far fewer producers concentrated around 
copper, lead, zinc and cobalt. In fact Zimbabwe’s total mineral production was equivalent to a quarter of 




investment in the sector, claiming the existence of a “second copper belt” in the north that 
was richer than Zambian one (Ngwenya, 2007, 18). The truth however is that copper deposits 
were a far cry from those of Zambia and “copper production in Southern Rhodesia never 
measured anywhere near that of Northern Rhodesia” (Ibid, 18). Copper ore grade was found 
to be low and veins not rich enough to allow profitable extraction under the pre-war prices. 
From the 1950s copper production peaked in response to increased global demand due to the 
World War II and Cold War arms race. But even in the wake of better prices, production 
maximisation and cost minimisation (especially cutting labour costs) as discussed below 
remained central to ensuring viability.   
 
Chrome and asbestos were dominated by large United States and British concerns due to the 
minerals’ linkages with overseas manufacturers. For the latter, asbestos was required for post- 
war reconstruction, in both industry and public infrastructure20. For the USA, chrome was 
needed not only for industrial use but was strategic as part of Cold War diplomacy (DeRoche, 
2001). The growing importance of chrome and asbestos is observable from 1920s, but more 
pronounced from the late 1950s. By 1953 asbestos, gold, chrome ore, coal and tungsten 
accounted for 97 percent of total declared value of mineral output (Thompson and Woodruff, 
1953, 152). Iron ore, iron pyrites and magnesite production was also significant. In spite of 
these changes, out of the total £311 826 736 value of all minerals produced in Southern 
Rhodesia from commencement to 1953, £197 873 656 (nearly 65 percent) was in gold 
(Phimister, 1988, 196).  
 
Figure 3: Graph Showing Output of Main Minerals in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1953 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  


















Source: Thompson and Woodruff, 1953, 195. 
 
Although Zimbabwe’s mining output has been small compared to say Zambia and South 
Africa, the sector’s contribution to the local economy has been significant. As noted above, 
investors’ interests lay mainly in the mining sector in the early colonial period. Between 1870 
and 1936, 90 percent of the £48 million private investment into Rhodesia went to mining. In 
1926, out of a national income of £12 million, mining was the biggest contributor, accounting 
for 24 percent, agriculture 18 percent and manufacturing accounting for 13 percent 
(Thompson and Woodruff, 1953, 12). The rest was in services. The sector dominated the 
country’s exports, a feature which has persisted through the post-colonial period. Out of the 
£5.4 million total exports, £4 million were from mining (Thompson and Woodruff, 1953). 
From the mid-1930s manufacturing contribution to GDP grew (15 percent by 1936) and the 
economy began to diversify. But mining still accounted for 27 percent of GDP by 1936. In 
comparative terms, however, mining’s contribution to export earnings decreased from 78 
percent in 1940 to 50 percent in 1945 (Ibid). This can be ascribed to the growing importance 
of tobacco and the rise in manufactured output. 
 
The period during and after the world war saw a restructuring of the economy with the rise of 
manufacturing and agriculture. By 1948 agriculture had replaced mining as the biggest 
contributor to national output. Increased importance of agriculture strengthened the ever-
growing influence of the white rural bourgeoisie coalescing around farming interests. It is not 
surprising that in the 1950s, the government moved to introduce land and agricultural reforms 
that further squeezed the black majority in favour of the white minority (Alexander, 2006; 
Arrighi, 1966). Manufacturing output was also experiencing a steady rise. It is possible to 
suggest that there could have been declining interest in helping small white accumulators as 
corporate wealth took off.  Moreover at this time individuals operating on a much bigger 
scale enter the centre stage. 
 
Two developments were crucial to the development of manufacturing, namely wartime 
disruptions of industrial output in Europe and increased white immigration into the country 
due to the war and the aftermath. There was also the stream of white migration from South 
Africa after the victory of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948. The war’s negative impact 
on manufacturing in Europe not only created a need to compensate for the now inaccessible 




but it also created markets for the hitherto globally uncompetitive local manufacturers. The 
ISI policy was supported by the promotion of economically strategic state owned enterprises. 
This became more pronounced during the UDI period as ISI became a vehicle to minimise 
the impact of international sanctions. Despite this restructuring, and the fall in mining’s 
relative contribution to national output, the sector remained critical to colonial development.  
 
Figure 4: Graph Showing Changes in Economic Structure 1939-1948 
 
Figure 5: Graph Showing Changes in Mining Contribution to Exports 1928-1953 
 
Source: John Phillips et al, 1962. 
 
While mining remained largely for export, production for the domestic market increased in 
tandem with growth of domestic manufacturing. Gold production was declining but asbestos, 
chrome, coal and copper output were increasing. Although from 1890 to 1953 gold 
production had accounted nearly two thirds of total mineral output (£198 million of the £311 
million), asbestos had overtaken gold by 1952. Iron ore and limestone output also increased 
considerably. Iron benefited from the Kwekwe steel works by the state owned Rhodesia Iron 
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A total of 4000 tonnes of asbestos was consumed in the local manufacture of asbestos cement 
products. The establishment of a ferro-chrome plant in Gweru in 1953 increased domestic 
uptake of chrome ore as well.  This to some extent served as a buffer against the momentary 
decline of commodity prices in the early 1950s. Metal manufacturing employment rose from 
1100 in 1938 to 9500 in 1952 while production of bricks, pipes, lime, cement, asbestos 
cement and concrete, which are somewhat related to mining,  rose from 1700 in 1938 to 9600 
in 1952 (Thompson and Woodruff, 1953:  164).  
 
4.	  Cheap	  Labour	  and	  Uneven	  Development	  
 
Geological limitations to profitability saw Rhodesian mines relying heavily on production 
maximisation and cost minimisation to maintain viability. While there were traces of a wide 
range of minerals, these were too scattered and only a few were commercially viable 
(Thompson and Woodruff, 1953, 58). Nearly all mines economised on the purchase and use 
of supplies.  But “… of all the factors of production, labour and its costs were most amenable 
to action and manipulation” (Phimister, 1975, 105). Van Onselen observes that “… it was the 
intense exploitation of cheap African labour throughout the history of the industry that made 
the greatest contribution to establishing profitability” (1980, 24). While the state was 
generally indifferent to exploitation, it did at times introduce measures aimed at improving 
working conditions, but these were met with protest especially from the poorly capitalised 
small miners.  
 
Labour exploitation was particularly gruesome prior to the 1930s. A few examples illustrate 
the centrality of cheap labour. In the case of Wankie Colliery, Phimister makes the following 
comment: 
From its inception, the colliery's fortunes ultimately turned on the regular supply of black labour, and 
in the absence of capital investment, this dependency became increasingly pronounced after 1914. 
Because Wankie's board of directors, on whom the B.S.A. Company was heavily represented, refused 
to sanction the purchase of additional capital equipment, expanded output was instead won through the 
simple expedient of increasing the size of the labour force. By drawing on the flood of migrant workers 
initially compelled to seek wage employment by the tax regime enforced by the B.S.A. Company was 
able to recover from its initial losses (1992, 66).  
The coal mine was viewed as strategic to the economic well-being of the whole colony and 




of the infrastructure. For the most part, the coal-powered steam engine rail, the bedrock of the 
country’s transport system, was the biggest consumer of coal from Wankie.  
 
Another example is copper. Despite state propaganda about rich copper veins, there were no 
significant copper discoveries in the 1920s and 30s leading to the frustration of investors. 
Even though copper production rose from the mid-1950s onwards, in 1966 Ian Smith, then 
Prime Minister of UDI Rhodesia admitted that the road had been frustrating, remarking that 
copper output was “not very much for 55 years’ effort” (The Rhodesian Herald, 23 
September 1966). Even with the intermittent rises and falls in global copper prices, Southern 
Rhodesian copper was just about marginally profitable because the ore grade was poor and 
too thin to be suitable for reliable returns. Yet, between 1965 and 1979 copper was the 
biggest foreign currency earner. Ngwenya attributes this to cheap labour (2007, 35). This was 
generally the case for nearly all mines, including gold, by far the most important mineral. The 
price of gold was pegged to the dollar for a long time and was also not all that profitable, 
notably after World War II when much bigger and richer finds were developed in the Orange 
Free State (South Africa). 
 
The colonial administration employed a dual strategy to compel Africans into wage labour, 
namely direct and indirect compulsion. Indirect compulsion involved measures such as 
taxation and discouraging independent economic activity among Africans. As long as 
Africans were able to earn cash, taxation on its own proved less effective. An opportunity for 
accumulation and earning cash among Africans existed in the form of peasant agriculture 
since early colonial interests were fixed at the mining sector. Growing mines in turn provided 
a ready market for African produce. However as the disillusionment with the second Rand 
grew even before 1914, the colonial administration started to actively promote white 
agriculture, especially the tobacco industry. This turn coincided with the reconstruction of the 
mining sector which emphasised the creation of cheap African labour. Stifling African 
agriculture and suffocating other African economic activities was intended to have a dual 
effect, reducing competition for white farmers’ produce on one hand, and forcing Africans 
into wage labour on the other.  
 
The onslaught on African agriculture was decisive. By 1922 63.5 percent of blacks were in 
reserves most of which were unproductive. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, Maize 




(amended in 1936), the Tobacco Marketing Act (1936), the Native Registration Act (1936) 
and the tightening of pass laws, were all introduced to maintain the white rural bourgeoisie’s 
competitiveness in the face of the global crisis while simultaneously squeezing Africans out 
of the game. These measures were a death knell to what had hitherto appeared to have been 
an advancing African agriculture. Government policy was to give Africans an option 
“between peasant farming and industrialisation (employment)”, since there was “no room for 
all the natives on the land”, (Thompson and Woodruff, 1953, 78). This too was not very 
successful until substantial African population increases created pressure. For the most part 
local Africans were unwilling to go into wage labour.  
 
Through direct compulsion, the RNLB, a successor to the Labour Board of 1899, was to be 
the central mobiliser of black labour for Southern Rhodesian mines. Thanks to the work of 
several historians, notably Charles van Onselen, the harsh conditions under which Africans 
worked during the days of Company rule have been exposed dramatically. The RNLB had a 
specific mandate to ensure an unbroken supply of cheap labour to mines and this was done 
through Chibaro (forced/slave labour). A result mining wages fell from 40 shillings per 
month in 1897 to 22 shillings in 1900. Yoshikuni estimates that between 1914 and 1921, real 
wages plummeted by more than 50 percent (1989, 442). The RNLB offered long term 
contracts with lower wages and did not permit a choice of employer (Phimister, 1988: 53). 
The centralisation of labour administration through the RNLB made it possible to compel 
mines to “loan” labour in line with “national priorities”. In exceptional circumstances, prison 
labour was provided. This was the case with the Wankie Colliery after the 1919 Spanish 
influenza pandemic which resulted in an acute shortage of African labour. Exploitation of 
African labour deepened during years of economic crisis. Due to limited success in recruiting 
local African labour, the Bureau turned to migrant labour. Free railway transport was 
provided to migrants from Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (now Malawi) and Mozambique to 
work at Wankie Colliery and gold mines in Matebeleland and the Midlands. Migrant labour 
accounted for more than 50 percent of Southern Rhodesia’s total mining and agriculture 
labour force (Thompson and Woodruff, 1953, 66).  
 
In addition to other cost-saving imperatives, employers were anxious to recoup the capitation 
fee they paid to the RNLB. Workers’ health, accommodation, food and safety were sacrificed 
for profitability. Of course conditions for white miners, constituting some four percent of 




employed in managerial, supervisory and skilled positions. As Phimister observes, white 
labour formed “part of the ruling-class coalition of interests” (1977, 187).  Where African 
workers were employed in similar positions, they were paid far less compared to their 
European counterparts (Phimister, 1977). This job colour bar had the effect of dividing labour 
along racial lines thus making it possible for mining capital to maintain low wages among 
African labour.  
 
Unwillingness to invest in better working conditions and health facilities had tragic 
consequences. In most cases, one small bath served more than 2000 workers exposing them 
to infection. In the compounds miners had to do with stench coming from heaps of 
uncollected refuse. At small mines, an equipped hut was said to be enough for a medical 
facility. This description of black worker conditions at Wankie Colliery is emblematic of the 
state of affairs:  
…the health of many black labourers deteriorated rapidly (once they start working in the mine). Under-
ground workers, covered in coal dust and 'subject as they were to cuts, scratches and abrasions in the 
course of their occupation', began developing large open sores, so-called 'tropical ulcers', on their legs 
and arms. In extreme cases, these suppurating sores led to limbs being amputated, and even to death. 
As labourers were issued with no protective clothing whatsoever, wounds were constantly reopened 
and re-infected (Phimister, 1988, 69).  
According to van Onselen, from 1900 to 1933 over 700 died from phthisis, 250 from syphilis 
as prostitutes flooded the compounds and over 500 died from dysentery every year (1980). 
Phimister further estimates 8000 to have died from pneumonia during the period 1900 to 
1933 (Phimister, 1973).   
 
Crowding in the compound and poor diet worsened the health situation. As many as twelve 
workers were made to share a single room and a common latrine. It is no wonder that the 
global outbreak of Spanish influenza had dire effects on Rhodesian mines. 3000 workers lost 
their lives in November 1918 alone (van Onselen, 1980, 38). Scurvy prevalence among 
African miners was due to underfeeding and over work. In most cases, black miners endured 
11 to 12 hour shifts. The state prescribed a daily ration of two to three pounds mealie meal 
and half an ounce of salt per day on big mines, “…occasionally supplemented by issues of 
meat or ‘kaffir beer’ (van Onselen, 43) which mines struggled to supply. The ration was later 
improved to a minimum two ounces and a half ounce of salt daily, at least a pound of fish or 





Mine accidents were also common. Van Onselen (1980) observes that conditions were worse 
in small mines. Reluctance to use timber for safety precaution resulted in shaft collapses and 
miner deaths (van Onselen, 1980, 23). Protective clothing was either absent or far from 
adequate. A 1919 report by the Chief Native Commissioner, observed that the “majority of 
boys working on mines and farms are clad in sacks” (Chief Native Commissioner, 1919). 
Production maximisation meant that workers were forced to work for long hours. This often 
compromised safety and health of the workers. Van Onselen observes that piecework resulted 
in deaths in some cases, since “workers had to extract a certain amount in order to be eligible 
for payment”. The anxiety to exploit a rich vein discovered during their shift often led to 
carelessness and haste, “culminating in burial beneath collapsing earth” (49). No recreation 
facilities were provided for Africans and the few schools for African miners were 
overcrowded.  
 
In later decades, the worst of abuses disappeared as van Onselen points out. Exploitation of 
cheap labour backfired as it became difficult for mines to attract new labour. Desertions and 
protests were common. The successes of the Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia closed it off 
as a source of labour. In addition, for most of the time, Southern Rhodesian mines competed 
with South African mines which paid better. This notwithstanding, Vail (1989) observes that 
Southern Rhodesia was more competitive than Nyasaland or Mozambique though offering 
less than South Africa and Nothern Rhodesia.  
 
Generally, the exploitative and uneven nature of colonial capitalist development created 
contradictions that proved self-defeating. To start with, mining was viewed as a symbol of 
colonial subjugation. Phimister captures early African sentiment as follows: “…people look 
upon the discovery of gold as the cause of the loss of their country … They are unwilling to 
cooperate in the development of what they consider a great misfortune,” (Phimister, 1988, 
25).  It is partly for this sentiment that migrant labour became dominant. Use of forced 
labour, abuse at the work place and the pathetic conditions described above led to 
insubordination and productivity was the ultimate casualty (Yoshikuni, 1989). Work 
stoppages due to protests were common. “…We are hungry and tired, we will work for the 
white men no longer” was the common chant (The Rhodesian Herald, 12 April, 1895). 
Besides the workers’ active response to unfavourable conditions, ill health made it impossible 
for workers to work optimally. It is thus not surprising that the truly abominable labour 




Stoneman, 1988). The competition with other economic sectors and with other mining 
territories was a major factor and the direct Crown Colony control mitigated crude 
exploitations. 
 
From the perspective of domestic mining capital, low wages, the colour bar, poor working 
conditions for black labour and long working hours inter alia were necessary for profitability. 
This was of course not necessarily true. A two tier labour system was in fact cause for 
consternation among international capital and manufacturing sector which preferred a 
liberalised labour market. Preferential treatment of white labour, restrictions on the skilling of 
blacks and African access to skilled jobs meant that mines and metal based manufacturing 
had to contend with paying relatively high wages for skilled labour and technicians. An 
incessant challenge for mining capital was the shortage of skilled, largely white labour. 
Because of the considerable degree of freedom enjoyed by white labour, it was able to 
unionise and push for higher remuneration. Similar to the job colour bar was the promotion of 
European economic activity over those of African.  
 
At the end of white rule in 1980, black mine owners still were virtually absent.  
As soon as colonial capital established a foothold in a specific sub-sector, an equivalent indigenous 
sub-sector which had either been there in the pre-colonial period (for example copper smelting) or had 
arisen in response to market opportunities after subjugation) for example, the quarrying of mica on the 
Great Dyke in the 1920s by Africans) was first made illegal then progressively suppressed, and 
completely finally displaced if the white man thought the activity was lucrative enough (Ndoro, 1996: 
23).  
Restrictions on economic activities by Africans were complemented by the creation of rural 
reserves. The logic was to ensure reserve labour for white capital. This labour reserve legacy 
explains the absence or insignificance of the informal sector in the immediate aftermath of 
colonial rule in most Southern African countries (Mkandawire, 1985). The fact that the first 
agitation leading to African nationalism was a struggle to gain access to economic space, 
with associations such as the Bantu Cooperative Society, has already been alluded to. The 
society was based in Bulawayo and advocated for black commercial interests. It was a 
reaction to colonial policies that promoted uneven development along racial lines and the 







Uneven development had economy-wide repercussions, too. The rapid industrialisation in the 
post second world war period was constrained by the absence of an important internal 
dynamic. African rural economy, which could provide an important market for growing 
manufacturing, remained mired in poverty. This observation becomes more relevant when 
one considers restrictions on Rhodesian exports due to international sanctions after 1965. Yet 
a lesson that can be learned from the ‘catch up’ economies of East Asia is the importance of a 
dynamic domestic market. By 1974, due to a combination of international sanctions and the 
very limitations of uneven development, the Rhodesian economy began to slow down (Bond, 
1997).  Unemployment was increasing and so was poverty and in turn political dissatisfaction 
among the black majority. This led to the intensification of the civil war and by 1979, the 
settler project was proving impossible to sustain. The Lancaster House settlement was signed, 
paving way for an election that ushered in a black majority government led by ZANU-PF in 
1980.   
 
The Lancaster House agreement expressed itself in a new constitution popularly known by 
that name. This was a compromise agreement which attempted to strike a balance between 
fears of the white minority on one hand and the need for change. For the section to follow, it 
is worth identifying different economic interests converging at this agreement and within this 
locate mining interests. To a large degree, the agreement managed to secure prevailing 
commercial interests at least for the first ten years. The agreement itself reflects the strong 
voice of both domestic rural capital and international capital. To some extent, there was a 
convergence between white farming and mining interests. Moreover, while mining interests 
were significant, it seems a bigger and far stronger concern for the white rural bourgeoisie 
was land rights. This might be due to the fact that land dispossession, as opposed to access to 
mineral wealth, was expressly stressed as a key grievance by liberation fighters. Unlike the 
case of South Africa where access and ownership of mineral resources is explicitly cited in 
the ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter, the land issue was more central for Zimbabwe’s 
nationalists.  
The inherited political economic structure not only had within itself structural limitations that would 
inhibit the journey towards market civilisation. It is this inheritance that forms “the weight of history” 
to use Freund (1999)’s phrase in examining the chances of democratisation in post-apartheid South 
Africa – the “dead hand of past generations” (Moore, 2006, 10) that was to haunt post-colonial 




Chapter	  Four:	  Mining	  and	  Accumulation	  in	  Post-­‐Colonial	  Zimbabwe	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
The first multi-racial election in 1980 brought into power a black government, officially 
marking the end of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. Colonial capitalism by its very nature had 
perpetuated “uneven development” across race and geography. Unemployment levels among 
Africans were staggering. Only three percent of the population (whites) owned about 60 
percent of the country’s arable land.  
The extremity of the unevenness was best painted by Alex Duval Smith in an article to The 
Independent (UK 9 May 2001) at the outset of the 2000 farm invasions: “Piers Nicolle has a wife and 
two sons and controls 54,000 acres of prime farmland. Shakespeare Tome has four wives, 28 children 
and five acres21 (Mawowa, 2007). 
The immediate task for the new government might be considered to be the necessity of 
correcting this imbalance. Yet the transition from white rule was through a compromise; 
since ZANU-PF and its rival, ZAPU, had had little chance of defeating the Rhodesian 
government militarily, a negotiated compromise probably presented the only possible route to 
power. Besides this, the very nature of Zimbabwe’s new ruling elites made radical 
transformation improbable. This notwithstanding, some impressive human development 
results were recorded in the first decade after 1980.  
 
Marked improvements in general standards of living for the black majority are observable in 
the 1980s. Access to primary education was made free and compulsory. The adult literacy 
rate of 97 percent in the 2000s owes to investments made in the education sector during this 
period. The government also made strides in providing public health. Life expectancy rose to 
a peak of 60 years in 1995 (IMF Country Report No.5/360, October 2005: 5). There was 
generally improved access to clean water. Partly because many whites abandoned their farms, 
land reform was substantial in the first five years: about a third of all white-owned land came 
into the hands of the state or squatters. However these gains were rapidly reversed from the 
1990s onwards, as the government cut public spending under the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP). Zimbabwe’s human development index rose from 1980 to 
1990, though remaining below the sub-Saharan African average (UN, 2010 HDR). On the 
whole, however, due to the later reversals, from 1980 to 2010 Zimbabwe's HDI declined by -
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




1.8 percent annually (Ibid). The economic growth experienced was not enough to sustain 
improving social conditions of the 1980s.  
 
While Zimbabwe’s economic decline is particularly marked in the post-2000 period and 
despite early human progress, growth patterns were never impressive. Whereas GDP per 
capita grew from US $701 in 1950 to US $1402 just before the civil war in 1975, the pattern 
after 1980 is that of stagnation. Between 1980 and 2000 GDP per capita vacillated around US 
$1320. Despite a momentary recovery from war in the early 1980s the economy was slowing 
down as early as the first decade after the coming of majority rule. According to official 
figures, from 1980 to 1990 growth averaged 4.5 percent per annum22 (Jones, 2011). But if 
one takes into account the devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, the economy shrunk in real 
terms. This has been attributed to apartheid destabilisation, droughts and the drop in 
commodity prices among others (Ibid)23.  
 
In 1980, though 70 percent of the population depended on farming (Jenkins and Knight, 
2002: 77), Zimbabwe was the second most industrialised economy in  sub-Saharan Africa 
after South Africa, but from then on manufacturing experienced a gradual decline and the 
economy grew more and more dependent on the resource sector. It is perhaps safe to say that, 
since by 1980 skills and capital were concentrated in white hands, two-thirds or more of the 
whites left the country, causing significant regression. Despite poor commodity prices, 
Africans responded to the new situation by dramatic increases in cotton and maize 
production. The situation still remained stable and modest growth could still be attained. 
There were sanctions against South Africa and the international community tolerated budget 
deficits and gave generously in aid because of the Front Line situation of the country. 
Zimbabwe was allowed to retain protectionist policies inherited from the colonial period. 
This changed from 1990 on. 
 
Though some attempts were made at social transformation in the 1980s, the compromises of 
Lancaster House presented some real limitations. In a sense, this contributed to stability and 
propping up many dynamic aspects of the white-run economy. Bond and Manyana (2002) 
make a rather harsh assessment of Zimbabwe’s ruling elite in the 1980s, characterising their 
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23 According to ZIMCODD 
(http://www.zimcodd.org.zw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=107), Apartheid-




modus vivendi as ‘talk Left, act Right’: redistributive rhetoric unmatched by delivery. 
However, it is fair to observe that in the first decade there were some nationalisation (partly 
due to the abandonment of firms by white owners) and much welfare spending by the 
standards of a poor country. No country in the whole world spent more percentage-wise of its 
budget on education. Nevertheless, the structural features of the economy remained the same 
more or less. At best, the post-colonial state could be described as ‘schizophrenic’. In the 
absence of a strong civil society, the state could vacillate between a policy of appeasement of 
the white bourgeoisie on one hand, and socialist welfarism on the other.   
 
Though mining, in particular small-scale gold and chrome mining, was viewed as important 
for promoting the entry of black players, it was not until the 1990s that one sees a massive 
entrance of black players. The state’s attitude towards aspiring small miners was consistently 
contradictory prior to 2000, but became enmeshed in hyper-populist redistributive rhetoric, 
patronage and elitist accumulation during the following crisis period. This chapter shows how 
Zimbabwe descended from a relatively stable, diversified growing economy (which  kept the 
rural white bourgeoisie fairly happy, especially after ESAP kicked in, which failed to tackle 
the structural features that so outraged the nationalist movement during the struggle) to the 
disorderly and violent accumulation patterns of the 2000s. It shows how mining and 
informality occupied a central pillar of this crisis political economy and the new opportunities 
that this presented. 
 
2.	  The	  State	  and	  Mining	  Capital	  After	  1980	  
	  
Though the early years of independence were characterised by mutual suspicion between 
mining capital and government, the relationship was not entirely antagonistic. Capital feared 
nationalisation, introduction of pro-labour laws, and the erosion of several colonially 
bequeathed privileges, while the government mistrusted capital and questioned its loyalty to 
the new state. Disputes on marketing, declaration of production and returns were common. If 
the Global Financial Integrity (GFI) figures are anything to go by, government’s fears were 
justified. According to GFI between 1980 and 2008, Zimbabwe lost US $15 billion through 
illicit financial flows due to mispricing. This is despite the new government’s establishing a 
Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) as early as 1982 “to act as the sole 




reliance of colonial capital on labour exploitation, wages and working conditions were 
inevitable conflict areas between state and business.  
 
The new government immediately took steps to establish its foothold in the hitherto white 
dominated mining sector. In 1982, ZMDC was established to “invest in the mining industry 
in Zimbabwe on behalf of the State” (see incorporating Act). Among other things, ZMDC 
was to oversee and support the development of the mining industry through prospecting, 
beneficiation and providing support to mining cooperatives and start up individual or group 
ventures. In 1983 the RCM was incorporated into the Zimbabwe Chamber of Mines (ZCM). 
This was in line with the Transitional National Development Plan and the subsequent Five 
Year National Development Plan underpinned by a socialist rhetoric.   
 
Despite the mistrust between state and capital and the socialist rhetoric, policy practice 
remained largely in favour of mining capital. The new government continued until 1990 with 
protectionist Rhodesia Front policies and was careful not to upset capital. Measures to boost 
mining included the intensification of prospecting and geological surveys, mostly through 
bilateral support (Ngwenya, 2007). A National Remote Sensing Facility was established with 
German support in the early 1980s. Increased and intensified prospecting led to the discovery 
of gold and opening of Royal Family Resource and Freda Rebecca Resource gold mines in 
1984 and 1988 respectively. The Mining Continuation Reserve and Mining Projects Fund 
were established to support input imports and increase production capacity. These measures 
did not automatically translate into a policy to increase participation of individual Africans.  
Instead, there was an emphasis on the role of the state through its mining company and 
promotion of cooperatives.    
 
The 1982 controversial loan to expand the Hwange Power Station suggests a close 
relationship between the state and mining capital. In that year the government secured a US 
$458 million loan from the World Bank and other western private lenders for a 440 watt 
extension of the Hwange Power Station near the Hwange coal field. A report by Jubilee UK 
notes that this project was actually the idea of Anglo-American Corporation, rather than 
miners of the coal field.  
At the time demand for coal from the field was falling, and Anglo American Corporation was looking 




their number one option. The power station was due to use coal with a high ash content, which Anglo-
American were struggling to sell to other buyers (Jones, 2011: 15). 
Upon the completion of the project however, demand for electricity was less than projected. 
Despite this, the Zimbabwean government obtained electricity from the coal plant rather than 
the Kariba dam so as to keep the plant and the mine in operation.  
 
The continued decline of mineral prices from the 1970s through the 1980s made it difficult to 
restructure the industry. Acute fuel shortages were experienced in 1982 and 1983 and a 
drought followed in 1984-85. The drought induced water shortages made things difficult for 
some producers. The copper industry, an important player since the mid-1950s was struggling 
due to the decline in prices. Copper grades at Messina Transvaal Development (MTD)-owned 
Mhangura and Alaska were declining and the new political dispensation meant continued 
exploitation of cheap labour was out of question. Due to these reasons, MTD disinvested 
from the two mines resulting in their takeover by ZMDC in 1984. MTD also cited 
unfavourable government policies among the reasons for its pull out.    
 
The ZMDC’s takeover of the mines was driven more by the need to save jobs and less by the 
viability prospects for the two mines although it might appear to fit a socialist strategy. This 
kind of nationalisation has been very typical in post-independence Africa and invariably led 
to economic failure (Bolton, 1985; Radmann, 1978; Genoud, 1969). Following the takeover 
of Mhangura and Alaska, no sooner did problems of corruption and mismanagement that 
have characterised the post-colonial state’s involvement in mining started surfacing. 
“Between 1984 and 2000, Mhangura Copper Mine hardly managed to break even, managing 
only five positive years in which it made profits — 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1992” 
(Ngwenya, 2007, 69). The Zimbabwe government also bought controlling shares in Kamativi 
Tin and Hwange Coal Mines, which were the only mines in their respective fields. These 
have equally been monumental failures (Ibid).   
 
After 1980, gold continued to be one of Zimbabwe’s main minerals. In fact the country’s 
gold output since 1980 gradually increased despite declining global prices for gold. This 
contrasts with the post-2000 decrease in output when prices  increased. The 1980 and 1990s’ 
increases have a lot to do with the government support during this period. In 1984, RBZ, the 
monopoly buyer of gold, introduced a gold stabilisation scheme to protect miners against 




Z $500 per ounce with a guaranteed extra 75 percent of the difference if the global price was 
more than the floor price (Kanyenze, 2011, 163). There was also an attempt to establish a 
roasting plant but this was suspended due to environmental concerns with the fumes. 
 
In 1990, the Zimbabwe government, with pressure from the IFIs, adopted the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in a bid to cut the government deficit and boost 
economic growth. Measures introduced included the liberalisation of exchange control, 
removal of import restriction and an export retention scheme. The export retention scheme 
was meant to enable miners to finance imports requirements, by allowing exporters to retain 
5 percent from exports. The facility was increased to 30 percent in 1992 and up to 50 percent 
in 1993 (Kanyenze et al, 2010, 166, 168). Rather than relying on state support, capital 
financing was liberalised. This saw MMCZ using its position to secure foreign currency 
denominated loans. The export retention scheme excluded gold producers who were not 
treated as exporters due to RBZ’s status as the monopoly gold buyer. Gold producers 
protested this exclusion since they too required imports for plant equipment and other inputs.  
From 1996 onwards the RBZ began to pay producers in foreign currency.  
 
Though ESAP is generally considered to have had negative economy-wide outcomes 
(Carmody, 1998; Gibbon, 1995; Moore, J. 2003), the picture for the mining sector is rather 
mixed. Due to the export bias of the reform program, exporters generally seem to have 
responded favourably while local market producers suffered. Asbestos production for 
instance actually picked up between 1990 and 1996 in response to these measures. Nickel 
performed well while chrome had mixed fortunes. Restrictions on foreign investors’ access to 
the domestic debt market were removed in December 1994. The Mines and Minerals Act was 
amended to provide for special mining leases. These measures actually yielded results. In 
1995 Australian mining giant BHP Inc. was given a special lease and formed Hartley 
Platinum Mine to mine in Selous, about 60 kilometres south west of Harare (more on this in 
Chapter Five). Reunion Mining started copper production at Munyati Copper Mine while 
Ashanti Gold Fields took over Freda Rebecca. Data from the Zimbabwe Investment 
Authority (2011) shows that in 1995, a record 36 new mining projects were approved. 
However, ZMDC’s copper operations were struggling due to low grade ore and declining 
prices especially between 1990 and 1993. Coal and iron ore producers did not fare well 





Persistent challenges for the sector during this period included foreign currency shortages. 
This was more acute for local market producers. While miners were initially excluded from 
the foreign currency support scheme, nearly all their plant equipment and other inputs were 
imported. Financial liberalisation created some problems. It increased the costs of domestic 
borrowing as interest rates shot up (Tim, 2012). Incessant droughts in the 1980s and 1990s 
compounded the situation for miners. So severe was the 1991-1992 drought, the most severe 
in a century, that hydro-electric power supply from Kariba was disrupted, and with it several 
mining operations. The agglomerated situation of key domestically orientated producers such 
as Hwange Colliery (coal), Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) (iron and steel), 
Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting Company (ZIMASCO) (ferrochrome and iron) and 
ZimAlloy (ferrochrome) exposed them to a contagion effect. ZISCO, ZIMASCO and 
Zimalloys are the biggest consumers of coal from Hwange after Hwange Power Station24. 
This, plus ESAP’s export orientation, explains the deteriorating performance of iron, steel, 
ferrochrome and coal in the 1990s.  
 
3.	  The	  State	  and	  Artisanal	  and	  Small	  Scale	  Miners	  in	  the	  1990s	  
	  
Due to the proliferation of small works, gold as a sub-sector offered greater potential for 
participation of indigenous players with relatively little capital. However, the nature of 
colonial development meant that, at the advent of independence in 1980, black small mine 
owners were marginal. Among Africans, ownership was confined to a very few ex-service 
men of the Second World War. Government viewed small scale mining as providing an 
opportunity for black accumulation and part of the solution to the unemployment problem. 
Bias however was towards promotion of cooperatives through ZMDC support. These became 
prominent in chrome where ZIMASCO’s ferrochrome processing plant in Kwekwe and Zim 
Alloys provided a ready market. Financial assistance was made available through the Mining 
Industry Fund. With the opening up of the sector, despite limitations, interest grew rapidly. 
The Small Scale Miners Association was formed in the mid-1980s, replacing older 
organisations. Shamva Mining Centre was established by the association to process gold from 
the surrounding communities and to provide technical assistance. Small scale mining at first 
was largely confined to gold, chrome, emeralds, mica and tantalite. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The post-independence period provided favourable circumstances for the growth not only of 
small black operated mines but also for the emergence of informal mining. While the state’s 
support for cooperatives was apparent, the attitude towards informal activity was ambivalent.  
The ZANU-PF 1984 leadership code prohibited those in the party leadership from involving 
themselves in business and acquiring property. This however was never put into effect and a 
handful of Zimbabwe’s ruling elites were able to accumulate substantial wealth and establish 
businesses. Overall, however, 
The informal sector’s development in the first half of the 1980s fell (sic) victim to the ambivalence in 
economic policy caused by the ideological perspective that imbued government’s thinking during that 
period. Its general “socialist” vision of the economic development of Zimbabwe, whether that vision 
was seriously meant or not, did not see a role for the informal sector, suspecting it of being a nurturing 
ground for future capitalists (Ndoro, 1996: 44). 
But in the absence of a viable economic alternative, the government allowed the sector to 
operate without much interference. Much later on a UN fact finding mission into the 
controversial demolition of informal houses and small businesses (this included small miners 
who were attacked indiscriminately) in 2005 was to lament government policy and treatment 
of informal activities (Tibaijuka, 2005, 7). The report noted that these “laws were reminiscent 
of the colonial local governance legal super structure used as a tool of segregation and social 
exclusion” (cited in Mawowa, 2006, 42).  
 
Despite this, the informal sector did grow exponentially after 1980. The growth was possibly 
inevitable given rising unemployment. While the country’s active population grew, 10 
percent of formal jobs were lost between 1982 and 1987 (CSO, 1987).  A corresponding 
growth of informal sector employment from 10 percent to 20 percent of the total population 
is observable in the same period. By 1991, informal sector employment had shot up to 27 
percent (Gemini Survey, 1991). But it was ESAP that had marked repercussions for small 
enterprises, small scale mining and the mining industry at large.  
 
ESAP acknowledged the importance of the small scale and informal sector in the economy. 
Its importance was stressed for the short and medium term as a cushion for job losses from 
retrenchments. An ESAP policy document had a long annex entitled “Assessing and 
Addressing Social Dimensions of ESAP”. This annex stipulated measures to cushion the 
populace against the impacts of “retrenchments, higher inflation levels and removal of 




out a gender-sensitive programme, foreseeing that women would be hardest hit by these 
negative outcomes of re-training, and was later complemented by the setting up of the 
Employment and Training Fund meant to promote and support “self-employment projects in 
the urban informal sector and public works projects in rural areas” (12). While ESAP 
provided for the role of small enterprises and informal sector as a generator of employment, 
more emphasis was laid on linkages with the formal sector. For example the document notes 
that, “As large and medium-scale enterprises became more specialised, they will subcontract 
work that they cannot do competitively to smaller-scale enterprises”(Ibid). This is inevitable 
given the urban bias of most discussions on the informal sector. 
 
Consequentially, policies that promoted entrance into the informal economy as a survival 
enclave for the retrenched poor became part of the ESAP reform package. This phenomenon 
can be ascribed to and was an expression of the continuing schizophrenic nature of the 
Zimbabwe state. Until its official jettisoning in 1995 the ESAP was interspersed by partial 
reversions to welfarist policies, especially on health and education. Subsequent post-ESAP 
economic reforms, especially prior to 2000, though increasingly glossed by a redistributive 
rhetoric, did not significantly depart from the neo-liberal “common sense” that informed 
ESAP. One could suggest that ESAP was a failed compromise; like most compromises of this 
sort, it was bound to leave both ends of the diametrical opposed sides dissatisfied. 
 
Probably the most significant of ESAP related changes in mining was the Mining Regulations 
of 1990, though this was from time to time undermined by the state’s inconsistent attitude.  
With technical assistance from the UZ department of engineering, Rural District Councils 
(RDCs) were given the right to issue panning licenses over 100 metre long stretches along 
rivers. The project is however said to have failed because the council did not have the 
capacity and technical knowhow to supervise and manage it. Though stream bank panning 
was far from a resounding success, mining on disused pits and pegging of new claims, in fact 
panning anywhere where gold was found, became common.  In acknowledgement of the rise 
of panning activities, from 1996 onwards, Fidelity Printers started to accepted gold in small 
amounts (from as low as 50 grams) for refining. However government’s attitude towards 
panning seems to have been rather ambivalent as police continued sporadic raids on panners. 
But with rising unemployment and poverty, panning was ever on the increase. Reports of the 
unpleasant consequences of the activity were increasing. Accidents and other fatalities in 




exposure to mercury although unmonitored became an issue of concern (Mtetwa and Shava, 
2003; UNIDO, 2007).   
 
4.	  Crisis	  in	  the	  Late	  1990s	  and	  the	  Changing	  Political	  Economy	  
	  
On the whole, ESAP had devastating economic and social effects. “Financial liberalisation 
and tight credit policies meant higher interest rates on domestic debt (up to 30 percent); 
currency devaluation, increased foreign debt payments; (and) firm closures reduced tax-take” 
(Carmody, 1998, 327-28). The deliberate measures to orient both the manufacturing and 
agricultural industries towards export production were at the cost of consumer goods, 
resulting in increased rate of consumer price inflation. The period also coincided with the end 
of apartheid and the subsequent flooding of Zimbabwe with the now legitimate SA imports, 
further straining Zimbabwe’s manufacturing sector. At the same time, the end of apartheid 
enabled the IFIs to push for neo-liberal reforms in Zimbabwe. 
 
A confluence of factors, economic and political decisions set in motion a crisis that was to 
reverse the modest gains of the 1980s. Removal of subsidies and unrestricted competition 
placed pressure on local industries resulting in closures and job cuts. This, coupled with 
government’s downsizing of the civil service among other government spending reduction 
mechanisms saw plummeting levels of employment. The percentage of households living in 
poverty increased from 61 percent in 1995 to 75 percent in 2000 (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 
2004: 358). In 1997 the Zimbabwe government decided on a costly military intervention to 
support the Kabila insurrection in Zaire, about to become the DRC (Nest, 2001) and Mugabe 
was forced to present financial hand outs to the increasingly restless former fighters of the 
country’s liberation war, the veterans. The results were cataclysmic, as epitomised by the 
crash of the Zimbabwe Dollar on 14 November 1997 otherwise referred to as the infamous 
“Black Friday” (Moore J., 2003, 6). 
 
The growing discontent marked by food riots in 1997 and 1998 culminated in the launch of 
the labour backed opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by 
Morgan Tsvangirayi. MDC was to present the most formidable challenge to ZANU-PF and 
President Mugabe’s rule since 1980. For the workers, the high rates of poverty were directly 
traceable to the state’s alliance with capital that had conceived ESAP.  To the peasants, the 




unfinished business of land redistribution and restitution. According to Raftopoulos et al 
(2004, 362) the “largely spontaneous land occupations in Svosve, Mashonaland East in 1998” 
were a result of growing rural poverty. The occupations were squashed by the government. 
 
The encouragement to accumulation private capital under ESAP inspired the emergence of 
largely elite indigenisation groups such as the Affirmative Action Group, Indigenous 
Business Women Organisation and the Indigenous Business Development Centre. The 
increasingly growing militant veterans’ association was aligned to these groups. These, 
though sharing membership with the ruling party, started to put pressure on the state to do 
more for them. According to Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004, 261) these groups became an 
important launching pad for ruling party politicians. This trend, found at the early stages of 
Zimbabwe’s current politico-economic crisis, may thus be argued to have given direction to 
the increased centrality of the party and state in the accumulation process and the blurred 
relationship thereof in the post-2000 accumulation modes.  
 
Hitherto, some members of the elite had entered into accumulation pacts with white capital to 
further their private accumulation projects. The alliance with whites was of course 
opportunistic on both sides. Though residual links remain between ZANU-PF, its companies 
and some elements of white capital continue to this day, rural white capital’s support in 1999 
for the then new opposition party MDC in 1999 marked the end of a somewhat official 
alliance with ZANU-PF.  ZANU-PF’s political desperation saw it embracing demands for 
radical redistribution of land by war veterans, setting the stage for a distributive authoritarian 
rhetoric which has characterised the period after 2000.  
5.	  Post-­‐2000	  Economic	  Decline	  and	  Crisis	  Accumulation	  
 
The years 1997 to 2000 represent a turning point in Zimbabwe’s economic history, setting in 
motion an uninterrupted downward spiral from which Zimbabwe has never recovered. Based 
on Angus Maddison’s (2010) estimates, in eight years from 2000 the economy declined by 44 
percent. This rate of decline has never been recorded outside a war situation (Clemens and 
Moss, 2005, 2). By 2008 Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita was just about what it was in 1954. 
Indeed by the end of 2008, nearly all formal economic activity in Zimbabwe had ground to a 
halt. In 2008, inflation skyrocketed to 79.6 billion percent per annum by mid-November 




Kwok, 2009).	  Government was unable to pay civil servants resulting in many leaving the 
country for greener pastures. Between June 2006 and May 2007 alone, the government lost 
15 000 employees or 40 per day (Financial Gazette 16 May 2007). 
 
Up until about 2011 when the economy appeared to be stabilising thanks to dollarisation and 
the IG, human conditions had been deteriorating since 2000. Between 1980 and 2010 
Zimbabwe's HDI declined from 0.241 to 0.140, while the HDI of Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
region increased from 0.293 in 1980 to 0.389. Formal unemployment stood at between 80 
and 90 percent, and by 2007 the estimated percentage of people living in poverty was about 
70 percent (HDR, 2007, Human Development Indicators; Country Fact Sheet). In 2007, 
average life expectancy stood at 36 years, the lowest in the world (Africa Report Quarterly, 5, 
2007, 147). The country’s inability to contain a cholera outbreak in August 2008, which soon 
swept the whole country, infecting over 100 000 people and claiming more than 4000 lives, is 
unequivocal proof of the extent of the crisis.  
 
Unspared by Zimbabwe’s economic and political crisis was the mining industry. Mineral 
output declined sharply, companies closed and, with the exception of the platinum sector, 
investment into the sector ebbed. This happened at a time when global commodity prices 
were rising and the mineral industry was experiencing a rebirth in most places. Zimbabwe’s 
growth pattern from 1960 had previously shown a generally positive correlation between 
metal prices and economic growth. This is in line with trends for most resource rich 
economies (Deaton and Miller, 1995; Raddatz, 2007). However the period after 2000 shows a 
consistent decline in GDP despite the record breaking and continuous rise of commodity 
prices (see  
Figure 6 below). By end of 2008 nearly all of the country’s mines were either closed or under 
care and maintenance.  
 
 While the sharp economic downturn since 2000 has its roots firstly in the general slowdown 
emanating from the 1990s failed economic reforms, the land seizures in 2000 were decisive. 
The impact was directly on agricultural output and in turn on the economy, historically 
dependent on agriculture. The post-2000 political climate, in particular violence and disputes 







Figure 6: Zimbabwe GDP Metal Prices Comparison Graph 1960–2010 
 
Source: Angus Maddison, 2010.       GDP 
 
Though mining ownership, unlike land, remained untouched, the confiscation without 
compensation of the farms of white capitalists sent shockwaves across the economy and 
internationally. Other interests in Zimbabwe were seen as vulnerable too.  A key element in 
this was the disregard of the government for court rulings and the rule of law with regard to 
property. Investment in the mining sector fell drastically as shown in the graph below. Even 
where projects were initiated, viability concerns would soon emerge, leading to a high 
turnover of investment.  
	  
Figure 7: Graph Showing Approved Mining Projects 1993–2007 
 
Source: Zimbabwe Investment Authority, 2011. 
 
The overall decline in investment however needs to be qualified. Zimbabwe still remained a 





















world’s asbestos and chrome production, two percent of PGMs, and one percent of lithium 
(George, 2007; International Monetary Fund, 2007). Holding the second largest deposits of 
known exploitable diamonds in the world and with the massive investment from South 
Africa, Zimbabwe rose to become a significant player in the global platinum industry. Also 
the discovery of diamonds in the east of the country in 2006, though marred in controversy, 
placed the country firmly on the world diamond map. A total of 468 EPOs issued between 
2005 and 2008 (Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, 2009; BCZ, 356) indicate that 
interest in the sector was substantial. Though official figures indicated a drastic fall in official 
gold output, unofficial and illicit channels were leaking an additional unknown amount. 
 
The country’s Marange diamonds epitomise the imbroglio characterising Zimbabwe’s mining 
sector in this period. Marange diamond fields have been characterised by ownership 
wrangles, opaqueness of operations, allegations of human rights abuses by the army and 
smuggling by high ranking government and military officials. This led to an initial 
suspension of the diamonds from international trade by the international conflict diamond 
watchdog, Kimberly Process (KP). Though Zimbabwe was allowed to conduct monitored 
diamond auctions, the issue of the country’s readmission was hotly contested and deeply 
divided the organisation. In 2011 after enforcing a modicum of serenity at the minefield, KP 
lifted the total ban on the sale of Marange diamonds to the chagrin of national and 
international civil society groups. By 2012, the fields were being operated by the Zimbabwe 
government in joint ventures with Chinese and Russian companies. However allegations of 
opaqueness continued with Zimbabwe’s finance ministry complaining that “Almost four 
years after the military took control of Marange not one cent has entered the national 
treasury” (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010, 3). Moreover a court challenge over ownership 
of the fields by the initial claim holder, ACR, remained unresolved.  
 
The government’s handling of Marange and ACR claims has been murky.  By the end of 
2010 ACR was adamant that it was the rightful title holder for Marange diamonds;  
ACR continues to assert that it is the rightful legal owner of the claims on which its discovery was 
made, and will continue to do all it can to work with the Government to resolve the Marange issue in a 
transparent manner for the benefit of all stakeholders (ACR Press Statement, November 2010). 
In fact, the courts made rulings in ACR’s favour which the government of Zimbabwe 
disregarded. Instead in December 2010, the Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu announced that 




acquired fraudulently” (New Zimbabwe, 22 December 2010). ACR vigorously denied the 
charges and dismissed it as baseless. Local independent media observed that the minister’s 
charge came just after ACR CEO Andrew Cranswick had been cited in the leaked US cables 
as alleging that senior ZANU-PF and government officials were enriching themselves 
through diamond smuggling in the country (Ibid). The Minister of Mines has been accused of 
corruption and benefiting corruptly from the Marange claims. Reports that he was buying a 
struggling local bank in 2012 did not help ease the speculation.  
 
The chaotic accumulation was not only restricted to Marange; it was sector-wide, and perhaps 
more pervasive in gold mining. The nature of Zimbabwe’s gold mining industry makes it 
susceptible to Zimbabwe’s post-2000 patronage politics. The plentiful existence of small 
claims made it possible to use the tactic of issuing mining licences to sustain pervasive 
patronage.  Zimbabwe’s ASM gold mining was dominated by syndicates and networks often 
involving powerful individuals (Mawowa, 2007). Some reports accused the RBZ for example 
for being fraudulently involved in the “extraction and processing of diamonds and gold in the 
Midlands” (Zimbabwe Independent, 3 September 2010). Smuggling was rife, and even the 
amendment of the Gold Trade Act (2006), mandating penalties for unlawful possession and 
trading in gold, could not help matters. Legal ambiguities and policy contradictions sustained 
networks of corruption and patronage involving powerful local politicians, police and gold 
dealers.  
 
Whilst 2008 saw the lowest output of gold since 1980 of 3 579 kilograms (ZCM, 2011), this 
was at a time when gold smuggling was at its peak. During this period, formal mining had 
ceased, with most mining houses citing viability and the non-payment for gold deliveries by 
the RBZ. By 2012, several miners were still owed by the bank. ASM miners directed their 
deliveries away from formal channels from 2002 onwards due to exchange rate 
discrepancies25. This tendency became even more pronounced in 2007 and 2008 when RBZ 
was failing to pay for deliveries. Small miners produced 52 percent of total gold output in 
2004; this proportion declined to 28 percent in 2005 and by 2010 it had declined further to 22 
percent.    
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 RBZ insisted on paying miners on the basis of the officially fixed exchange rate which would see miners 
earning much lower than prevailing parallel market rates. Even though later on the bank improved the official 




The authoritarian populism characterising post-2000 Zimbabwe, dismissed by opposition 
groups in Zimbabwe as a survival strategy and mere politicking on the part of ZANU-PF, saw 
the emergence of what may be described as “mining nationalism”. The logic was that “we 
have taken the land, now we want our mines”. This started with the enactment of a 
controversial indigenisation and empowerment law in 2007, prescribing a minimum of 51 
percent indigenous stake in all foreign owned business. A draft amendment to the Mines and 
Minerals Act followed with the aim of aligning it to the empowerment law. By 2012, the 
draft was yet to pass through parliament and unlikely to do so with its radical proposals with 
the new coalition government and an MDC dominated parliament.  The drive to expropriate 
foreign owned companies came at a time when the country was struggling to attract foreign 
investment. In fact, in response to lack of investment and sanctions of its senior officials by 
western governments, ZANU-PF had adopted a “look east” policy. Most mining deals 
between 2000 and 2008 involved either Chinese or Russian companies in joint ventures with 
ZMDC and Zimbabwe Defence Industries. The nature of these ventures betrays ZANU-PF’s 
avowed “mining nationalism” and empowerment rhetoric.  
  
A worrying trend with most mining deals entered during this period is not only their 
opaqueness, but that a significant number involved mortgaging Zimbabwe’s minerals wealth 
in one form or another. Because in the 2000s borrowing options were limited, the Zimbabwe 
government pledged future mineral output as collateral for loans.  
In May (2006), the Reserve Bank pledged future nickel exports to European and South American banks 
in exchange for their setting up a $50 million fund that would pay for refined petroleum imports. In 
June, the Government agreed to a $1.3 billion deal to send chromite to China in return for the Chinese-
funded development of additional coal-fuelled electricity-generation plants, and cemented an 
agreement, which was valued at $60 million, to send chromite to China in exchange for radio and 
television transmission equipment (Mobbs, 2009: 42). 
In 2011, the government of Zimbabwe obtained a loan from the Chinese government to build 
a defence college. The government pledged Marange diamond revenues from its joint venture 
with a Chinese company, Anjin. 
 
The performance of state owned mines has been plagued by accusations of corruption, 
maladministration and patronage. In March 2006, the Dubai based Global Steel Holding Ltd. 
was awarded a 20-year contract to manage and rehabilitate ZISCO’s facilities; by September, 
however, Global Steel had walked away from the project (Mobbs, 2009). A subsequent 




public release, ignited media frenzy about alleged corruption, financial mismanagement, and 
looting of ZISCO funds by Government ministers, members of parliament, other politicians, 
and senior company officials (The Herald, 10 May, 2006). Similar accusations have been 
made against ZMDC with the minister reshuffling the company’s board in 2010.  
 
However, following dollarisation and the formation of a coalition government in early 2009, 
Zimbabwe’s economy appeared to be on the mend. Inflation declined to single digits.  GDP 
grew by 5.4 percent in 2009, 9.6 percent in 2010, 10.6 percent in 2011 and estimated 4.4 
percent in 2012 (Zimbabwe Ministry of Finance, 2012). Recovery of the mining sector was 
the most impressive, growing by 47 percent in 2010 (ADB, 2012: 3). From contributing 3.2 
percent to GDP in 2008, the sector’s contribution grew to 8.1 percent in 2009 and 9.5 percent 
in 2010. In fact, by the end of June 2012 mining was forecasted to grow by 16.7 percent. 
Minerals account for 13 percent of national GDP and for 73 percent of total exports (Ministry 
of Finance, 2012). According to the ZCM (2011) the sector’s GDP contribution was 18.5 
percent if one takes into account the multiplier effect. This buoyant growth of the sector 
marked a continuation of a trend set in 2009 after the establishment the coalition government. 
At least in the short to medium term, prospects for Zimbabwe’s economic recovery hinged 
largely on the country’s ability to optimise on its mineral wealth.  
 
Figure 8: Pie Chart Showing Zimbabwe Export Distribution by Sector January-June 2012 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Zimbabwe), 2012. 
 
Diamond exports rose to 1.3 million carats in 2009 and 6.5 million carats estimated at US 




“…chrome increased by 148 percent; gold 61 percent; nickel 26 percent; coal 25 percent; and 
platinum, 24 percent” (RBZ, 2011: 17). Mining accounted for 60 percent of total exports in 
2010 and 47 percent in 2011 (Zimstat, 2010; RBZ, 2010, Ministry of Finance, 2012). 
According to the African Development Bank (ADB) Zimbabwe’s mineral exports grew by 
148 percent in 2010 and 38.7 percent in 2011 (2012, 3). RBZ attributed this rate of recovery 
to “buoyant international commodity prices … investment in expansion programmes and 
recapitalisation of mining operations”. As the sector recovered, small scale gold producers 
increased their contribution from 12 percent of total output in 2010 to 32 percent in 2011 
(ADB, 2012).  
 
Table 2: Distribution of Mining Output in Zimbabwe by Mineral for 2011 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2012. 
 
Within the context of dollarisation, export earnings (of which mining represented 73 percent) 
were one of the few available avenues for wealth creation26. However, little of this money 
stayed in Zimbabwe beyond what the state extracted. Consequently, questions were being 
asked about the mining sector’s low contribution to bank deposits. Despite accounting for 73 
percent of exports and 13 percent of GDP, mining was contributing a meagre 3 percent to 
national bank deposits (Ministry of Finance, July 2012, 99).  If one considers the offshore 
banking arrangement for the platinum sector to be discussed later, and the opaqueness of 
diamond revenues, it is easy to understand why this was the case.   
 
In mining terms, it is probably fitting to call the first decade after 2000 the platinum decade. 
By the time of writing, corporate platinum, and in particular Zimplats, was Zimbabwe’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 This is so since official dollarisation saw the Zimbabwe dollar replaced by a basket of foreign currencies, 
mainly the US dollar and South African rand. This took away the capacity of the country’s central bank to create 





biggest investor with close to US $1 billion.  In 2011, 43 percent of total mining exports 
came from platinum, 28 percent from gold and 20 percent from diamonds.  Zimplats alone 
employed more than 5000 people directly and indirectly through contractors.  Zimplats was 
not spared ZANU-PF’s authoritarian populism. The company was subject to attacks targeted 
at getting the company to dispose 51 percent of its stake to either government entities or 
indigenous Zimbabweans. The company’s mining lease was being revisited “so as to ensure 
maximum benefits” for local Zimbabweans. 
 
Figure 9: Pie Chart Showing Share of Bank Deposits by Sector 
 




In 1980, post-colonial Zimbabwe inherited the most diversified economy in Africa outside of 
South Africa, with a considerable manufacturing base. “By that year, 52 percent of the 
country's export earnings were from Value Added Manufacturing” (Mawowa, 2011, 2). In 
1950 Zimbabwe had a higher GDP per capita than China and India, higher than South Korea 
attained before 1970 (Angus Madison, 2010). By 2008, Zimbabwe had become a useful case 
study of how a promisingly prosperous African country could easily turn into a failed 
developmental state. However, despite the acute economic crisis, ZANU-PF and Robert 
Mugabe have remained in power since 1980. It is argued in the following pages that 




to reach such levels of economic decline and the level of hyperinflation that it did without 
experiencing a change of government or deteriorating into armed conflict and anarchy.   
 
The cumulative consequence of ESAP failure, political reconfiguration, the chaotic, free-for-
all land invasions and ZANU-PF’s post-2000 authoritarian populist rhetoric opened up a 
special regime of accumulation. Raftopoulos and Phimister observe, hitherto:  
…members of the state elite, including ministers, judges, senior army officers, parliamentarians and 
civil servants, had all quietly enriched themselves by leasing state land on favourable terms, but, in the 
changed context of the structural adjustment programme’s market driven approach, circumspection was 
thrown to the wind. … Class formation no longer needed to proceed behind closed doors (Raftopoulos 
and Phimister, 2004, 363). 
As the 2000 fast track land reform and the subsequent crisis unfolded, this class of 
accumulators became so intertwined with the state that one can hardly separate the two, 
functionally or otherwise. This is not surprising considering the petty bourgeois pattern 
historically embedded in Zimbabwe’s ruling elite and now “as the moral legitimacy of this 
elite has been eroded, so its core economic ambition has come to dominate the state’s 
political imperatives” (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). This changed context is 
exemplified by the developments in the mining sector.  
 
The degeneration into unregulated, informalised and often violent modes of wealth accretion 
did not end with land grabs but spread to other sectors. It hit ASM and then sucked in big 
mining companies through the indigenisation and economic empowerment policy. By side-
lining the rule of law during the 2000 land grabs, the state revealed an unwillingness 
consistently to enforce laws and policy, especially when it came to party members and some 
of the petty bourgeois elements within its ranks. The centre of power in Zimbabwe shifted to 
the party, the military and securocrats. Yet the party runs the state and the state has been 




PART	  THREE:	  PLATINUM	  MINING	  AND	  CRISIS	  POLITICAL	  ECONOMY	  
 
This part looks at Zimbabwe’s biggest platinum mine, Zimplats, during what can be 
considered one of the most difficult times in Zimbabwe’s history. In the midst of the chaos, 
and economic and political crisis of the 2000s, Zimbabwe’s platinum sector stood out as an 
exception. Indeed by 2008, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) was claiming 
Additional Profit Tax from Zimplats in lieu of “super” profits accumulated since 2001.  
Ironically, by December of the same year, nearly all the country’s medium and large scale 
mines had halted operations as the economic crisis took its toll. Considering the generally 
favourable commodity prices that prevailed, the poor performance owed itself to factors 
outside of the sector, to political and economic conditions obtained in the country.  
 
The shrinking economy brought increased relative importance for the few remaining taxable 
economic activities as sources of public revenue. To maintain a viable accumulation project, 
managing the interests of elites, increasingly dependent on patronage for survival, was 
crucial. This part shows that, while the role of ruling party-based political networks tended to 
be most apparent in ASM gold mining, Zimplats’s strategy did not exclude this approach. 
The company appears to have successfully adapted to Zimbabwe’s political context, 
negotiating relatively good deals, appeasing powerful politicians and engaging local 
traditional chiefs, thus maintaining both the “social and legal license” (Zimplats Annual 
Report, 2011: 43). Perhaps less acknowledged than should be the case, this also included the 
political license. This chapter focuses on Zimplats’s survival strategy in a vexatious political 
and economic environment and how the company has negotiated Zimbabwe’s economic 




Chapter	  Five:	  “Growth	  against	  the	  odds”:	  The	  story	  of	  Zimplats	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
1.	  Introduction	  
 
 By 2012, exactly 10 years after commencing operations, Zimplats’s cumulative operational 
profits stood at over US $1 billion. The company had invested over US $700 million in its 
Zimbabwe operation in spite of what most investors considered a risky political and 
economic environment. Nearly all of the profits had been reinvested to fund a mega-million 
dollar phase two expansion project. This chapter tries at the least to unpack and at best 
explain Zimplats’s exceptional performance, and how Zimplats dealt with the economic and 
political pressures linked to the Zimbabwe crisis discussed above. The chapter starts by 
briefly chronicling the history of platinum mining in Zimbabwe. 
2.	  Platinum	  Mining	  in	  Zimbabwe:	  A	  Brief	  History	  
 
Platinum was first discovered at Mimosa in the southern part of Zimbabwe’s Great Dyke in 
the Wedza Geological Complex (see map below) in 1918. The deposits were exploited briefly 
in the 1920s by the Granger Brothers27. In 1966 the Granger Brothers’ claims were acquired 
by Union Carbide which conducted trial mining until 1978. In 1992, ZIMASCO (a 
ferrochrome mining and smelting company) took over Mimosa. Production recommenced in 
1994 after a feasibility study. In 1996 the claims were consolidated into a mining lease 
covering 6 500 hectres. The success of Mimosa, rising global platinum prices in the 1990s 
and the thinning out of South Africa’s Bushveld ore body triggered interest in Zimbabwe’s 
platinum. Zimbabwe holds the second largest known commercial platinum deposits after 
South Africa.  In 2001, South Africa’s Impala Platinum, the world’s second largest producer 
of platinum, acquired a 35 percent stake in Mimosa and an additional 15 percent in 2002. 
Aquarius Platinum, a Mauritius based company, took the remaining 50 percent.  
 
During the early 1990s, a second platinum mine, the Hartley Platinum Project, was developed 
by a joint venture between the Australian companies BHP (with strong South African 
connections) and Delta Gold. Since the mid-1980s, Delta Gold had been prospecting for 
platinum in Selous, about 30 kilometres from Chegutu town. In 1996, following the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A presentation by Mimosa makes reference to the “Granger Brothers” as the operators of the first platinum 
mining operation but other than that no additional information is provided. Attempts at getting additional 
information had not yielded results by the time of writing. One can only assume they were among the early 




introduction of special mining leases to attract big foreign investment into the mining sector, 
BHP obtained a special lease to mine platinum in the area. According to Zimbabwean law, a 
special mining lease is considered for investment of over US $100 million and where such 
investment is mainly or wholly in foreign currency (Mines and Minerals Act (Chapter 21:05) 
Part 9). A special mining lease is subjected to presidential approval.  
 
In June 1998, BHP’s HPP operations were suspended, ostensibly “following a string of 
geological and metallurgical problems” (Platinum Today, 22 February 2013). In May 1999 
Zimplats purchased BHP's 67 percent interests in the Hartley Platinum Project and the 
Mhondoro Platinum Joint Ventures which included a concentrator and smelter (also known as 
the Selous Metallurgical Complex (SMC)). According to the company website, Zimplats was 
incorporated in Guernsey in the Channel Islands (a notorious tax haven). While continuing 
the development of HPP, Zimplats undertook and successfully completed a feasibility study 
for separate underground and opencast mines at Ngezi, east of Selous.  In December 2000, 
the Zimbabwe Government “released BHP from its obligations” under Hartley Platinum 
Mine lease, paving the way for Zimplats to acquire BHP’s Zimbabwe platinum assets for a 
nominal amount in January 2001 (Zimplats website, 14 June 2012). Once the viability of a 
mine in Ngezi was established, a 77 kilometre highway was constructed, linking Ngezi Mines 
with the processing facilities at the SMC in 2001, thus completing what came to be known as 
the Ngezi/SMC project. In 2002 the Ngezi/SMC project exported its first converter matte 
from its Ngezi open pit mine.  
 
The turning point for Zimplats appears to have been its purchase by Impala Platinum, 
bringing with it not only large volumes of capital but experience and expertise. In its 2001 
Report the company commented that:  
The investment in Zimplats and HMC by Impala, the world’s second largest platinum producer, has 
secured for the company the skills and expertise in PGM production... exposure of HMC management 
to the various Impala operations… to assimilate the successful operational practices employed by 
Impala and to introduce them at HMC. 
Impala Platinum first acquired a 30 percent stake in Zimplats from Delta in a 50/50 joint 
venture with ABSA Bank Limited of South Africa (ABSA) in 2001. Impala held pre-emptive 
rights over ABSA’s 15 percent stake as well as a 30 percent direct stake in the then Makwiro 
Platinum (Pvt) Limited, a Zimplats subsidiary (ZIMPLATS Annual Report, 2001). The 




percent stake in Zimplats from Aurion Gold, and in June 2003 purchased ABSA’s 15 percent 
stake. Impala subsequently made an unconditional cash offer to minority shareholders in 
Zimplats, increasing its stake to 87 percent (Zimplats Fact Sheet, November 2011). While the 
company is listed on the Australian stock exchange (ASX), Impala Platinum Holdings 
Limited, the majority shareholder, “is a long term holder and not seller of securities that it 
holds” (Patrick Shayawabaya, 8 March 2011). This means only a few of the company shares 
are accessible to the public through the stock exchange.  
Figure 10: Pie Chart showing Zimplats’s Share Structure as of 31 March 2012 
 
Source: Zimplats 2012 
 
Zimplats has operations in two of the four geological complexes known to contain the 
Platinum Group of Metals (PGMs), as well as base metal deposits situated along Zimbabwe’s 
550 kilometre long and 10 to 13 kilometre wide geological expanse known as the Great Dyke 
(see map below). The Great Dyke holds 11 percent of the world’s known commercial 
platinum reserves.. The two complexes where Zimplats has operations are the Hartley 
Geological Complex and the Musengezi Complex. The Hartley Complex is about 100 
kilometres long and is estimated to contain 80 percent of Zimbabwe's PGM mineral resource. 
Two-thirds of HGC is thus under Zimplats control. By 2012, Zimplats’s ore resources were 
the largest held by Impala and accounted for 40 percent of its total holdings.  
 
The other two complexes are Wedza Complex operated by Mimosa and the Selukwe 
Complex where Anglo American’s Unki mine began operations in 2011. In 2011, Unki 
produced around 50 000 ounces of platinum, and is expected to produce 70 000 ounces of 
platinum per year once it reaches full capacity. Since 2002, output at Mimosa has gradually 
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the world — extracts around 100 000 ounces of platinum annually.  Zimplats is thus by far 
the biggest platinum producer in Zimbabwe, producing close to 200 000 ounces of platinum 















Source: Zimplats website June 2012 (http://www.Zimplats.com/activities/acts.htm) 
 
Since the commencement of its operations in 2001, the company took stock of the extent of 
Zimbabwe’s economic decline but remained optimistic. “Zimbabwe has suffered from 
unfortunate political and socio-economic dislocations in the past year. We believe that the 
processes underlying these disruptions will diminish and possibly reverse in the foreseeable 
future” (Zimplats 2001 Annual Report). It was however not until February 2009 after the 
formation of a coalition government between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations that 
the crisis showed clear though uncertain signs of abating. Though Zimbabwe’s economy was 
already struggling in 2001, the company claimed that the overall environment was “largely 
positive and conducive to Zimplats being able to extract maximum shareholder value from its 
assets…” (Ibid). By 2008, despite nearly all other mining companies shutting operations, 
Zimplats’s optimism seemed vindicated. Below I discuss this optimism and the company’s 
rather remarkable performance during a difficult time in Zimbabwe’s history.  
 




3.	  Zimplats’	  Growth	  and	  Performance	  Since	  2000	  
 
Since its first shipment in 2001, Zimplats has embarked on a massive two phased expansion 
program. The first phase was officially completed in 2011 and involved the opening of two 
underground mines, a new concentrator at Ngezi and construction of other required 
infrastructure at a cost of US $340 million. Matte output increased from 43 771 ounces in 
2002 to 367 788 ounces in 2011 signify an increase of 840 percent in ten years. The company 
had started with one open pit mine in 2001 before opening an underground mine in 2003. The 
addition of an underground mine tripled ore output and quadrupled matte produce while 
simultaneously lowering production costs and improving recovery rate.  Over the years, 
reduction in production costs and gradual improvements in recovery rate have been 
synonymous with the company’s development and expansion. In 2008, by the time two 
additional underground mines, namely Ngwarati and Bimha, were opened, ore and matte 
production increased to 2.5 million tonnes and nearly 200 000 ounces respectively.  
 
With the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008, and the decline in metal prices, the 
company closed the open pit operations in November 2008 to cut operating costs. Loss of 
open cast ore output was more than compensated for by output from Ngwarati and Bimha 
mines. The opening of these two mines saw the company increase its ore production capacity 
in excess of 4.5 million tonnes per annum. A US $460 million phase two expansion program 
had commenced in 2011, targeted at increasing capacity to 6.4 million tonnes (ASX, Zimplats 
Annual Report, 2011, 13). Up until 2009 the company was relying on one concentrator 
having to transport ore to Selous, some 77 kilometres from Ngezi where mining was taking 
place. In 2010, however, a new concentrator was opened at Ngezi leading to the doubling of 
milled ore from two million tonnes in 2009 to more than four million from 2010 onwards. 
Though nearly half of the ore continued to be hauled to Selous, the proximity of the new 
concentrator to Ngezi further reduced operating costs. Zimplats had by 2012 become one of 
the lowest cost platinum producers in the world. Seven thousand tonnes of white matte were 
shipped to Zimplats’s refinery in SA monthly and annual platinum production was 180 000 
ounces. 
 
Zimplats exports a matte concentrate consisting of several minerals for processing at Impala’s 
refinery in South Africa. The matte contains six PGMs (ruthenium, rhodium, palladium, 




nickel, copper and cobalt. However, it is the output of platinum, palladium, rhodium, gold 
and nickel that is most significant. Platinum and palladium usually constitute 50 percent of 
total. In 2011, gold and nickel sales constituted 17.5 percent of the company’s total earnings 
(ASX, Zimplats 2012, Annual Report, 21). Estimates of these minerals per tonnage of ore are 
shown in the picture below. Calls were being made by the Zimbabwe government for the 
company to establish a Zimbabwean local refinery. But this, according to the company, 
required a minimum of 500 000 ounces of platinum output to be commercially viable (Patrick 
Shayawabaya, quoted in New Zimbabwe, 8 March 2012). 
 
Figure 12: Zimplats Minerals Output per ton of ore 
 
Photo taken by the author during a visit to Zimplats August 2010. 
 
With the exception of 2005 and 2009, the company’s rate of profits have been increasing 
since its inception, from 30.2 percent in 2001 to 61.3 percent in 2011. Even though profits 
fell in 2005 and 2009, the company was still able to record profits of US $35 million and US 
$15 million respectively. Growth in profits was caused by gradual reductions in operating 
costs, increased production and rising global prices. In particular the shift from open cast 
mining has been marked by a rise in profits and decrease in operating costs. According to one 
senior employee, underground mining is 40 percent cheaper than open cast (Interview, 
Zimplats Senior Employee, 14 August 2010). In 2002 after the opening of Rukodzi 
underground mine, coinciding as it did with rising PGM global prices, profits rose by another 




the Year for managing to expand Zimplats’s business during a very difficult year for business 
(Herald, 29 September 2020: B3).  Following the 2009 decline in profits, Zimplats’s output 
and profitability improved the following year. From 2002 to 2011, the company’s cumulative 
profits amounted to more than one billion US dollars well above the US $700 million in 
cumulative investment already.  
 
Figure 13: Graph Showing Zimplats Production and Profit 2002-2011 
 
Source: ASX Zimplats Annual Report 2011. 
 
Globally the increased profitability for PGMs in 2010-2011 was underpinned by the global 
economic recovery and increasing prices. These conditions applied to most minerals and 
coincided with the Zimbabwean economic stabilisation; under a dollarised monetary regime 
and a coalition government, Zimbabwe’s mining sector was generally on a recovery path. 
Platinum was responding positively to increased global demand in automobiles, jewellery and 
the recovering industrials. Platinum was further benefiting from the increasing use of fuel cell 
technology due to world attention on climate change and need to reduce dependence on fossil 
fuels28.  In Europe, the use of platinum increased by 50 percent between 2010 and 2011 (2011 
AR). Palladium and rhodium, which are almost exclusively used in the automobile sector, 
also experienced a similar trend. The automobile sector is the biggest consumer of PGMs. 
With the US dollar momentarily losing credibility after the 2007 crisis, most investors turned 
to gold and the white metal for hedging purposes. Demand was further spurred by the launch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 While the different fuel cell technologies advance simultaneously, it is the polymer electrolyte membrane 
(PEM) fuel cell that is the most important product of PGM mining as it utilises PGMs exclusively, consuming 




of the US Platinum and Palladium Equity Traded Funds which increased physical demand for 
the two metals.  
 
As of 2012, Zimplats had successfully planted a town in the middle of rural Mhondoro Ngezi 
area and with it diverse economic activities. The company had constructed more than 2000 
houses at Turf Village near its Ngezi operations and private individuals were also buying 
space and building houses. Hitherto, Turf had fallen under the political administration of 
Ngezi rural council but, as it now held a population of more than 10 000 residents, the 
company applied for the granting of town status. With approximately 3000 employees and 
2000 more employed by sub-contractors, the company was one of the biggest employers in 
Zimbabwe. The 2010 most admired employer survey by Industrial Psychology Consultants 
(IPC) ranked Zimplats second in Zimbabwe. Zimplats was attracting employees from other 
struggling mining companies. The most cited reason for the preference in the survey was 
remuneration.  
 
4.	  Negotiating	  Zimbabwe’s	  Crisis:	  Accounting	  for	  Zimplats’	  Success	  	  
 
In accounting for the company’s exceptional success, Zimplats cited at least four factors:  i) a 
preferential fiscal regime entered with the Zimbabwe government in 2001, ii) low operating 
costs, iii) availability of skills from other struggling mines and iv) supportive shareholders. 
These factors are discussed in greater detail below but suffice to say they fall short of 
adequately explaining the company’s success within Zimbabwe’s crisis. The company’s 
allusion to “legal and social license” is perhaps close to explaining the combination of 
political and economic strategies that sustained its business in Zimbabwe. To fully 
understand this successful accumulation story is to understand a great part of Zimbabwe’s 
political economy of accumulation. This is interrogated closely below after first examining 
the four success factors cited by the company above. Coming at a time when Zimbabwe was 
increasingly facing isolation from the West and investment was drying out, Zimplats was able 
to negotiate a favourable deal.  
 
Zimplats inherited BHP’s mining lease, first signed in 1996. Before commencing operations 
in 2001, the company further entered into a framework agreement which contained several 
incentives, among them an exemption from offshore banking restrictions and additional profit 




commentators in Zimbabwe (The Herald 14 March 2012). There is a widely held view that 
the Zimbabwe government gave BHP a five year tax break only for the company to pull out 
near the expiry of the incentive. An official from the Chegutu rural district council said that 
he had expected the Zimbabwe government to be more stringent in negotiating the Zimplats 
lease (Interview, anonymous, Chegutu rural council official, 15 April 2010). The early 2000s 
saw increasingly illiberal, populist, nationalist rhetoric from ZANU-PF and the notorious 
farm seizures. Yet the Zimbabwe government was desperate to attract foreign investment. 
Thus it represents an ideal example what Bond and Manyana (2002) would term the “talk left 
and walk right” discourse of ZANU-PF. 
 
In its 2001 annual report the company cites “...securing of appropriate and essential fiscal 
arrangements,” as having informed its investment decision (Zimplats Annual Report, 2001). 
The same report states, “Zimbabwe enjoys world-class mining legislation ...” Looking back 
and in response to allegations that the agreement was largely in the company’s favour, 
Zimplats’s then Chief Financial Officer during an interview in October 2011 noted: 
There was nothing to suggest that government wanted to be stringent. If there was a belief the 
agreement was one sided it did not show in 2001. If anything those written undertakings were very 
much to encourage the big investment that Zimplats promised. You will have this, you will have this 
extra whatever. It may well be that has changed now (Interview, Patrick Shayawabaya, 2011).  
A senior employee who preferred anonymity made a more or less similar observation, “...the 
government was desperate so they resorted to us banking offshore... it was because of this 
that other companies collapsed so Zimplats did not want to take this risk” (Interview, 
Anonymous Zimplats Employee, 2010). The provision for external banking was perhaps the 
most significant of the fiscal incentives given to the company.   
 
Offshore banking (perhaps to tax haven Guernsey) enabled the company to “navigate the 
period prior to dollarisation” in which the country’s payment system effectively collapsed 
and acute shortages of foreign currency were experienced. This made it possible for the 
company to access external capital finance, service its debts and pay for imports with relative 
ease. Unlike other miners, the platinum sector did not have to deal with cash shortages which 
made it difficult for miners to meet payment obligations to suppliers and service providers. 
Despite the acute devaluation of the local currency that had seen the economy rapidly 
dollarise, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) continued to enforce the use of the 




circumvent these measures so as to access external markets and foreign currency. The RBZ 
estimates that the value of minerals smuggled out of the country from 2002 to 2007 could be 
over US $500 million (Moore and Mawowa, 2010). In some cases, where miners exported 
directly, RBZ forced them to surrender the foreign currency at a pegged below market 
exchange rate. To compound matters, it was not possible to access the same foreign currency 
when miners want to import inputs. In most cases the bank channelled the foreign currency to 
ZANU-PF cronies in the name of fuel import support (Mawowa, 2007). These constraints 
however did not affect the platinum sector owing to its special fiscal and marketing regime. 
 
Beyond the lease agreement, several subsequent written and unwritten undertakings were 
made by the Zimbabwe government to Zimplats, not least the 2006 ground release 
agreement. Though these agreements were rather opaque, it was known that under the ground 
release agreement the company released 36 percent of its ore resource to government in 
return for empowerment credits equivalent to 29 percent of its total shareholding (The Herald 
14 March 2012). From the company’s point of view, the resource empowerment credits swap 
would later serve as a hedge against the indigenisation and empowerment law which 
prescribed a minimum of 51 percent local shareholding for all mining companies. Further to 
this, the company was on record for having voluntarily offered 15 percent shares to 
indigenous investors as early as 2001 and long before the enactment of the Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act in 2007. By 2011, the company maintained that the Zimbabwe 
government had largely met its obligations at least in some material respects (e.g. offshore 
accounts agreements) despite “a few outstanding issues”.  
 
Geological factors, corporate culture and support by the main shareholder Impala were also 
cited by Zimplats as accounting for the company’s success. The ore body “enabled us to 
operate at the low cost end of the cost curve” (Interview Patrick Shayawabaya, 2011). 
Operating costs were further cut significantly when the company shifted from open cast to 
underground mining. By global standards, Zimplats was one of the cheapest in terms of 
operating costs in by 2011. This enabled the company to better cope with the low prices of 
2007. “We have a good ore body which is generally shallow. This means we are better placed 
than competitors when market retreats as in 2008 and 2009” (Ibid).  Zimbabwe’s long 
tradition of mining meant that there existed in the country skills for the mining sector. 
Coming in at a time when the sector was in decline, skills were generally available.  In its 




sector 29 .  In addition, the company’s business model, like most mining companies, 
emphasises cost control (Interview, Busi Chindove, October 2011). It is also true to say the 
role of Impala as the major shareholder was crucial, investing over US $700 million between 
2001 and 2011.  
 
Impala investment was not only decisive for operational expansion but did enable the 
company to fill the infrastructural void arising from state incapacity. In a public-private 
partnership )Zimplats 60 percent and the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) 40 
percent) constructed a 330 KVA power sub-station in 2010 at a cost of US $25 million (Busi 
Chindove, quoted in Newsday (Online), 9 November 2010). The company financed the entire 
project and ZESA repaid it by forfeiting payments for Zimplats’s electricity usage equivalent 
to its 40 percent stake30. Since then the company has effectively been importing its electricity 
directly from Mozambique, another unprecedented arrangement, thus securing an 
uninterrupted supply of electricity at a time when power outages were crippling the industry. 
In January 2012, the company, together with MIMOSA, rescued ZESA by contributing US 
$35 million towards repayment of the debt owed to Mozambique power supplier Hydro 
Cabora Bassa (Zimbabwe Independent (Online edition), 7 June 2012). The money was to be 
recovered by being credited to the company’s electricity accounts as pre-payment (The 
Herald Online, 26 April 2012). Other notable infrastructure made possible by the Impala 
investment included an fibre optic cable of which the company was only using at 40 percent 
capacity and a 77 kilometre road to link its two operations as noted above. 
 
Marketing arrangements for platinum insulated Zimplats from the domestic factors that 
crippled Zimbabwe’s mining sector. Firstly, the MMCZ is legally responsible for the 
marketing of all minerals in the country excluding gold, which prior to 2009, was only sold to 
RBZ. However, the fact that Zimplats’s matte is first taken to South Africa for processing 
before being sold to the market limits scope for MMCZ’s role31. The company has thus been 
able to rely on its major shareholder’s experience in the marketing of platinum. Secondly, 
unlike with gold, Zimplats did not have to deal with problems of non-payment by a state 
agency. A comparison of figures from different gold mining companies suggests that miners 
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plant can be easily retrained as a technician at a platinum plant. 
30 Zimplats also partnered with ZESA to refurbish a transformer in Norton (40 km south west of  Harare) and a 
National Control Centre under PPP arrangements. 
31 This also raises issues of effective and just taxation as the matte contains several minerals which belong to 




were owed in excess of US $30 million in non-payment for gold deliveries to the RBZ. With 
direct access to foreign currency and an exemption from surrender requirements imposed on 
other exporters, Zimplats was able to import operational consumables with relative ease. 
Nearly all of the company’s financial transactions were conducted outside the country, 
insulating it from Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation and the collapsed national payments system. 
Unfortunately, so long as the Zimbabwe dollar remained legal tender, there was little 
equivalent respite for the company’s employees.  
 
Armed with the special mining lease and subsequent agreements, the company tended to 
exhibit confidence in spite of political uncertainty and threat of expropriation. In an interview 
in 2011, despite the threat of losing its majority stake under Zimbabwe’s indigenisation 
policy, the company was optimistic about its Zimbabwe operations. “Zimplats and its 
majority shareholder have had no reason to believe that these (agreements) will not be 
honoured... despite all that’s being said and so forth we still believe that eventually it will be 
honoured” (Interview, Patrick Shayawabaya, 2011). Less than a month prior to this interview, 
a 10 percent share transfer to the local community had been ‘launched’ at the company’s 
Ngezi operations. Despite this “gesture of goodwill,” the minister responsible for 
indigenisation and empowerment was threatening to withdraw the company’s license alleging 
that Zimplats was refusing to “facilitate the transfer of the remaining shares” in order to meet 
the 51 percent indigenous threshold. In effect, government was dishonouring a 2006 
framework agreement in which Zimplats released ground for empowerment credits. This was 
not all; in 2007/2008 Zimbabwe’s central bank took US $34 million from Zimplats’s account 
to meet ‘national priorities’32.  
 
The period of 2007 and 2008 was particularly difficult for companies, and not only in terms 
of hyperinflation. The RBZ was predatory in its handling of the crisis. Companies, NGOs and 
foreign embassies were coerced into opening foreign currency account with the bank. During 
this time the bank embarked on massive quasi-fiscal activities justified as “extraordinary 
measures for extraordinary times” (Gono, 2009). These activities, which ranged from fuel 
import support, funding local governments, paying soldiers and sponsoring self-help projects, 
were regarded as necessary to deal with sanctions-triggered hyperinflation, fuel and foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 While most of Zimplats’s banking was done outside the country, the company operated local accounts to 
facilitate local transactions. The company is known to have operated a local account with Stanbic, a subsidiary 




currency shortages. The reality however was that Gono’s interventions were serving to oil 
ZANU-PF’s patronage system and elite wealth accumulation (Mawowa, 2010). While RBZ 
could print money to fund domestic requirements, foreign currency was needed for imports 
such as fuel and machinery. At first this was made possible by printing even more money 
which was used to purchase foreign currency from the informal market (see Mawowa and 
Matongo, 2009), but printing money could not cope with the ever-rising inflation. The bank 
thus resorted to looting foreign currency accounts of its client and Zimplats was not spared. 
By 2012, this money was yet to be repaid with on-going debate within cabinet and parliament 
as to whether the government should assume the RBZ debts. 
 
5.	  Zimplats	  and	  Zimbabwe’s	  Central	  Bank	  
 
For any company during the crisis period, a key component of navigating the crisis political 
economy would include dealing with Zimbabwe’s Central Bank. Prior to dollarisation, the 
RBZ enjoyed a wide and seemingly unrestricted mandate engaging not only in printing 
money but quasi-fiscal activities. By statute, the bank is responsible for i) monetary policy 
formulation and implementation, ii) issuing of bank notes and coins, iii) custody of gold and 
other foreign assets, iv) being banker and advisor to government and v) being a bankers’ bank 
and lender of last resort (RBZ Act, 1999). However the bank went beyond this and engaged 
in pervasive quasi-fiscal activities supported by its access to the printing press. The bank’s 
operations were entwined in Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis, helping to buttress 
ZANU-PF in the wake of political and economic challenges.  
 
Between 2003 and 2007, with the deepening economic crisis, the bank engaged in a number 
of interventions justified as necessary to arrest Zimbabwe’s growing economic crisis (Gono, 
2010). The bank was involved in literally all economic management affairs of the country. 
Working with the police and military, the bank enforced price controls and foreign exchange 
requirements, often harassing officials of big companies.  Zimplats was not spared from this 
crusade. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss in detail all of the bank’s activities here 
but I will make a brief comment about the bank’s attempts to be involved in the management 
of the platinum sector. 
 
In its 2004 fourth-quarter monetary policy statement, the bank announced the introduction of 




This was unheard of since the bank’s mandate on paper is restricted to managing the trade of 
gold. The rationale put forward by the bank was that:  
Currently, the platinum industry largely operates under a fragmented framework in which the 
processing and marketing agreements are not quite comprehensible to many. In this environment, it has 
become increasingly difficult to account for the country’s foreign exchange receipts arising from the 
extractive industry (Ibid). 
This created tension with the Ministry of Mines and the MMCZ. The bank wanted to reduce 
MMCZ’s role to an advisory one while giving RBZ control over the most profitable sector of 
the economy. Further to this, platinum producers were compelled to open special local 
Foreign Currency Accounts and move from offshore banking. This proposal, if it had been 
accepted by the cabinet, would have compelled Zimplats to close all its offshore accounts in 
violation of the principal agreement. RBZ’s attempt clearly did not receive buy-in from some 
quarters within ZANU-PF, MMCZ and the Ministry of Mines amidst discomfort over the 
growing power of the Governor.  
 
Having forced several companies, NGOs, individuals and foreign embassies to open Foreign 
Currency Accounts33, the bank abused the accounts and was unable to provide the funds upon 
request. At the time of writing, several FCA clients were still owed by the bank including 
local universities (The Zimbabwean (online), 8 June 2009). Even though Zimplats opened a 
foreign currency account with RBZ, the company retained its main offshore accounts. This 
notwithstanding, Zimplats lost US $34 million which was taken from its FCA by the RBZ. 
By the time of writing, this money had not been reimbursed. 
 
In 2008 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe instigated a mineral exports audit on suspicion that 
mining companies were not fulfilling their tax obligation. This is in spite of ZIMRA being the 
authority directly responsible for tax matters. The audit conducted by Alex Stewart 
International LLC (ASI), reported that Zimplats owed the government US $70 million in 
unpaid APT and US $195 million in penalties and interest for late payment (Herald, 18 
November 2011). In April 2009 as a result, ZIMRA claimed US $140 million for the 
principal APT liability and late payment penalty from Zimplats’s operating subsidiary. Citing 
the 2001 agreement, the company objected to this claim. The company also noted some 
erroneous computation by the auditing firm leading to ZMRA revising liabilities to US $23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 As a measure to discourage parallel foreign currency trade, the Bank created a facility where individuals and 
institutions could open foreign currency accounts with the bank. This was also a way for the RBZ to build 




million.  This was eventually paid though the company took the matter for tax arbitration and 
the matter was yet to be resolved by June 2012. Making a presentation before parliament, 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe’s (RBZ) Governor Gono complained about the “lack of political 
will to take ASI’s findings to a court of law for purposes of recovering the monies” (Herald, 
18 November 2011). ASI was to be paid a commission on the recovered taxes and by then the 
auditing firm had taken RBZ to court over non-payment of US $35 million for the services 
rendered (Ibid).  
 
The insistence by ASI that Zimplats was liable reveals the problems of confidentiality and the 
nature of the agreement entered into with the Zimbabwe government. It turns out that the 
agreement included certain oral promises “by the minister” to make legislative changes on 
the laws governing mining leases which were never made. Specifically, as the quote below 
shows, it seems there was a promise to exempt the mine from the Additional Profit Tax. 
While a mining lease agreement does not need parliamentary approval, making the legislative 
changes promised in the lease would of necessity require parliamentary involvement. 
However, justification for such legislative changes would inevitably warrant parliamentary 
insight into the “confidential lease” in question. Following Zimplats’s protest over ASI 
findings, The Sunday Mail of 12 November 2011, quoted an advisory letter by the ASI 
lawyer stating: 
From a legal point of view I advise that those ministers’ undertakings cannot be enforced. The effect of 
the undertakings is that the legislature, which is Parliament in terms of our Constitution, will amend the 
legislation to accord with certain promises made to Zimplats. In the letter of the March 9 2001 
Zimplats states ‘Zimplats is not liable for APT’. In other words, Zimplats is claiming that as the law 
stands it is not liable. This is clearly not the case because, as the law stands, they are liable for APT 
because their earnings are from a special mining lease… All that they can rely on is a promise to 
amend that legislation and in my view that promise cannot be enforced . . . Consequently, Zimplats is 
not entitled, from a legal point of view, to rely on the undertaking from the minister to amend the Act 
to avoid its clear liability for tax which is payable in terms of the existing Act. 
The company eventually acceded to demands by tax authorities and paid US $23.5 million in 
Additional Profit Tax despite earlier written agreements with Government that exempted the 
company from payment of that tax” (Zimplats Annual Report, 2010, 20). The report noted 
that the “Government’s decision was based on the fact that despite the existence of the 





On the 23rd of May 2012, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) revived its bid to force 
Zimplats to localise its off-shore bank accounts. The bank noted that only three percent of 
Zimbabwe’s mining sector earning was streaming into the local banking system (see, Figure 
9, page 78). RBZ pointed to the fact that, on its own, Zimplats constituted about 35 percent of 
the country’s total exports (RBZ, 2012 Mid Term Monetary Policy Statement, 31 July 2012: 
37) and more than 50 percent of mining’s total (Hawkins, 2009, 8).  By banking locally, 
Zimplats would assist in easing the country’s liquidity challenges since the onset of official 
dollarisation. The bank’s directive was swingeing. RBZ prohibited the company’s local 
bankers from facilitating its international transactions until compliance was met.  
Due to the failure by Zimplats (Zimbabwe Platinum) to adhere to provisions of this directive, to close 
their offshore accounts and transfer their funds to bank onshore as directed, exchange control has taken 
corrective administrative measures to enforce compliance… In this regard, authorised dealers are 
hereby advised to stop processing and facilitating international or any cross border payments on behalf 
of Zimplats . . . (and) to stop processing and facilitating any exports, including the issuance of export 
documentation, electronic or otherwise on behalf of Zimplats (The Herald Online, 25 May 2012).  
The company responded by saying that the directive was most unfortunate since the company 
“understands and fully embraces the policy objectives of the directive...” (ASX 
Announcement, 28 May 2012). It went on to claim that in spite of the mining agreement 
providing for offshore accounts, 75 percent of the company’s total spend was transacted 
through local banks and the remaining 25 percent was related mainly to servicing external 
debts (Ibid).   
 
At the time of writing, Zimplats’s local annual expenditure had risen by 57 percent from US 
$164 million in July 2011 and to US $247 million as of June 2012 (Zimplats Integrated 
Report, 2012). The company is said to have acceded to the directive and localised its 
accounts. Since this matter was resolved behind closed doors, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the company did indeed close offshore accounts. It must be said though that banking 
locally is unlikely to have a significant impact on the country’s liquidity situation. Out of 
Zimbabwe’s 25 local banks, the big four, namely Stanbic, Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered 
and Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ) accounted for more than 80 percent of the total 
bank deposits. Of these, only CBZ is indigenously owned. Zimplats’s main local account is 
with Stanbic a subsidiary of the Standard Bank of South Africa and one of the smallest 
providers of credit when one looks at the loan to deposit ratio. The Zimbabwe Chamber of 
Mines suggests that the highly transactional and short term nature of mining deposits means 




economy tends to be very weak. RBZ seemed to confirm this in its 2012 mid-year monetary 
policy review, pointing out that while bank deposits had increased during the review period, 
these were mainly short term and thus not helping to improve domestic borrowing.  
 
Figure 14: Zimplats Local Spend in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Zimplats 2012. 
 
6.	  Platinum	  Mining	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Zimbabwe	  Minerals	  Dependency	  
 
Zimbabwe’s narrow public revenue base emanating from years of economic decline made 
revenue from the mining sector particularly crucial.  The discovery of diamonds and the 
buoyant performance of platinum made these two metals subject to political and public focus. 
But, according to the government, mining was not generating as much revenue as expected. 
On the July 18, 2012 the Ministry of Finance announced a downward revision of the 2012 
budget from an initial US $4 billion to US $3.46 billion (Ministry of Finance, July 2012). In 
fact the budget review was titled From Crisis to Austerity: Getting Back to Basics. This move 
was necessitated by the less-than-expected revenue performance of the mining sector. 
Diamonds in particular were projected to contribute about US $600 million towards the 
public revenue in 2012, but this was not the case. However, on the whole, the mining sector’s 
contribution of 18 percent to total revenue exceeded its GDP contribution of 13.5 percent. 





There are several ways in which mining contributes to public revenue, income or corporate 
tax: Pay as You Earn tax charged on employees (PAYE), royalties, and import and export 
duties, amongst others. At US $96 million in 2012 Zimplats’s fiscal contribution to 
government (corporate tax, royalties, duties and PAYE) represented 31 percent of the mining 
sector’s total excluding diamonds (Zimplats Holdings, Integrated Report: 9). The mining 
industry as whole paid approximately 17 percent of its total revenue (representing 60 percent 
of the sector’s profitability or effective tax) to government (ZCM, 2012).  
 
The relationship between the Zimbabwe government and the mining sector continues to be 
characterised by mutual suspicion. In January 2012, Zimplats was instructed to pay US $28 
million in outstanding royalties. ZIMRA claimed that Zimplats “continued paying royalties in 
2010 at a rate of 2.5 percent when they had been increased to five percent” (Reuters Africa, 9 
January 2012). Prior to this, Zimplats had "grudgingly" paid $23.5 million to ZIMRA in 
outstanding super profit tax for the period 2001 to 2007 (Ibid). In his 2012 budget, the 
finance minister further increase platinum royalties to ten percent (Ministry of Finance, July 
2012). In August 2012, the Zimbabwe government undertook to station ZIMRA officials at 
selected mining locations to be involved in the “extracting, sorting, weighing, sealing and 
recording, receipting and storage, evaluation, grading and polishing, auctioning and 
processing of export customs documents” (Ministry of Finance, July 2012). This signifies the 
growing pressure in poor economic circumstances whereby Zimbabwe has lost a major share 
of its internationally tradeable economy, perhaps permanently, to squeeze wealth out of 
foreign owned mines. 
 
The company’s employees are from across Zimbabwe.  Officially, it claims to prioritise 
employment of locals, especially for low skill jobs. The company however does not insist on 
its contractors applying the same recruitment practices and labour standards. It is projected 
that at the end of the phase two expansion program, the number of people directly employed 
by the mine will rise to 5000.  In 2011 net employment costs amounted to US $42 million 
with obvious downstream effects. Already some 14 000 or so people were estimated to be 
directly dependent on the company and residing at Turf Village where the company has built 
over 2000 houses for its employees. This number is set to grow to nearly 30 000 by 2014 if 
one considers this projected growth, the estimated appeal to other migrants as witnessed by a 
growing shanty settlement close to the mine. This is significant considering that Zimbabwe’s 




associated industries. Perhaps 150 000 more were said to have been dependent on the sector 
in one way or the other (ZCM, 2011). These figures refer only to corporate mining.  
 
Nationally, Zimplats has been involved in some high profile ventures with economy-wide 
ramifications. In 2010 Zimplats entered into a public-private partnership towards the 
construction of a power sub-station near the company operations. A total $26 million was 
spent on the project of which 40 percent was agreed to be “recoverable through power credits 
against power consumption” (Zimplats, December 2011, 11). According to the company’s 
2010 annual report, Zimplats also “… financed the replacement and upgrade of the computer 
system at the ZESA national control centre” for US $3 million (23). In August 2012, 
Zimplats advanced ZESA a US $25 million-loan to help the latter pay its outstanding debts to 
its Mozambican supplier Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa (New Zimbabwe, 4 August 2012). 
“The loan principal and interest were converted into power units which will be redeemed 
over three years. In return Zimplats is guaranteed uninterrupted power supplies for its 
operations for five years” (Zimplats Financial Report, Second quarter 2012).  
 
Other than the PGMs, Zimplats is a key producer of gold, nickel, copper and silver as seen in 
Figure 12. These metals each have different tax regimes. After the processing of ore, the 
PGMs together with these metals are exported as matte (semi-processed). The tax regime 
applicable to Zimplats refers specifically to platinum, attracting royalties of 2.5 percent until 
2010, five percent in 2011 and ten percent in 2012. Prior to 2012, gold royalties were pegged 
at 4.5 percent and increased to five percent. The Ngezi Concentrator Crushing Plant Flow 
sheet (Figure 12) shows production estimates for each of the eleven metals produced per 
tonne of ore. From the company’s financial statements, there is no evidence that royalties for 
other metals other than PGMs are being charged by the Zimbabwe government. Moreover, 
the company production and annual reports only reflected production of four main minerals 
namely platinum, palladium, gold and rhodium. There are no split figures for earnings from 
these different metals. According to the company’s 2011 annual report 20 860 ounces of gold 
were produced in 2011. Based on an average price of US $1500 per ounce, the company 
earned US $31 290 000 from gold alone. Prior to 2010 gold royalties were higher than 
platinum and it is possible that the government might have lost by applying a blanket royalty 
regime. While platinum and palladium usually constitute 50 percent of total earnings, gold 
and nickel sales are quite significant, accounting for 17.5  percent of the company’s total 





From the standpoint of the Zimbabwe government, it has proved difficult to come up with 
correct estimates of minerals being produced and consequently how to apply royalty 
requirements. This is because Zimplats exported matte, a semi-processed product. It is only at 
the refinery in South Africa that the various metals are separated into single individual 
elements. Civil society groups complained that, as the PGMs were exported in raw form, 
Zimbabwe was exporting jobs, taxes and other economic opportunities to South Africa. 
Interviews with the MMCZ and ZMDC officials (November 6, 2010) showed a gross lack of 
capacity to monitor the production and exportation of platinum and consequently inability to 
tax appropriately. This does create possibilities for transfer pricing, under-invoicing, under-
declaring of output, exports and profits, among other things. Platinum possesses a particular 
challenge for regulatory authorities due to the technological intensity involved.  
 
Zimplats’s approach has been to focus on core activity and outsource all non-core activities 
thus presenting opportunities for contractors. Items that are outsourced include the transport 
of ore, drilling (to Netherlands based Sandvik Mining), blasting/explosives (to African 
Explosives Ltd based in South Africa), construction and vehicle maintenance inter alia. For 
the most part however, Zimplats admitted that it was purchasing more than 80 percent of its 
inputs from outside the country. According to the company, “the recent economic crisis in 
Zimbabwe destroyed the capacity of the country to supply the mining industry; hence they 
were forced to import most of their supply needs” (Southern Africa Resources Watch 
(SARW) Report, 2010). Thus even the contracted catering company, Servcor, was sourcing 
supplies from South Africa. Notably and perhaps in response to criticism by SARW and the 
political onslaught to give 51 percent of its shares to indigenous Zimbabweans, Zimplats’s 
reported an increasing local procurement from  nearly zero in 2008 to 48 percent or US $136 
million in 2011 (Zimplats, 2011 Annual Report). It is of course true to say that Zimbabwe’s 
stabilised currency situation and improving economy made this easier to achieve.  
 
7.	  The	  Quest	  for	  Legal,	  Social	  and	  Political	  License	  	  
 
Appeasing political elites and their various interests was a necessary strategy in maintaining 
viable accumulation. During the crisis period, it was common for powerful politicians to 
demand political and economic rents from companies and individuals. Whereas the ZANU-




homogenous among the ruling elites. During the period under discussions, ZANU-PF had 
gotten more and more fractious along succession and accumulation/patronage lines. The 
mining sector was a melting pot of competing political and economic interests. To complicate 
matters, the country’s military and other security chiefs had gotten sucked into this imbroglio. 
Policy positions and pronouncements were often contradictory and incoherent. Growing 
extractivism 34  among civil society and local communities added another dimension. 
Inevitably, mining companies had to carefully manage this fractious policy context on one 
hand as well as respond to calls for environmental accountability and corporate social 
responsibility on the other hand.  
 
The quest for legal, social and political license was thus a central part of Zimplats’s 
accumulation strategy. One may call this the “license to accumulate”. To win the hearts of the 
local community and chiefs, the company, sometimes proactively and at times reactively, 
promoted itself as a leading socially and environmentally responsible miner. The strategy for 
attaining political license was not divorced from “corporate social responsibility” either, and 
involved an interchange of appeasement and resistance. Appeasement targeted both local 
community and national politicians, and was both overt and covert. In all, the company was 
sensitive to political sentiment despite sounding optimistic for the most part.  
 
Hosting President Robert Mugabe more than once at its operations can be viewed as one such 
overt appeasement strategy. Mindful that issuing a special mining lease was the prerogative 
of the president, placating Mugabe’s support appears to have been critical in an era where 
property rights were not held sacrosanct. The president possesses sweeping powers over 
mineral rights. “The dominium in and the right of searching and mining for and disposing of 
all minerals ... is vested in the President...” according to Zimbabwean law (Mines and 
Minerals Act, Section 2). Legally Mugabe could cancel Zimplats’s mining lease at any time. 
It must be noted though that such drastic action also was in fact on occasion taken extra 
legally as the case of ACR shows in the previous chapter.  
 
In October 2009, the company invited Mugabe to officially commission its new concentrator 
as part of the Phase 1 expansion project. During the visit, Mugabe praised the company’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A term borrowed from Patrick Bond to refer to resource extraction activism, in an article entitled “The 
Newest Threat to People and the Planet The Rise of “Sub-Imperialism””, in the Counterpunch 





corporate social responsibility projects as a model that other companies should follow and 
expressed appreciation for the investment in infrastructure “which would attract other 
businesses into the area”. Specifically he noted that the company was  
...complementing government development goals through its projects outside the realm of mining... I 
have no doubt that the achievements you have made are of great benefit for the future of both your 
operations and that of the local community, and ultimately, the well-being of our country's population 
(Herald, 16 October 2009).  
In an inclusive government — characterised by a tug of war between two main political 
parties jostling to score political points and bent on outmanoeuvring each other as responsible 
for economic recovery and benefitting the population — such a platform was political fodder. 
It is no wonder Mugabe responded accordingly and heaped praise on the company.  
 
However only a few days later, one of Mugabe’s most trusted lieutenants, Media, Information 
and Publicity Minister and former Minister of Special Affairs in Mugabe’s office and MP for 
Chegutu East, Webster Shamu, was attacking the company, publicly accusing it of being 
“self-centred” in its approach to business (IDE, 4 June 2012). Shamu’s rage, apparently, had 
been provoked by the company’s “failure to honour a local chief” Chivero35. According to 
the minister, “Zimplats should have tarred the road to the chief’s homestead” (Zimbabwe 
Independent, 22 October 2009). He went on to allege that there was nothing to “show for 
large quantities of platinum ore that is being mined by Zimplats in his area” (Ibid). Early in 
the same year, another ZANU-PF MP for the area, Bright Matonga (Mhondoro area), 
together with traditional chiefs, was reported to have petitioned Zimplats management over 
its employment policies deeming them unfavourable to locals. Much earlier there had been 
reports that one of the chiefs wanted the company to build him a house.  
 
Despite these political pressures, the company resisted and stated that it would not be swayed 
into underhanded dealings.  
…We have explained to them that we can’t, any donations that we do or any contribution that we make 
have to be broad based, have to benefit the community and that’s why you find some of them perhaps 
not being comfortable with us… any contributions we make cannot be for personal gain (Interview, 
Busi Chondove, 2011).  
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aligned to ZANU-PF who desposed the other brother who was the sitting chief until 2011. The deposed chief 




At least publicly, the company, it seems, did try to maintain a principled stand; the extent to 
which this was sustained at all levels is difficult to tell. Leaked US cables suggested that at 
least one senior politician offered to protect the company from the Chinese and other senior 
politicians in return for shares. This was by no means an open discussion. There were 
allegations that several ZANU-PF politicians, including the minister responsible for 
indigenisation policy, were positioning themselves to acquire Zimplats shares.  
 
Zimplats might have provided political rents by creating opportunities for certain politicians 
to gain political expedience. In 2010 several unemployed youths in Chegutu were submitting 
names to Shamu through the ZANU-PF branch leadership for job recruitment with Zimplats 
(Interview, ZANU-PF youth 1, October 2010). The company predictably refuted any 
insinuation that its recruitment favoured a particular political party. However, at least three of 
the people who claimed to have submitted names through ZANU-PF structures did indeed 
manage to get employment with the company. In follow up interviews, these three were 
convinced that they owed their newly found placement to Shamu’s influence. Since the 
company admittedly gave preference to locals for employment and worked with chiefs and 
local councillors in this regard, it is possible that politicians were manipulating this policy.  
 
In January 2012 workers were locked in a dispute with the company after the Zimbabwe 
Electricity and Transmission Distribution Company36 cut off electricity from their homes at 
Turf Village over non-payment of bills. The workers argued that the company was reneging 
on its promise to settle the bills while the company insisted that employees were liable as 
private consumers. The Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe) of 20 January 2012 quoted a source 
within the company management as saying “the dispute had been hijacked by disgruntled 
politicians who felt side lined in the CSOT” established to facilitate transfer of 10 percent 
shares to the community under the indigenisation and empowerment law (see the next 
chapter). “…a certain colonel and a group of war veterans are stirring emotions among the 
workers because they wanted to be part of the CSOT” the company source alleged (Ibid). 
“Mbudzi inodya payakasungirirwa... vakasati bata bhoo tinovafiksa” 37 , remarked one 
ZANU-PF district leader as if to confirm Zimplats’s claims. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ZEDTC is a subsidiary of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA).  




In 2010, following an adverse report by resource watchdog Southern Africa Resources Watch 
(SARW), Zimplats invited SARW together with the Zimbabwean civil society organisations 
for a meeting and a tour of the mine38. It was surprising to find police, traditional leaders and 
other individuals linked to “institutions of power” present at the meeting. The police were in 
fact represented by a chief superintendent for Kadoma district, one Mr. Manzini. In its report 
on the visit, SARW notes: 
The high powered presence of the ZRP (Zimbabwe Republic Police) in an engagement between 
Zimplats and the civil society structures in the SARW delegation was puzzling to say the least. Police 
interest in mining is usually at the behest of mine management in liberal democracies and then usually 
during strike actions. A police presence during a consultative meeting with an international NGO and 
its local partners is extremely unusual and perhaps reflects the state of democracy in Zimbabwe, unless 
the police presence at the meeting was at the invitation of Zimplats in which case it will be a bad 
reflection on the attitude and management style of Zimplats towards civil society (SARW, Report on 
the Zimplats and Mimosa visit, 2010).  
Ironically, “conspicuous in their absence from the meeting were trade unionists, employees, 
local community except the presence of Zimplats organised farmers who are beneficiaries of 
the company’s conservation farming CSR project” (Ibid).  
 
The company’s response to policy uncertainty, which often created anxiety among its 
shareholders, was guarded. In May 2010, when reports suggested that the company was 
considering shelving its US $500 million Phase II expansion program due to policy risks, the 
company was quick to refute this through the Zimbabwean media. 
Recently, some press reports have erroneously suggested that Zimplats has stopped its Ngezi Phase II 
Expansion Project. This is incorrect; the company is going ahead with its Ngezi Phase II Expansion 
Project, based on the existing agreement with the government, some subjects of which are subject to 
on-going discussion (Zimplats, Phase II Statement, May 2010).  
The truth however was that the company was indeed uneasy about the indigenisation and 
empowerment policy and the expansion hung in the balance. Also, this is when platinum 
prices began to fall. It could be that the public posture was a way to safeguard the confidence 
of the Zimbabwe government. A month prior to the above press statement, the company in a 
quarterly report had stated that Phase II was depended upon resolution of “compliance issues 
regarding the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act and the accompanying 
regulations” (Report ending March 31, 2011). In fact, the company insists that any discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




about indigenisation policy must be based on prior existing agreements, in particular the 
ground release agreement of 2006.  
 
It is notable that the press statement was addressed to a Zimbabwean audience, while the 
quarterly report was targeted at shareholders on the ASX. The press statement emphasised the 
benefits of the envisaged project, namely construction of a 35 000 mega-litre dam “to provide 
irrigation water for the local rural community,” construction of two new schools, a referral 
hospital and the creation of 1000 additional jobs. The statement added, 
Zimplats has since 2001 been a consistent and serious investor even during the most difficult times in 
the history of Zimbabwe. In less than 10 years, Zimplats will have invested, including the Phase II 
project, over US $1 billion, which is more than any other company ever in the history of Zimbabwe.  
Nowhere did the statement mention commercial viability as raison d’être for continuing the 
planned expansion despite policy difficulties. By stressing the “public benefit” the company 
was perhaps not only allaying fears of a pull out, but in fact reminding those who cared about 
the opportunity cost to the Zimbabwe government what exactly such a pull out would entail. 
Yet a year later, the company reaffirmed the 31 March 2011 position, insisting that honouring 
of “commitments as enshrined in the agreements signed in 2006 and earlier” was a 
precondition for Phase II expansion (ASX Zimplats Annual Report, 2011, 9). 
 
True to a seemingly differentiated and audience targeted communication approach, the 2010 
first quarter report emphasised the commercial aspects of the Phase II expansion project. It 
describes the expansion as consisting of a “2 million ton per annum underground mine, 2 
million ton per annum concentrator module, 35 000 mega litre dam, 9 kilometre ore overland 
conveyor and 1 125 employee houses” and 1000 new jobs (2010 First Quarter Report to 
shareholders, 2010). This according to the report was dependent upon the resolution of sticky 
issues such as “the US $34 million that the company was owed by the RBZ and the 
Additional Profits Tax provisions of the Income Tax Act.”  The report elaborated,  
...the APT rates in the Income Tax Act, which have not been adjusted since 1996, have become 
punitive and are now inconsistent with the original objectives of the Act... The Government of 
Zimbabwe has ruled that Zimplats is liable for APT despite the written undertakings given to the 
company in 2001 that this would not be the case. The board and shareholders feel very strongly about 
the negation of undertakings given by government to Zimplats (Report for the quarter ended 31 March 
2010, 3). 
The 2011 annual report stated, “Zimplats remains committed to implementing its Ngezi 









This chapter has covered the history and growth of the platinum sector with a particular focus 
on Zimplats. It considered how Zimplats was able with relative success to handle 
Zimbabwe’s difficult crisis in both its economic and political dimensions despite numerous 
pinpricks and disputes emanating from various demands by Zimbabweans with political 
connections. The company’s lease and subsequent agreements were very crucial in protecting 
the company from Zimbabwe’s economic breakdown and scorched earth policies by the 
central bank and government at large.   
  
In dealing with an authoritarian populist government the company combined tacit resistance 
and cooperation thus giving politicians what they wanted— the appearance that the company 
is acceding to pressure from government and ZANU-PF. In reality, movement was very 
minimal although threats of one sort or another were frequent. It is no wonder, despite policy 
uncertainty, with government unilaterally announcing the takeover of some of its mining 
ground the company persisted with phase expansion. Some commentators argue that Zimplats 
is buying time through appeasement, hoping that a new “sober” government will emerge after 
the elections and reverse some of the populist demands. Soon after an election in 2013, 
ZANU-PF started to pursue what seemed like a policy of normalisation of relations with 
investors and the international community. The harshed tone when dealing with big investors 
was replaced by a more conciliatory approach.  
 
The following chapter looks specifically at the company’s dealing with indigenisation and 
empowerment policy. It considers how the empowerment and indigenisation policy provided 
a smokescreen for elite interests while appearing to be aimed at empowering the masses. In 
this regard the company appeared to be playing along, but the status quo ante between 




Chapter	  Six:	  Zimplats	  and	  the	  Indigenisation	  and	  Empowerment	  Policy	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	   	  
In early 2008 the Zimbabwe government enacted the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act (IEEA) also known as Chapter 14:33 Act 14/2007. This law and its 
implementation became Zimplats’s sternest test since 2001. The aim of the law was to make 
sure that at least 51 percent of the “shares of every public company and any other business” 
in Zimbabwe is owned by indigenous Zimbabweans. In order to reach compliance, 
companies are allowed to sell 10 percent to employees through a “qualifying” Employee 
Share Ownership Scheme/Trust (ESOS/T). Since 2011 the Zimbabwe government started to 
demand the disposal of a 10 percent stake of all mining companies to local communities 
through a CSOT. This, according to the National Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Board (NIEEB), applies to all mining companies irrespective of being foreign 
owned or not. The year 2015 has been set as the deadline for attaining the 51 percent 
threshold. 
 
Besides transfer of shares, the policy blueprint also requires that procurement for all 
businesses and government agencies to be at least 50 percent local goods and services. 
Government is empowered to take action within the spirit of the law for the benefit of 
women, youth and “disabled persons39.” The law gives the minister responsible powers to 
make several unilateral decisions, among them: appointment and dissolution of the 
indigenisation board, revoking of business licenses on grounds of non-compliance with the 
law and the selection of indigenous individuals and entities to benefit from the law, among 
other things. Sceptics have dismissed the drive as a political gimmick within the dual contest 
for power between ZANU-PF and MDC. Indeed parallels have been drawn with the takeover 
of white owned farms which, most argue, was responsible for the country’s economic 
collapse.	  Outside the land seizures, Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and empowerment policy is 
the most controversial initiative since 2000. 
 
At a conceptual level the emphasis on creating a local community stake, employee ownership 
and disposal of shares to ordinary indigenous citizens and companies (as opposed to state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





centred emphasis on taxation or nationalisation) presents an interesting dimension of what 
may pragmatically constitute benefit sharing between mining companies, local communities, 
employees and citizens at large. Generally, governments have been accused of hiding 
information on mining contracts and abusing resource rents while mining companies have 
been accused of externalising the costs of extraction and privatising profits. In this sense, one 
is tempted to view Zimbabwe’s empowerment policy as progressive. This chapter however 
argues that, despite the benevolent language, Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Policy as attempted in the platinum sector is largely top down and rooted in 
patronage politics and a continuation of an authoritarian populist discourse.   This chapter 
starts by a short analysis of South Africa’s empowerment program in the mining sector. 
 
2.	  Regional	  and	  International	  Precedents	  	  
 
In the discussions around indigenisation and empowerment in Zimbabwe, reference is 
sometimes made to experiences elsewhere. A supposed South African precedent in the name 
of Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) has featured prominently. 
However, during an interview with the NIEEB Chairperson David Chapfika, he was quick to 
point out that Zimbabwe is offering something radically different to the South African 
legislation (Interview, September, 2012).  Chapfika went on to state that a Marikana40 will 
and would never happen in Zimbabwe. It is perhaps true that South Africa has applied a more 
cautious approach to redressing historical imbalances in the mining sector. However, this 
chapter indicates that Zimbabwe’s approach may not be as radically different as is made out 
to appear the case. The rhetoric is certainly radical, but the two approaches share a 
commonality in that empowerment through the mining sector is largely top down to the 
benefit of political elites.    
 
Mineral rich South Africa represents one of the most unequal societies in the world. Poverty 
in South Africa has a lot to do with the apartheid legacy wherein the majority blacks were 
denied economic opportunities.  Since the end of apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s ANC 
government has sought to reverse racial imbalances through the Black Economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Marikana near Rustenberg is the site of the tragic incident that took place at Lonmin Mine in which over 30 




Empowerment (BEE) policy41. BEE according to a 2001 Commission report aims at 
changing the imbalances of the past through the transfer and conferring of “ownership, 
management and control of South Africa's financial and economic resources to the majority 
of the citizens.” Specifically South Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (No. 28 of 2002) Section 100(2)(a) instructs the Minister of Mines to ensure attainment of 
government objectives in order to redress historical, social and economic inequalities. The 
goal is to 
…develop a broad based socio economic empowerment Charter that will set the framework, targets and 
time-table for affecting the entry of Historically Disadvantaged South Africans into the mining 
industry, and allow such South Africans to benefit from the exploitation of mining and mineral 
resources.  
Generally BEE has been mainstreamed and one sees a common purpose between legislation, 
policies and government departments.	  	  
	  
Unlike Zimbabwe there is no requirement for CSOTs or schemes in South Africa. Thus 
ESOSs and CSOTs are not prominent. In fact, there are several ways for companies to attain 
BEE compliance and these need not necessarily include community ownership. South 
Africa’s Department of Mineral Resources’ 2009 report observes that BEE related ESOS and 
CSOTs where these were established have been characterised by inequitable distribution of 
benefits and sometimes benefits were extended to non-historically disadvantaged groups. The 
funding model for the acquisition of shareholding for the “formerly disadvantaged” groups 
has in many instances resulted in the actual ownership being tied in loan agreements.  
 
Perhaps the excessive focus on regulatory compliance has been at the expense of fundamental 
transformation. On 9 February 2007 the South African government published BEE codes also 
known as the Broad Based Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). This saw a shift from the 
previously excessive narrow focus on ownership. BBBEE is anchored on seven requirements 
for companies which include ownership, management, employment equity, preferential 
procurement, skills development, enterprise development and socio-economic development. 
Failure to comply according to the enabling act can lead to the revoking of a mining license. 
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white females. While this may be seen as providing a basis for a broad and non-discriminatory empowerment 




Of these, ownership constitutes only 20 percent of BBBEE credits. In fact, South Africa has 
taken a more gradual approach with a requirement of 15 percent black ownership in 2010 
which would be increased to 26 percent in 2015. Further, the mining sector-specific scorecard 
includes employee housing and living conditions targeting an occupancy rate of one person 
per room by March 2015.  
 
The only aspect of the policy that prescribes direct benefit for mining communities is socio-
economic development, which constitutes 15 percent BBBEE’s total weight for the mining 
sector 42 . The South African mining charter requires mining companies to “conduct 
ethnographic community consultative and collaborative processes to delineate community 
needs analysis” (BBBEE Mining Industry Scorecard). This according to the charter should 
result in the implementation of community approved projects. Unfortunately this seems to be 
the	  charter’s most difficult	  target to measure as there are no specified instruments to measure 
compliance. Preferential procurement is only prescribed for BEE entities with a target of 40 
percent, 70 percent and 50 percent for capital goods, services and consumables, respectively 
(Ibid). Far less ambitious targets are set for employment equity, human resource development 
and sustainable development and growth. There are no requirements for the employment of 
people from the local community. Included in the BBBEE discourse is the desirability of 
beneficiation though targets are yet to be stipulated.  
 
BEE’s prescribed change in ownership has been very slow to transpire in South Africa’s 
mining sector and is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals. Black ownership of 
mines stood at only nine percent in 2009. A 2009 report by South Africa’s Department of 
Mineral Resources notes that BEE ownership of mines is “concentrated in the hands of 
anchor partners and Special Purpose Vehicles representing a handful of black beneficiaries” 
(Department of Mineral Resources (South Africa), 2009). Critics point to the BEE business 
constellation being dominated by people with links to the ANC and government as a serious 
flaw. These individuals include relatives, spouses and powerful figures in ANC.  The 
performance of most BEE companies has been far from pleasing with a worrying trend of 
heavy indebtedness. BEE companies, it is argued, have struggled to exist outside the network 
of apartheid monopoly capital which has remained parent to most BEE companies (Hirsch, 
2007).  Reinforcing this dependence is the reliance on pre-existing sources of finance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Prominent scholars like Professor Bill Freund have questioned whether South Africa’s new 
elite has the sense of direction to persue an industrialising economic model or a broad social 
model to carry through envisioned changes — “Its instincts appear far from democratic”. The 
twist to a BBBEE was a response to the widening gap between rich and poor. “The heart of 
the story is that the masses have been left behind while the leaders fatten themselves with 
new wealth” (Freund: 672). Despite a few shining examples,  what you have in South Africa 
by and large is the creation of a parasitic business class which lacks a broader project for the 
development of South Africa. In what appears to be an extension of historical comradeship 
by the once “comrades in arms” to “comrades in business,” the now disgraced former ANC 
Youth League president Julius Malema was taken on a tour of Zimplats during what he 
branded a solidarity visit to a fellow liberation movement ZANU-PF in 2010. Ironically, 
Malema’s populist talk of nationalising mines found no takers in the ANC and he was 
expelled by the party for ill-discipline in 2012.  
 
There are few cases where significant community interventions have occurred in the context 
of BEE. Thus in 2011, Optimum Coal, born out of the need for global giant BHP Billiton to 
secure black economic empowerment credits, joined hands with the Steve Tshwete 
municipality in Mpumalanga to deliver 100 houses to the public in a ZAR 13 million project. 
This perhaps represents one of the most radical BEE related community development 
interventions. On the whole, though, BEE (or BBBEE) represents something far less radical 
than what is enunciated in Zimbabwe’s empowerment policy. South Africa’s constitutional 
guarantees of property rights make it difficult for the government to force companies to 
dispose shares. Even in Zimbabwe the impracticality of this approach has been exposed. In 
fact, what BEE relies on is a combination of legal and moral suasion. As a result, the road to 
achieving economic transformation sought by BEE has been a frustrating one. In 2009, South 
Africa’s Mineral Resources Department reported that targets set by the Mining Charter were 
far from being met.  
 
South Africa, however, has one of the most remarkable cases of community involvement and 
shareholding in a mining venture in the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) or tribe. This has been 
used to justify Zimbabwe’s concept of community share ownership trusts. RBN is a 
community of approximately 300 000 Setswana-speaking people with substantial, mineral-




in South Africa normally involved land in private hands, this is a major development in an 
ex-Bantustan where land is held along communal lines that are disposed of by chiefs. RBN is 
entitled to 22 percent royalties on all platinum taken from their territory. Annual royalties 
amount to over US $70 million. Through an investment arm, the Royal Bafokeng Holdings 
(RBH), RBN has direct stake in Royal Bafokeng Platinum and Impala Platinum Mines. The 
RNB has a sovereign wealth fund managing assets worth over US $4 billion. This status was 
a product of extensive negotiations, fights with mining companies during and post-apartheid, 
culminating in a court settlement which affirmed RBN’s ownership of the minerals and 
entitlement to 22 percent royalties. While the establishment of facilities such as the 45 000-
seat stadium (one of the venues for the FIFA 2010 world cup), an athletic complex and the 
Royal Bafokeng Institute (for education and training) has been celebrated in many circles, it 
is criticised in others. It remains unclear to what extent ordinary Bafokeng benefit. 
 
On the whole, nothing much has changed in terms of ownership in South Africa’s mining 
sector. There is growing discontent among communities about this lack of transformation and 
the fact that the gap between the rich and the poor is widening further. Several proposals are 
being discussed at national policy level. Among these is the option of nationalising either all 
or some of the mines, an approach so far rejected by the Zuma administration. Proponents of 
nationalisation constantly refer to ANC’s 1955 Freedom Charter which states that “the 
mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the 
ownership of the people as a whole…” Notably none of the proposals clearly advocates for a 
community centered approach. Thus the often cited South African model really suggests that 
only a small new elite has been cut into an existing structure with uncertain results. The legal 
basis for this has been so far relatively cautious. 
 
3.	  Zimbabwe’s	  Indigenisation	  and	  Economic	  Empowerment	  Policy	  
	  
The emergence of the indigenisation and empowerment discourse has been touched on and 
located within the context of Zimbabwe’s changing political economy in the 1990s. We have 
already noted the emergence of indigenisation and empowerment pressure groups such as 
Affirmative Action Group, Indigenous Business Women Organisation and the Indigenous 
Business Development Centre in that period and how these began to make their claims within 
and through ZANU-PF politics. The war veterans, and to some extent labour, added a strong 




these voices, the government in February 1998 came up with a Policy Framework on the 
Indigenisation of the Economy.   
 
The 1998 Policy Framework defines indigenisation so as to capture the different interests of 
political pressure groups that were emerging at the time. Indigenisation is defined as 
…a strategy for the development of a democratic socio-economic system, nation building and poverty 
eradication among the majority of Zimbabweans. The master to key indigenisation of the economy 
includes an increase of indigenous productive investment in the economy, industrialisation, skills 
development, land redistribution and mobilisation of financial resources (State Enterprises and 
Indigenisation Department, 1998, 3-4).  
This policy framework even went as far as speaking of “expanding the market and tax base” 
(Ibid). It was only in October 2004 that the policy framework was adopted after revisions. 
The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007 appears to have somewhat 
narrowed down the definition, defining indigenisation as “deliberate involvement of 
indigenous Zimbabweans in the economic activities of the country, to which hitherto they had 
no access, so as to ensure the equitable ownership of the nation’s resources” (2). Thus while 
the 1998 policy framework encompassed issues of democratisation, poverty eradication, 
increasing productivity, industrialisation and skills development, the current policy and act 
emphasises transfer of ownership. This bias is also reflected in the stipulated objectives of the 
2007 Act. 
 
To give effect to the law, a series of government notices and general regulations were issued 
from 2010 onwards. Even before, ZANU-PF’s 2008 election campaign slogan was “100% 
empowerment”. The delay in enforcing the law might owe itself to the chaos and economic 
decay Zimbabwe experienced in 2007 and 2008. Mining, which has turned out to be the main 
target of the policy, was on its knees. By 2010, however, the sector was leading the country’s 
economic recovery, growing by 47 percent and 26 percent in 2010 and 2011. First among 
these is the Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 gazetted 29 January 2010. The instrument sets 
2015 as the deadline for all foreign-owned companies to meet the 51 percent local ownership 
requirement. Every business with an asset value of US $500 000 was required to submit a 
compliance plan detailing present and future state of compliance to the minister within 45 
days. The move was criticised as harsh and an untimely threat to foreign investment “at a 
time when the country needed to be seen to be investor friendly.” Political parties within 




ultimatum was not met by most companies. Following much discussion in cabinet, some 
aspects of the regulations were revised43.   
 
On March 25, 2011 the Ministry of Youth Development Indigenisation and Empowerment 
issued amended regulations specifically targeting mining companies. The capital threshold 
for the 51 percent local ownership requirement was reduced from US $500 000 to US $1. 
Thus every mining company no matter how small or big was required to indigenise. Another 
45 day ultimatum was issued which most mining companies again failed to meet. Mining 
companies contested the minister’s discretion in determining prices for the shares to be 
transferred. Most mining companies negotiated for an extension of the deadline to give 
themselves time to negotiate with the minister. There is evidence that the law has not been 
uniformly and rigidly applied.  One journalist noted that the indigenisation and empowerment 
threshold “…is not cast in stone... If you look at the ZISCO-Essar deal, you will notice that 
foreign shareholders surpassed this threshold. Another example would be the acquisition of 
Premier Bank now Ecobank Zimbabwe” (Online Interview, Independent Journalist, 11 June 
2012). Far from a blanket application of the law, issues of what is or is not acceptable have 
been determined by negotiations. This somewhat arbitrariness stems from the discretion 
given the Minister by the law. 
 
There are several players which are directly involved in the implementation of the 
Indigenisation and Empowerment (IEE) programme. The Ministry of Youth Development, 
Indigenisation and Empowerment is the core ministry mandated with the implementation of 
the IEE programme in Zimbabwe, including the formulation of the IEE policy and strategies, 
acts, regulations as well as receiving and approving IEE applications/proposals. It also liaises 
with other stakeholders, ministries, the NIEEB, IEE sectoral committees, the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee and the Zimbabwe Youth Council, among others. The minister in turn 
reports on IEE issues and progress to the Office of the President and Cabinet. The NIEEB as 
provided for in the Act consists of a maximum of fifteen persons appointed by the Minister 
responsible for IEE in consultation with the President of Zimbabwe. The Board is responsible 
for the management of the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund 
(NIEEF), advising the Minister on the policy and overseeing compliance with the National 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Charter. The NIEEF provides financial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





assistance for share acquisition, warehousing of shares under employee share ownership 
schemes or trusts, management buy-ins/buy-outs, business start-up consolidation and 
expansion.  
 
For the most part, policy pronouncements on indigenisation and empowerment have been 
acrimonious. On several occasions between 2010 and 2012, the minister would issue 
statements on the policy only to be rebuffed by some elements within ZANU-PF but 
especially from the MDC. For the MDC, the policy is just a political gimmick by ZANU-PF 
to garner more supporters and placate public opinion towards the party.  Parliament also 
issued adverse reports on Statutory Instrument 21 and several other pronouncements by the 
Minister relating to the enforcement of the policy. Due to the controversy surrounding the 
IEE policy, the government set up sectoral committees to provide recommendations on how 
sector peculiarities could be treated. The consequence of sectoral committee has been the 
creating with sector specific thresholds. While 51 percent is required for mines by 2015, this 
is not the case for manufacturing. According to NIEEB, it all depends on the economic 
importance, capital requirements, expertise required and technical skills involved. 
 
The government of Zimbabwe has placed special interest in diamond mining and there is a 
strong possibility that a different indigenisation regime might apply to the sector. On 
December 7, 2010, Cabinet announced a unanimous agreement that the government should 
be the owner of all alluvial diamond mining operations in the country. The decision of the 
Cabinet is yet to be implemented and by the time of writing there was growing scepticism 
that this will ever be implemented. The opaqueness of diamond deals and military 
involvement made it difficult to enforce this decision. The section below discusses some of 
the policy controversies related to the enforcement of indigenisation policy in the mining and 
platinum sector. 
 
For the most part, Zimbabwe’s politicians viewed mining, and indeed Zimplats’s relationship 
with the broader economy, in terms of tax contribution to public revenue and transfer of 
ownership to black Zimbabweans. This of course served a particular political purpose. Even 
in 2012 when discussions on approaches to indigenisation grew more nuanced, questions 
about employment, decent work, economic dependency on mining, ecological sustainability 
and backward and forward linkages remained peripheral. Indeed, despite the significant 




elsewhere. This holds true for both the period prior to and the period after dollarisation. 
Discussion on the role of mining in Zimbabwe’s economy remained largely rhetorical and 
unscientific. 
 
A lone voice in ZANU-PF calling for a more nuanced policy approach in dealing with the 
mining sector is the Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono. Gono, fronting a section of 
moderates or technocratic realists in ZANU-PF, stressed the need to look at mining in terms 
of backward and forward linkages. Gono emphasised the backward linkages through what he 
termed the supply side model. Gono argued that empowerment in the mining sector must be 
“…a multi-dimensional socioeconomic process of opening up opportunities for livelihood, 
growth and prosperity to the greater majority of people in an economy regardless of whether 
the source of opportunity is non-indigenous or otherwise” (Gono, 2012). This approach found 
support from the ZCM and Zimplats in particular. In this regard Gono was pushing for an 
empowerment model that goes beyond the mere transfer of ownership of mine to develop 
links, particularly with indigenous suppliers (Gono, 2012). 
 
Critics, especially private media in Zimbabwe (SW Radio Africa, 15 January 2013; New 
Zimbabwe, 12 March 2013; Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2013), argue that the policy is 
an election campaign tool. The enactment of the law in 2007 coincided with the campaigning 
for the watershed 2008 presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. Having 
exhausted “the land reform” the only available populist gimmick for ZANU-PF was to 
promise the forced transfer of the country’s business and mines to the black majority. ZANU-
PF’s 2008 election campaign slogan was 100 percent empowerment; the logic being that 
Zimbabweans have taken back our land so “now let’s finish the struggle by repossessing our 
mines and controlling businesses.” Mining’s buoyant recovery since 2009 and competition 
for political power with the MDC in the inclusive government has seen the resuscitation of 
the indigenisation drive. Yet, a survey by Harare based Mass Public Opinion Institute showed 
that the policy was generally unpopular, with up to 55 percent negative compared to 41 
percent positive responses among both urban and rural respondents (2011). Reasons cited for 
the negative perception were that the policy was meant to benefit political elites (55 percent). 
Some 26 percent said the policy was corrupt and ill timed (10 percent) among others.  
 
Certain aspects of the policy and regulations were revised on the insistence of cabinet in 




replaced and instead read “sell”. Between 2010 and 2012, the minister would issue statements 
on the policy only to be rebuffed by cabinet and especially the MDC side of government. On 
several occasions Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirayi of MDC dismissed the minister’s 
pronouncement as null, void and illegal, often urging business to ignore them. Parliament 
also issued adverse reports on Statutory Instrument 21 and several other pronouncements by 
the minister relating to the enforcement of the policy. Despite the criticism, even from some 
of his ZANU-PF aligned colleagues, the Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Saviour Kasukuwere, was determined to have his way.   
 
In April 2012 Kasukuwere declared that 51 percent of all shareholding in mining companies 
that did not comply with the indigenisation law were now vested with the state “with 
immediate effect.”  
All mining companies that have not complied with this notice should note that 51 percent of their 
shareholding is now deemed to be owned by the State and any business transacted in respect of this 51 
percent shall have been transacted on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe with effect from the 
deadline stipulated in the said General Notice 114 of 2011, which deadline for the avoidance of doubt 
was 25th September 2011 (Kasukuwere, 5 April 2012).  
The policy incoherence in Zimbabwe’s coalition government was exposed once again.  
Within hours of the appearance of the minister’s notice, the Prime Minister’s office issued a 
notice nullifying the minister’s notice and urging business to ignore it.  
The Prime Minister would like to inform the public that there is no such Government position… the 
inclusive Government has not sanctioned the Minister’s actions that are a threat to investment in the 
industry… The Prime Minister would like to inform mining entities that, should anyone or any 
institution be it private or public, attempt to enforce Minister Kasukuwere’s pronouncements, they 
would be doing so unlawfully and without the mandate of the Inclusive Government (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 5 April 2012).  
The Prime Minister’s position was later seconded by his party’s National Council Resolution 
which dismissed indigenisation as an “asset stripping exercise” by ZANU-PF (Sunday Mail, 
14 April 2012).  
 
The previous year, the Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, had 
been happy to describe the policy as government-sponsored but partisan.  
It should be made clear and that policies implemented in Government are as a result of the policies 
different parties have. Indigenisation is fortunate enough to be a Zanu-PF policy and in the same light 
parties such as the MDC have their own policies they want implemented in Government (Kasukuwere, 




But criticism of the policy was coming from within his party with accusations that some 
within the ranks were committing “acts of economic banditry” and lawlessness, and 
parcelling “…out pieces of the economic cake and opportunities created by this noble piece 
of legislation to a few connected cliques of people whilst the majority of intended 
beneficiaries remain with nothing” (Gono, 2011, 2). Gono’s comment reflects the commonly-
held view that the land reform exercise was dominated by nepotism. 
 
4.	  Zimplats’	  Pre-­‐emptive,	  Resistance	  and	  Cooperation	  Strategies	  	  
 
Zimplats’s strategy towards the indigenisation policy has been both pro-active and reactive, 
resistance and cooperation. For the larger part, the company seems to have anticipated that 
things will at some point come to a boil and manoeuvre so as to pre-empt Zimbabwe’s ruling 
elites. One such pre-emptive move was the 2001 Framework Agreement where the company 
reserved 15 percent of its shares or 13 million ordinary shares for purchase by indigenous 
Zimbabweans. The shares were worth US $15 million then. Newspaper reports suggested that 
none of the earmarked indigenous parties were able to raise the required US $15 million to 
buy the shares.  Consequently, the value of the 15 percent shares rose to US $35 million in 
2006 and to US $140 million by March 2011. For this reason Zimbabwe’s Chamber of Mines 
questioned the feasibility of finding local investors capable of purchasing Zimplats’s 51 
percent stake. “… If indigenous players could not raise just US $15 million in 2003, it 
becomes doubtful that they will be able to raise above half a billion to acquire 51 percent 
stake” (CMZ, 2011). However, while it is true that raising capital finance was a constant 
challenge for local businesses interested in shares availed by the indigenisation law, it seems 
the question of Zimplats’s 2001 15 percent initiative was a victim of ZANU-PF’s factional 
and patronage politics.   
 
Zimplats’s 2001 annual report gives some useful insight into what really transpired. Firstly 
the 15 percent offer was to ensure the “long term” prosperity of Zimplats.  
Shareholders will recall that Zimplats has agreed to make up to 15% of its share capital available for 
ownership by Zimbabwe citizens, by subscription at prevailing market prices, and our board believes 
that this initiative is essential to the long term prosperity of Zimplats (Zimplats, 2001 Annual Report, 
Chairperson’s statement).  
Secondly, it appears the company was being pressured to accept an arrangement that could 
only benefit a few individuals contrary to its intentions “to benefit the wider Zimbabwean 




It is, however, essential that the arrangements made maximise the sustainable benefit of this share offer 
to a wide Zimbabwean shareholder base. Schemes designed in absolute good faith to achieve similar 
objectives in neighbouring South Africa have, at best, met with mixed results. Accordingly your 
management is engaged in on-going discussions with the National Investment Trust ("NIT") of 
Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and with a wide number of role players and financial 
institutions in order to ensure that this initiative successfully achieves its empowerment objectives.  
Lastly, despite the pressures, the company was determined to do the right thing.  
Your board has considered and rejected several proposals to date and has clearly conveyed to all 
stakeholders in this initiative that it will not be pressurised into agreeing to any arrangements that, 
whilst technically satisfying the commitments made by Zimplats, are unlikely to result in a wide and 
economically viable Zimbabwean shareholder base. Nonetheless, as a consequence of some innovative 
financial engineering by Zimplats and its advisors, I am hopeful that a balanced and sensible 
Zimbabwean shareholder empowerment transaction, acceptable to all stakeholders, may shortly be 
finalised (Ibid). 
 
Though the provision was made in 2001, it was only in 2003 that the company announced to 
its shareholders an agreement to transfer 15 percent of its shares to an Empowerment 
Consortium at a 15 percent discount. The discount was deemed necessary for the placement 
to succeed. According to the announcement, the consortium had received financial support 
from a South African commercial bank (most likely ABSA) with the backing of Zimplats 
(Zimplats, ASX Announcement, Empowerment Placement, 22 September 2003). Further, the 
Zimbabwe government was said to have supported the transaction and expressed satisfaction 
that it met the company’s obligation under the framework agreement (Ibid). Curiously the 
company did not mention the name of the empowerment consortium. In spite of what seemed 
to be a breakthrough, the transaction was never completed, and until 2010 it remained a 
mystery as to why this was the case. In May 2010, it came to light that the deal was 
“verbally” halted by the Minister of Mines soon after the announcement (Zimbabwe 
Independent, 3 September 2010). This according to the paper came to light after Needgate, 
the empowerment consortium set to benefit from the deal, wrote to the minister of mines in 
2010 insisting that the deal must go ahead.  
 
The handling of the 15 percent share offer demonstrates how murky the implementation of 
Zimbabwe’s indigenisation policy has been. Initially the government of Zimbabwe selected 
the National Investment Trust for the empowerment deal. However the National Investment 




Chininga44  to second Needgate without cabinet approval. At face value the Needgate 
initiative met Zimplats’s requirement for broad-based empowerment. Needgate was to be the 
project leader under a shell company named Grassroots Investment. Grassroots Investment 
was structured as follows: Needgate (27 percent), Decathlon (18 percent), Graname (15 
percent), Jelly Mine (15 percent), state owned ZMDC (15 percent) and, on behalf of Ngezi 
Community Trust, ABSA (10 percent). However, a closer look raises questions. Decathlon 
was Needgate’s partner in South Africa, responsible for raising money offshore thus 
increasing Needgate’s interest in Grassroots Investment to 45 percent. Shadowy ZANU-PF 
functionaries were reportedly behind Graname and Jelly mine (Interview, anonymous 
Ministry of Mines official, 13 September 2010). Needgate’s co-founder McDonald Chipfika 
was the younger brother to then deputy minister of finance David Chapfika, ZANU-PF 
Member of Parliament and chairperson of the NIEEB.  
 
A cabinet reshuffle in 2004 saw Amos Midzi replace Chininga as Minister of Mines. The 
Needgate transaction was halted and instead Midzi seconded Rusununguko-Nkululeko 
Mining Company. Literally Rusununguko-Nkululeko (in Shona and siNdebele respectively) 
translates to “liberation” which resonates with the ZANU-PF philosophy of “liberation war 
hero entitlements.”  If Needgate had alleged links with Chininga, some individuals linked to 
ZANU-PF and its vice-president Joyce Mujuru (Financial Gazette, 6 May 2011, The 
Independent, 15 April 2010), Rusununguko-Nkululeko was equally connected to senior 
politicians in ZANU-PF. According to one anonymous contact (10 June 2011), “…that 
Chininga then minister of mines is linked to Needgate explains why Zimplats was eager to 
partner the company and even went to the extent of facilitating funding for the purchase of its 
own shares.” Ironically Rusununguko-Nkululeko’s founder and front man was a former 
advisor to Chindori-Chininga during his tenure as minister of mines (The Independent, 15 
April 2010). He had resigned earlier before moving on to form the company. But despite 
government backing, Rusununguko-Nkululeko was unable to finance the transaction (Sandu, 
2005). In 2011 Rusununguko-Nkululeko was accusing Zimplats of coming up with new 
conditions in 2004 to frustrate its bid for the 15 percent stake. “They wanted government to 
put in place a regulatory framework and to sign a Bilateral Investment Promotion and 
Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with South Africa” (Alex Manungo, Rusununguko-Nkululeko 
managing director quoted in Financial Gazette, 6 May 2011). It is safe thus to conclude that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 In 2012 Chininga was the chairperson of the parliamentary portfolio committee on mines and at the fore front 




the share offer suffered from a confluence of competing political interests and the company’s 
selective choice of partners.  
 
Yet it is important to note that, while a strategy of appeasement was apparent in the 
company’s handling of ZANU-PF interests, this was not always the case. This is especially 
true prior to 2011 before the indigenisation rhetoric became more militant. The debacle over 
the 15 percent indigenisation offer has led to the company to become more willing to 
confront the state. In response to threats of indigenisation while addressing President Mugabe 
at the launch of the company’s new concentrator in 2009, the Zimplats CEO said;  
It is important to stress to Your Excellency that as investors our confidence to embark on such a 
significant investment, particularly at a time when other investors choose other destinations, was 
premised on the agreements referred to earlier… Speaking as an investor I would like to stress the 
importance of adherence by both parties to the letter and spirit of all agreements (David Brown, then 
Impala Chief Executive officer, quoted in Zimbabwe Independent of 29 October 2009). 
Brown went as far as suggesting amendments to the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment laws to take into account concerns by investors. However as will be seen 
below, this approach has not always yielded positive results where political expediency and 
elite accumulation matter above all else. 
 
The 2010 empowerment regulations were followed by bickering within Zimbabwe’s 
fledgling coalition government. On its part, ZANU-PF led by Youth Minister Saviour 
Kasukuwere, insisted that “there is no going back”, while the MDC formations argued that 
taking over 51 percent shares from companies was neither government policy nor feasible. 
Propaganda that several companies were cooperating with the minister was used to add even 
more pressure on the company. Zimplats’s 2010 indigenisation proposals were dismissed as 
unacceptable and the minister accused the company of playing games. For its part the 
company insisted that prior agreements were still applicable and that the law must not be 
applied in retrospect. Kasukuwere was relentless and on March 25, 2011 issued amended 
regulations targeting mining companies specifically. 
 
In similar fashion to the 2010 regulations, all foreign mining companies were given a 45-day 
ultimatum to submit empowerment plans. In fact, the March 2011 regulations were more 
radical than the principal act and previous regulations. While according to the 2010 




valuation of US $500 000 and more, this was reduced to US $1. Companies were instructed 
to submit plans of how they intended to achieve the 51 percent threshold. Within six months, 
shares were “to be disposed of to the Government agencies — the National Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment Fund, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation and 
sovereign wealth fund when created” (Extraordinary Government Gazette, 25 March 2011). 
In this case, the shares in question would be warehoused by the state “until indigenous buyers 
are found” (Interview, Tongai Matutu, 2012). The price of the shares would be  
…calculated on the basis of valuation agreed to between the Minister and the company concerned and 
shall take into account the State’s sovereign ownership of the mineral or minerals exploited or 
proposed to be exploited by the company (Government Gazette, 25 March 2011). 
This took not only mining companies but parliament as constituted by both ZANU-PF and 
MDC parties aback.  
 
The US$1 minimum threshold in mining means that non-indigenous Zimbabweans and 
foreigners cannot operate any mining concern, even a small one, without partnering with an 
indigenous player. While the debate on the country’s economic empowerment and 
indigenisation was raging, a study by the Business Council of Zimbabwe (BCZ) showed that 
“50-60 percent of total mineral rights are indigenously owned by the state, state owned 
enterprises and indigenous people” (BCZ, 2011, 350) (see appendix 3). However, the biggest 
mines were largely owned by foreigners. The BCZ study noted that there were around 25 000 
small scale miners who are members of the Zimbabwe Miners Federation (ZMF) of whom a 
significant proportion is indigenous. Of these, state support has been minimal, yet the fact 
that they are small-scale in nature provides opportunity for broader entrance.   
 
Following the promulgation of the regulations, between March 3 and 8 the price of Zimplats 
securities fell from US $15.99 to US $12.50 prompting an enquiry from the ASX (Styn 
Timmermans, Letter to Zimplats, 8 March 2011). In response, Zimplats indicated that this 
may have been caused by the intense media coverage of the country’s Indigenisation and 
Empowerment regulations which were affecting the whole mining sector. This however, the 
company noted, was already in the public domain and discussions were on-going with the 
Zimbabwe government (Patrick Shayawabaya, letter addressed to the ASX, 8 March 2011). 
The letter pointed out that the impact of this loss of value would in any event be mitigated by 
the fact that “the company’s majority shareholder Impala Platinum Holdings Limited, is a 




indigenisation talk was not only affecting the company directly as reflected at the ASX. 
Impala shares at the Johannesburg Stock Exchange took a tumble as well. On the JSE on 
March 28, 2011 Impala and Aquarius shares fell at one point by over five percent and 
AngloPlatinum by two percent after Mugabe had threatened to take over foreign mining 
companies (Daily News, 29 March 2011).  
 
The period between March 2011 and May 2012 was a roller-coaster ride for Zimplats. In 
response to the March 25th government gazette, in May 2011 the company submitted a formal 
written proposal on its empowerment plans. On 17 August 2011 the minister angrily rejected 
Zimplats’s proposal and the company was given a 14 day ultimatum to submit an “acceptable 
proposal” (Zimplats ASX Announcement, 22 August 2011). The company came up with a 
second proposal. On 8 September 2011 Zimplats issued an announcement at ASX to the 
effect that the minister, in a letter dated 6 September 2011, “advised that the company’s 
Indigenisation Plan does not meet the minimum requirements of the law and accordingly, he 
has requested the Minister of Mines and Mining Development to cancel the company’s 
operating licence.” The major area of disagreement according to the announcement was the 
2006 Release of Ground Agreement. But the threat of cancellation was withdrawn two days 
later with the Minister giving Zimplats yet another deadline to submit a revised plan of mid-
November 2011 (Zimplats ASX Announcement, 13 September 2011).  
 
In October 2011, before submitting a new plan, the company invited President Mugabe to 
launch a 10 percent CSOT. At this occasion the company announced a US $10 million 
donation to the community. The event was heralded as a moment of triumph for ZANU-PF 
and its indigenisation program. ZANU-PF aligned state media carried a screaming headline 
the following day: “Mining giant gives shares to communities” (The Herald 14 October 
2011). It was reported that “Zimplats gave 10 percent shareholding to the local community” 
(Ibid). The Financial Gazette reported that a new trust had been formed namely “Chegutu 
Mhondoro-Ngezi and Zvimba” Community Trust. The US $10 million and 10 percent shares 
were to be transferred to the new trust (Financial Gazette, 21 October 2012). Strictly 
speaking however, no such trust had been formed nor existed. It is no wonder different media 
had conflicting names for the said trust. The reference to Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi and 
Zvimba Community Trust raised eyebrows. While Chegutu, Mhondoro and Ngezi could 
legitimately be classified as falling within Zimplats’s sphere of operations, the same could 





Figure 15: Launch of the Zimplats CSOT 
 
In the picture: David Brown hands over a cheque of US $10 million to Minister of Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Saviour Kasukuwere as President Mugabe looks on.  
Source:  The Herald Archives. 
 
If the company was hoping to appease Mugabe and ZANU-PF, Mugabe’s rather 
contradictory messages in one speech did not help. On one hand, Mugabe praised the 
company for its “second to none” community interventions. He added, “Go tell your 
shareholders that we do not intend to take over” (The Herald 14 October 2011). On the other 
hand, it was clear what the event meant for Mugabe and ZANU-PF. “This happy event is 
evidence of Government's movement towards implementing the policy of empowering our 
people…” Mugabe went on to justify the indigenisation policy, stating: 
All we are saying here is that what is in Zimbabwe is what God gave us and that is ours. If you want to 
make a fortune, if you are a fortune seeker and we have a bond that binds both of us, you get your share 
but you should recognise that in Zimbabwe you are the smaller brother and we are the bigger brother… 
If we go to South Africa, we will be the young brother there. We also don't want to be robbed, let us be 
fair to each other (Financial Gazette, 21 October 2011). 
In November 2011, Zimplats submitted a revised indigenisation plan which was again 
rejected by the minister. Responding to accusations that government was not keen on 
compensating for shares, the minister had said, “On the contrary Zimbabweans shall pay for 
any stake they wish to uptake … (sic). In mining, the value of the resources underground 
owned by the people of Zimbabwe, shall be the contribution they make in their partnering 





In rejecting the company’s November 2011 submission, Kasukuwere on 22 February 2012 
cited “the portion of its indigenisation implementation plan relating to the empowerment 
credits for the Release of Ground agreement entered into in 2006” as unacceptable (ASX 
Announcement 24 February 2012). The company was given 14 days to transfer the required 
shareholding to the NIEEF (Ibid). In March 2012, parliamentarians visited the company 
premises to “assess the progress of indigenisation” (Monica Mutsvangwa, ZANU-PF senator, 
quoted in New Zimbabwe, 8 March 2012). “We’re here to understand what is going on. We 
are looking at the implementation of the empowerment policy,” she continued. What the 
parliamentarians saw was of course the giant concentrator, the production process, company 
buildings and equipment at most. Evidence of change or lack of change in the company 
ownership lay in books and computers elsewhere and certainly on the company website, the 
ASX or the Impala offices in Johannesburg.  
 
After a series of meetings between the company and the minister, the proposal was accepted 
(Zimplats ASX Announcement, 13 March 2012). At a joint press conference with the 
Zimplats chairperson, the minister announced that Zimplats had finally submitted a plan 
which “meets our expectations as Government… to a very large extent complies with the 
laws of our country in terms of achieving the 51 percent minimum indigenisation threshold” 
(The Herald, 14 March 2012). Regionally, reports were that Kasukuwere had “scored a major 
victory over South Africa’s Zimplats platinum mining company when he forced it to hand 
over a 51 percent stake in its Zimbabwe operation, Zimplats, to Zimbabweans” (Mail and 
Guardian, 4 May 2012). However, it was not clear why, after so much resistance the proposal 
was accepted without any changes. That a joint technical team, composed of Zimplats, 
NIEEF and the Ministry was put in place to come up with transfer details suggests something 
akin to agreeing to disagree or passing the buck. The media hype had drawn much publicity 
and it is perhaps safe to speculate that this was a way to let the matter rest. 
 
Far from a victory for Kasukuwere, the matter was largely unresolved and by the time of 
writing, the company’s ownership remained unchanged. Part of the company’s proposal that 
had created problems with the minister was the insistence that prior agreements must be 
honoured. The final so-called agreement reached did not negate these prior agreements as the 





The frequency with which the company cited the agreements warrants a more detailed 
reflection on them. Since the company said that the agreements had a confidentiality clause, it 
is difficult to tell with certainty what was included45 (SARW, 2010).  However, through 
media reports and a careful examination of the references made by the company to the 
agreements during the indigenisation and empowerment discussion, it is possible to 
extrapolate some of the things contained therein. It is known for certain that the preferential 
fiscal regime contained in the 2000 framework of agreement entailed exemption from APT 
(Zimplats 2001 Annual Report; IDE, 4 June 2012). Through company reports, it is also 
known that the 2006 Ground Release Agreement involved the company releasing a portion of 
the their ore body for empowerment credits (Financial Gazette, 8 April 2011).  
 
The finer details of these agreements also came to light through the media probably from 
company or government insiders. State-run and ZANU-PF-controlled daily newspaper The 
Herald on 14 March 2012, (a day after the purposed agreement between Zimplats and the 
minister) alleged that it cost Zimplats US $1 to acquire the special mining lease. The paper 
was obviously enraged. From the same report, the 2006 Ground Release Agreement involved 
Zimplats selling back 36 percent of the land from the mining lease to the Zimbabwe 
government for US $153 million or 29.25 percent empowerment credits. The IDE’s African 
Growing Enterprise file adds that this agreement assured the company “ground required for a 
steady state one million ounce per annum platinum mine with a fifty year life is secured 
under two mining license regimes.” According to IDE, the 36 percent of the company’s 
resource base released amounted to 51 million ounces of platinum “in return for 
empowerment credits and/or cash.” 
 
The effect of this prior arrangement was to reduce scope for the minister’s discretion over 
Zimplats’s shares available for indigenisation. The 29.25 percent empowerment credits were 
reached as follows: “19.5 percent empowerment credits, as well as cash credit of US $51 
million or 9.75 percent empowerment credit if no cash is forthcoming” (IDE, 2012). This 
would reduce the company’s shares available for local ownership first to 21.5 percent. 
Considering Zimplats’s offer of 20 percent divided equally between the community and 
employee ownership schemes, this would further cut the number of shares openly available to 
1.5 percent. In that case the minister and ZANU-PF’s say in accessing or determining 
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beneficiaries from the shares would have been severely curtailed. The Herald report 
suggested that the government of Zimbabwe felt cheated by these agreements. “It was 
extremely naïve and irresponsible for the Zimplats board to assume it could fortify its 
operations in Zimbabwe with a flawed and exploitative agreement,” (14 March 2012) the 
paper commented, justifying the government’s determination to disregard the previous 
agreements albeit the final agreement did not actually subvert the agreements.  
 
One official from the Ministry of Mines suggested that the Ground Release Agreement was a 
calculated move by Zimplats to pre-empt government on indigenisation and economic 
empowerment. This was not denied by the company’s leadership; 
The 2006 Release of Ground Agreement was entered into in anticipation of the promulgation of the 
IEE legislation and was meant to enable Zimplats to meet its IEE obligations partly through the release 
back to Government of part of the company's mining claims rather than fully through equity (Interview, 
anonymous Zimplats senior employee, 17 June 2012). 
It is no wonder, “… the agreement was reached in 2006 when government was proposing the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act which was passed the following year” 
(Interview, Anonymous, Ministry of Mines official, 13 September 2010). This explains the 
company’s continuous reference to the agreement and government’s reluctance to honour it. 
A senior Zimplats employee seemed to confirm this, stating that it was common cause that 
“… there are clauses which protect Zimplats from things like indigenisation unless the 
government changes” (Interview, Anonymous Zimplats employee, 14 August 2010). If it was 
true that the government felt embarrassed and duped by the deal, an easy exit would have 
been to reverse the deal. However, according to one Central Intelligence Organisation officer 
interviewed in 2012, concessions for the ground released by Zimplats had been sold to 
Russian and Chinese firms in 2008. If true, this makes it easy to understand why Zimplats 
dug in its heels and why it may well be that the government ended up accepting the Zimplats 
proposal without the changes. But since the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment 
Policy was a ZANU-PF policy (Kasukuwere S., Presentation at SAPES, 3 November 2011), 
it was expedient to give an impression that Zimplats had acceded to government demands.  
 
The fact that the framework agreement allowed the company to bank offshore was explained 
as a means to enable the company to pay suppliers. Ironically, according to the Herald (14 
March 2012), “in terms of Clause 14 of Special Mining Lease, Zimplats is supposed to 




course, this agreement dates to 2001 at a time when Zimbabwe’s economy was relatively 
stable. The Herald’s report suggested that the government felt “cheated” by the way the 
agreement was structured, and this reflected badly on those responsible for the deal from the 
government side. According to the mining law, the responsibility for such an agreement had 
been vested in the Minister of Mines and the president.  
 
5.	  Zimplats’s	  Community	  Share	  Ownership	  Scheme	  
	  
In the midst of controversy over its compliance, Zimplats and the Zimbabwe government 
launched a community trust referred to in media as the Chegutu Mhondoro-Ngezi Zvimba 
CSOT. However no such trust exists to this date and it is uncertain whether such an entity 
will be formed. The only trust established with regards to Zimplats community allocated 
shares is the Mhondoro-Ngezi Community Trust (MNCT). In fact there is confusion as to the 
actual name of what was launched in October 2011, and different names continue to be used 
to refer to the same. What is known, though, is that the said trust was meant to facilitate the 
acquisition of community designated shares in Zimplats and to spearhead local economic 
development. From interviews and news reports, and, as suggested in the name, this was 
meant to cover the three rural districts of Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi and Zvimba. 
  
According to the former Chairperson of NIEEB, David Chapfika, CSOTs and ESOTs 
represent the second leg upon which the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment policy 
stands, the first being the 51 percent local ownership requirement. Chapfika points out that by 
providing for CSOT the policy ensures broad-based economic empowerment. Section 14 of 
Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 provides for Employee Share Ownership Trusts (ESOTs) to 
be used as a vehicle to fulfil the policy requirement. According to NIEEB, ten percent 
community ownership and ten percent employee ownership is a requirement applicable to all 
mines, whether foreign, state owned or indigenous owned. Government contends that 
“…communities have the natural right to benefit from their God-given resources” (Ministry 
of Youth Flyer, 2012). Since 2010 and the mooting of CSOT as a vehicle for communities to 
benefit from resource extraction, several CSOTs have mushroomed. This has at times 
resulted in more than one CSOT claiming to represent the community. In a bid to regulate the 
situation, the Cabinet came up with a framework for the establishment of CSOTs which gave 
the Minister of Youth Development Indigenisation and Empowerment sweeping power over 





Since 2010, a number of CSOTs have been launched amidst pomp and fanfare. While it is 
difficult to ascertain how many have been launched to date, five Trusts stand out. These are 
Marange-Zimunya Community Trust (MZCT) in Manicaland, the previously mentioned 
Mhondoro-Ngezi (sometimes includes “Chegutu-Zvimba”) Community Trust, Mat South 
Gwanda Community Trust in Matebeleland South, Tongogara CSOT (TCT) and the 
Zvishavane Community Trust (ZCT). It must be pointed out that, of these, MZCT has a 
unique arrangement. While other CSOTs are entitled to a ten percent stake in foreign 
companies, MZCT is to enter into a joint venture with the state-owned ZMDC and a yet to be 
identified private investor. In all the cases, the CSOT launch was accompanied by either a US 
$10 million capitalising donation or pledge for the new entity by companies concerned. 
MZCT had a donation of US $1.5 million on the day of its launch and pledges of US $10 
million by each of the five concerned diamond mines, thus totaling US $50 million. It could 
not be established by the time of writing whether the companies had honoured their 
commitments.  
 
In most cases the take-off for CSOTs has been slow and far from convincing. This research 
encountered several complaints especially from members of mining communities and local 
leaders in this regard. It is only with the TCT and ZCT CSOTs that tangible evidence of 
functioning has been reported. On October 2012, the Chronicle reported numerous 
community projects ranging from vegetable gardens and water provision, to the construction 
of schools (10 October 2012) under the watch of the TCT. Prior to this, it had been accused 
of not making any progress with its developmental plans after receiving US $10 million in 
November 2011. Similarly ZCT seems to have established itself administratively and 
operationally. One can locate the trust’s offices within the Zvishavane rural district council 
offices. In September 2012, ZCT was advertising for tenders related to a number of projects. 
However, this apparent sign of progress was tainted by allegations of abuse of funds by chiefs 
who form part of its board of directors. It is alleged that in 2011 five chiefs awarded 
themselves US $5000 each as their sitting allowance for a meeting to decide how to use a US 
$2 million donation from Mimosa Platinum. 
 
The establishment of the Zimplats CSOS, its operations, the reported donation of US $10 
million and the ten percent share transfer was very difficult to follow.  On many occasions 




indigenisation proposals and threatened to withdraw the company’s mining license 46 . 
According to the media as well as politicians, the CSOT launched marked the transfer of ten 
percent of Zimplats shares to the local community. The Herald of 14 October 2011 reported 
that “…Zimplats gave ten percent shareholding to the local community.” Similarly the 
Financial Gazette reported that a US $10 million donation from Zimplats to the community 
and that ten percent shares were to be transferred to the newly formed Chegutu Mhondoro-
Ngezi and Zvimba Community Trust (CMZCT) ( 21 October 2012). These are the facts that 
one gets when talking to both ordinary people and some government officials. 
Notwithstanding, the company remained in dispute with government over the remainder of 
shares required to meet the 51 percent threshold. 
 
While government gave the impression that shares had been transferred to the community, 
the reality was something else. Both the Zimplats chairman David Brown and the minister 
suggested that transfer details would be worked out. The former suggested this would take 
“weeks and months” (The Herald 14 March 2012). Zimplats’s ASX announcement to 
shareholders the day after the joint press conference affirmed that the victory was for the 
company to claim.  
It has also been agreed that Zimplats and the Government will explore fair value compensation in lieu 
of empowerment credits for the ground released under the agreement of 24 May 2006. It was proposed 
to Government that on receipt of this compensation, Zimplats Holdings Limited will make available for 
sale to the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (“NIEEF”) a 31 percent fully 
contributory stake in Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) Limited for cash at an independently 
determined fair value at the time (ASX Announcement, Indigenisation update, 14 March 2012). 
The conditionality that a 31 percent stake would only be made available subject to 
compensation for ground released effectively put to rest in the short to medium term 
government’s quest for the Zimplats shares. It was impossible that Zimbabwe’s cash-strapped 
government could afford to pay the required compensation, let alone afford the 31 percent 
stake. The remaining 20 percent to make up the stipulated 51 percent was to be met evenly 
through the community share and employee share ownership trust.  
 
Yet the propaganda about the successful transfer of Zimplats shares seems to have been so 
convincing that even the MDC aligned Deputy Minister of Youth, Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Tongai Matutu was convinced. In an interview in May 2012, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Kasukuwere’s deputy was convinced that the matter was a done deal and that ten percent of 
Zimplats’s shares had been transferred to the local community. It is unlikely that Matutu, who 
was critical of the policy to the extent of dismissing it as ZANU-PF’s political gimmick, was 
well-informed. Zimplats’s ASX announcement of 14 March 2012 was in direct contrast to the 
deputy minister’s assertion— 
…shares in the operating subsidiary representing 10% of the [enlarged] issued share capital of that 
company will be issued to the Community Trust at the independent valuation previously submitted to 
the Government. Zimplats Holdings Limited (“Zimplats”) will provide an interest free loan to the 
Community Trust to fund the shares and the loan will be repaid from dividends (Zimplats, ASX 
announcement 14 March 2012). 
Thus while the minister stated that this was “a done deal,” this was in fact yet to happen 
(Interview, 25 June 2012). Curiously, during the same launch of the CSOT Zimplats 
announced a donation of US $10 million to the trust. It only became clear later that this 
would be disbursed over a period of three years. For politicians associated with the occasion, 
merely mentioning the US $10 million donation was enough.  
 
Yet the nature of the proposal for the employee and community share ownership does not 
guarantee the successful transfer of shares to the envisaged beneficiary. Even though the 
cabinet came up with a framework for the establishment of CSOTs, forming these proved to 
be difficult. The requirement for approval by the minister means that the trust would be led 
by people aligned to ZANU-PF. That the Board of Trustees would be constituted by chiefs 
(known to be sympathetic to ZANU-PF), local councillors and other members appointed by 
the minister was protested against by civil society organisations and community based 
organisations excluded from the arrangement. Conflicts associated with the forming of trusts 
mean that, even though the company made the shares available, it would take time before the 
“community” gets organised enough to claim the shares. It may seem good that the company 
was providing an interest-free loan for the CSOT, but this would means years of repayment 
with no dividends accruing in the short to medium term. This would be further extended by 
the fact that the company is going through an expansion and in fact had not declared 
dividends since 2003. By August 2012, no trust had been constituted to claim the Zimplats 
shares as per the cabinet framework. What continues to exist is a community trust established 





The problems associated with the CSOTs are similar to those of the employee share 
ownership scheme (ESOT). Zimplats’s empowerment proposal suggested that 
… a further 10% of the [enlarged] issued share capital of that company will be sold to an employee 
share ownership trust for the benefit of all full time employees of Zimbabwe Platinum Mines (Private) 
Limited (Zimplats ASX Announcement, 14 March 2012).  
Unlike the CSOT, the funding for the scheme attracts interest. The length of the repayment 
period, given that the company is in expansion mode, makes it uncertain as to when the 
employees would start receiving dividends. Since the scheme is available to willing 
employees, it remains to be seen whether the employees would actually take up the offer. The 
law does not prohibit the company from buying back shares from both the CSOT and the 
ESOT at some point. Kasukuwere said Zimbabwe will no longer consider social investment 
credits for foreign firms, including mines, in their quest to fulfil empowerment requirements. 
The minister’s assertion that, “We are not going to consider social grants such as building 
schools and clinics. What we have said is the communities will be able to do it themselves 
when they get the ten percent share of the profits,” (Daily News, 21 January 2011) is likely to 
see communities worse off. 
 
6.	  Grassroots	  Empowerment	  or	  Elite	  Accumulation?	  
	  
Reports in 2011 and 2012 suggested that ZANU-PF politicians were jostling for Zimplats 
shares. In 2011, the politically powerful late general and husband to the vice president, 
Solomon Mujuru, had allegedly offered to protect the company in return for shares (The 
Standard (online edition), 11 September 2011). He is said to have warned the company that 
the Chinese were interested in platinum and had the support of President Mugabe. At his 
death, Mujuru’s estate was estimated at over US $9 billion, more than the country’s GDP. 
The scramble involved other big political names such as Webster Shamu and Bright 
Matonga, who were allegedly “pushing to have the entirety of Zimplats’s 51 percent 
indigenisation equity acquired by investors from Mashonaland West” Province (Financial 
Gazette, 6 May 2011). Others politicians were reported to be pushing for their companies 
while others suggested that the shares should be distributed equally among Zimbabwe’s ten 
provinces. The Financial Gazette reported that Zimplats was planning to approach Mugabe 
for clarity and guidelines on how to go about this. The Zimplats CEO complained that the 






The community entity that exists with regard to Zimplats’s CSO is Mhondoro-Ngezi CSOT, 
and not Chegutu Mhondoro-Ngezi Zvimba CSOT, which was supposedly launched in 
October 2011. According to the Cabinet Operational Framework for Community Share 
Ownership Schemes or Trusts, a CSOT “ought to be formed” at district level. The reference 
to “Chegutu Mhondoro-Ngezi Zvimba” CSOT is then somewhat of an anomaly as this 
potentially combines three districts47. In a focus group discussion, councilors from Ngezi 
district argued that such a complex name was born out of greed and an attempt by some 
politicians to incorporate other districts which, geographically speaking, would not qualify. 
Prior to the Trust launch, Chief Nyika, in whose area Zimplats is mining, had threatened not 
to take part in the proposed Trust insisting “…his people had formed their own Mhondoro-
Ngezi Community Development Foundation.” (The Standard, 24 September 2011). However 
strictly speaking, Zimplats’s operations transcend Mhondoro-Ngezi district boundaries, 
encroaching into two other districts namely, Chegutu and Zvimba. A 77 kilometre road, 
constructed by the company, connects mining operations in Mhondoro-Ngezi with a 
processing plant in Selous and overlaps the Mhondoro-Ngezi district boundaries. In such a 
case, according to the cabinet CSOT framework, a Special Purpose Vehicle will be used to 
“…ensure equal distribution of dividends amongst the affected Trusts” (by implication 
districts). 
 
The Mhondoro-Ngezi Community Trust hosts the most significant company operations. It is 
likely to bear most of the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the mine. The Board 
consists of four chiefs, the Ngezi RDC chairperson, the Council CEO, a women’s 
representative and a representative for people with disabilities. The chiefs assume board 
chairpersonship on a rotational basis. Though the board has met on more than one occasion 
since 2011, the CSOT is yet to have an independent office and start operations. So far, the 
board has relied on RDC offices for its meetings. If one considers how other CSOTs are 
operating, it is likely that the CSOT will operate from the RDC offices. There is thus risk that 
these trusts might be subsumed by RDCs and end up functioning as local government sub-
units, thus failing to improve community involvement in local development. Locally there is 
growing frustration and impatience over the empowerment deal. Residence and local leaders 
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months after the launch. The use of the term Chegutu Mhondoro-Ngezi Zvimba may thus be representing 




question why, a year later, nothing tangible has come out of the CSOT and the US $10 
million donation. The impression from media and politicians has been that this money was a 
once-off payment but this is not the case. 
It is seldom mentioned that the US $10 million is actually staggered over a period of three 
years. According to Zimplats, this will be done in amounts of approximately US$3.3 million 
from 2012 to 2014. Sources within government suggest that the US $10 million is actually 
meant to cover the three districts of Chegutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi and Zvimba. What this means 
(and again something hardly stated) is that each district will get about US $1.1 million 
annually until 2014. This money was intended for corporate social responsibility projects 
which henceforth will be managed by the community trusts instead of the company. In fact, 
since the government no longer allows the social investment credits, the community will use 
the money from its shares. Whether or not the ten percent shares will also be shared equally 
between the three community trusts has not been discussed. So far, the assumption is that it is 
the Mhondoro-Ngezi CSOT that will access the entirety of the shares.   
 
If the public pronouncement on Zimplats’s compliance and the establishment of a CSOT 
were meant to provide for a gracious end to the extensively raised public attention on the 
matter, at least up until the time of writing, this seems to have worked. The media frenzy had 
died. Having “successfully indigenised the mines” the minister was shifting his focus towards 
education, banking and tourism first and then other sectors. Of course more questions than 
answers were being raised by the manner in which the policy was being implemented. While 
according to Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Empowerment Ministry, nearly all big mines 
had complied with this law, there was no tangible evidence that this was the case. At least in 
the interim, Zimplats’s investment appeared safe and the company was on course to execute 
its phase two expansion project. In this the company was not alone — Chinese, Indian and 
Russian companies among others were extending operations and entering agreements with 
the Zimbabwe government without having to meet the policy’s 51 percent local ownership 
requirement.  
 
A curious aspect of Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and empowerment debate was the loud 
silence of the intended beneficiaries. The Mutoko community where granite mining and 
Chaidzwa communities in eastern Zimbabwe where diamond mining is taking place are 




Environmental Law Association and the Centre for Research and Development. Yet even in 
these two communities, positions on CSOT remained muted and under-represented at policy 
formulation and implementation level. Among community members interviewed there was 
no sense of ownership of the CSOT or understanding of indigenisation policy. The cabinet 
CSOT framework does not provide for community participation or involvement of pre-
existing community organisations in an area. The General Notice 114 of 2011 requires “all 
non-indigenously owned companies to submit Revised Indigenisation Implementation plans.” 
These must be approved by the minister and there is no mention of community engagement 
though one aspect of these plans would be the transfer of ten percent of the shares to 
community.  
 
The top down nature of the trust is not only shown by the way it is originated but the fact that 
chiefs are heavily represented. Mhondoro-Ngezi Trust has four chiefs who serve as 
chairpersons rotationally. Some within the community and indeed among local councilors 
argue that their office has been compromised by politics and hence they are not the best 
people to unite the community for the purpose of maximising benefits from resources. They 
also note that having a leader is not enough; “We might have a leader, but he is not 
everything about us...” (Focus Group Discussion, 11 September 2012). The sense of 
exclusion is represented in statements by local leaders below. One chief went as far as 
describing the whole affair as a lie.  
...this whole thing is a cheat... it is just speech, nothing is being done ... (the) ...whole thing is an 
imposition because we have no say, you must just say yes… What are mothers getting from this... it is 
only comrades. And some of these comrades were year olds when the war started...This whole thing is 
political. Chiefs are just being forced to support this... (Interview, 11 September, 2012). 
Asked about community needs and perceptions in the wake of the CSOT and indigenisation, 
one local councilor remarked,  
This issue is a top to bottom approach... if we go into community, people don’t know about this. There 
is no community and grassroots involvement. Most people do not know. Even as we tell you what they 
want, the truth is we are only speculating what people actually want because they are not 
participating... so we actually do not know what people want (ibid). 
The minister has sweeping powers over the establishment and management of community 
trusts and generally the implementation of the indigenisation policy as a whole.  
 
Contrary to claims by the ZANU-PF side of the Zimbabwe government, there is no legal 




be said about ESOT, though the latter is mentioned in the principal act and subsequent 
regulations. In fact, nowhere in the principal act does the word “community” appear let alone 
“community share ownership.” It appears as if the concept of CSOT was an afterthought and 
a reaction to criticisms that the policy lacks broad based empowerment. That the ministry is 
responding to criticisms is, in itself, a positive thing. Having been excluded in the principal 
act and subsequent regulations, on March 25, 2011, government came up with an amended 
Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 which provides for CSOTs but this does not make mandatory 
the disposal of ten percent shares to communities. 
 
The NIEEB green handbook incorrectly states, “In terms of Section 14 B of Statutory 
Instrument 116 of 2010 and General Notice 114 of 2010 it is a requirement that communities 
must acquire at least ten percent in mining communities that operate in areas they live in.” 
(NIEEB, December 2011). However the referred to section is only defining or qualifying that 
the CSOT “…may be taken into consideration when assessing the extent to which a business 
has achieved or exceeded the minimum indigenisation and empowerment quota.” This 
according to Section 4 (b) 4 is provided for where a “… a business is wishing to use the 
qualifying scheme…” Thus the regulation does not require but clarifies how a willing foreign 
owned business may use CSOT to fulfill the indigenisation minimum requirement. 
  
In the absence of clear legal backing, the CSOTs will only participate and own shares at the 
discretion of the minister and mining companies. Section 4 (b) 4 referred to above implies 
that the mining company has to be willing. According to NIEEB the ten percent Community 
Share Ownership is also applicable to indigenously owned mines, the principle being that 
communities are entitled to ten percent shares in every company extracting resources in their 
area. The acknowledgment that communities are entitled to directly benefit from mining 
activities is progressive. However, without making this legally mandatory, it is difficult to 
imagine how this can be enforced. Curiously, the cabinet framework on CSOTs lists several 
functions for the community trustees. However, none of these speak to acquisition, 
management or disposal of shares provided for by the IEE policy.  
 
During interviews, some government officials became evasive and agitated when pressed 
about the lack of clarity with regards to the community shares and the supposed US $10 
million donation. While there is a lot of loose thinking, with one official remarking “... they 




2012), there is a general unwillingness to provide specifics. One media report noted “...there 
has been no fanfare surrounding the issuance of shares certificates to beneficiary 
communities, nor has there been much publicity about the trust deeds.” From this research it 
could not be ascertained whether the Mhondoro-Ngezi Trust has been constituted in terms of 
a deed of trust. Information obtained was contradictory and following up with the deed office 
proved impossible. Prior to the CSOT, Zimplats had a trust for CSR projects and this would 
continue to hold monies until the Mhondoro-Ngezi Community Trust is registered and 




Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and empowerment policy and the related attempts at organising 
community involvement in resource extraction and local economic development show a 
disjuncture between i) policy as legislated, ii) policy as pronounced (either through public 
verbal pronouncements or through official documents) and (iii) policy as practiced. As a 
result, the apparently hostile political environment and patronage accumulation in Zimbabwe 
may appear, prima facie, anathema to big corporate ventures of the stature of Zimplats, but as 
this case shows, this is not always the case. Of course the context is one where the profits are 
so big that the corrupt demands are well worth Zimplats’s expenditures. Zimbabwe’s political 
economy of crisis is riddled with contradictions. It brings to the fore questions about the 
acquisitive character of Zimbabwe’s political elites.  
Thus at a conceptual level, Zimbabwe’s indigenisation and economic empowerment policy 
may appear to represent a pragmatic way of transforming an industry that has been known to 
scar lungs and landscapes into one that can spearhead pro-poor economic development but 
the reality is largely otherwise. This chapter has shown how the program is severely 
compromised by the centralisation of the authority in the minister. It is no wonder, during the 
tenure of the inclusive gorvnment, that some started to describe the minister of indigenisation 
and empowerment as either a “super minister” or “priminsiter”. In ZANU-PF power retention 
and accumulation strategy - a combined (economic and political) reproductive function two 
ministries where very important, namely, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment and 





The combined reproductive function is replicated in the manner in which the state and the 
party dealt with ASM as the following chapter will show. But similar to Zimplats’ 
exceptional performance, this has not excluded possibility for some sort of independent 
vertical mobility. In essence, the dream for real economic liberation is seriously compromised 
by the very nature of the Zimbabwean state. This problematic stance of Zimbabwe’s 
“economic history of liberating ‘ourselves’” has been mentioned in the introduction but will 





PART	  FOUR:	  CRISIS	  ACCUMULATION	  AND	  ASM	  GOLD	  MINING	  
 
Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis has seen the dramatic decline or death of most of 
the country’s formal economy on one hand and the growth of a pervasive and important 
informal sector on the other. A key feature of this informality is informal artisanal and small 
scale gold mining, dominated by gold panning. The previous part observed the general 
decline of the mining sector and the exceptional situation of the platinum sector. This 
together with ASM gold mining constitutes two outcomes of the crisis.  While the previous 
two chapters looked at Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis as relating to the state’s 
attempt at extracting revenue and wrestling control of the platinum sector, this part looks at 
the state’s interaction with ASM, and how this, like the platinum sector, became entwined 
with Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis. It analyses the emerging accumulation 
networks, conflicts, processes and socio-economic outcomes from this activity. It argues that 
during this period, the dividing line between formal and informal becomes increasingly 
blurred. The state and ruling elites play a salient role. Within this context ASM has ceased to 
be merely about poor people’s survival. Patronage, accumulation, politics and violence is 
now also at the core of this phenomenon. 
 
Chapter Seven describes the growth and nature of ASM in Zimbabwe and the Chegutu area 
in particular. It shows how the activity forms part of a highly informalised national regime of 
accumulation. The networks operating in the sector are explained. Chapter Eight considers 
the centrality and pervasiveness of the influence of the Zimbabwe state and ruling elite in this 
sector. It shows how policy contradictions have intersected with the acquisitive instincts of 








Indeed the words chaos, violence, patronage, pillage and plunder have commonly been 
associated with land, politics and diamond mining in the east of Zimbabwe, and by inference, 
epitomise Zimbabwe’s post-2000 crisis political economy. Focusing on the Chegutu 
Mhondoro area, this chapter shows that similar acrimony accumulates in Zimbabwe’s ASM 
and in fact predates the 2006 diamond rush. Gold panning typifies Zimbabwe’s informalised 
and unregulated regime of accumulation, in which those with access to the state play a 
dominant role. To this extent, Zimbabwe’s artisanal and small scale gold mining has 
metamorphosed from merely being a survival strategy for the poor to being a highly 
contested arena for accumulation. Evidence presented in this chapter also shows that the 
sector has provided opportunities for upward mobility. This chapter analyses ASM in the 
Chegutu area, emerging accumulation networks, conflicts, processes and socio-economic 
outcomes.  
 
As observed earlier, as far as Zimbabwe’s mining sector is concerned, two sectors have 
remained vibrant. These are the platinum sector and the ASM sector in gold. Evidence of 
viability is easily noticeable with regards to the platinum sector since output and profit 
figures are well documented. The latter sector is somewhat problematic since official figures 
are either absent or sporadic. However, news reports and estimates of smuggling by 
Zimbabwe’s central bank suggest that ASM burgeoned post 2000 and continues to blossom 
by the time of writing.  My research shows this to be true with respect to the Chegutu 
Mhondoro area. If anything, the very nature of the crisis and the elite-driven political 
economy attending it appear to have spurred the sector.  
 
It is useful at this point to recap questions raised earlier in this thesis. The first and perhaps 
most obvious question is to understand the factors facilitating the buoyant performance of the 
informal/illegal ASM. This question can be further problematised by the fact that the decline 
of Zimbabwe’s mining sector during the period in question presents a paradox since it 
happened at a time when commodity prices were rising globally. According to Hawkins 
(2009, 16), “From 2003 until mid-2008 the mining industry was progressively constrained by 




global boom in metal and mineral prices.” It is thus necessary to confront the reasons for the 
“exceptional performance” of ASM.  Additionally, one needs to address the question of 
power in the Zimbabwean economy. Using the rhetoric of economic indigenisation and pro-
poor wealth redistribution, Zimbabwe’s political elites sought to control all available spaces 
for viable accumulation.  A distinct feature of Zimbabwe’s informality has been its 
intersection with the state (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). While the state was a declared an 
enemy of informal gold mining, through its actions it fuelled informal artisanal and small 
scale gold mining. This formed a critical component of Zimbabwe’s elite-driven crisis 
accumulation strategy.  
 
2.	  Defining	  ASM	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
	  
There is no single agreed definition of the ASM sector. Generally, definitions have differed 
from country to country and author to author.  Hentschel et al. (2003, 7) identifies several 
characteristics that can be associated with ASM. These include but are not limited to: 
ü Use of labour-intensive technology, 
ü Use of unskilled labour, 
ü Low production volumes, 
ü Small size claims, 
ü High losses of value and time, 
ü Illegality and informality, 
ü Gambler mentality, 
ü Subsistence economy, 
ü Seasonal activity, 
ü Low economic literacy and poor management practice. 
They note, “The development of the sector shows a strong relationship to the general 
economic indicators of the country: ASM is poverty related” (8). It is thus regarded as a 
survival/temporary mechanism to cope with poverty and unemployment. Evidence presented 
below illustrates that these characterisations only apply to a very limited extent for the 
studied area. In particular, dependence on unskilled labour, labour intensity, poor 





Policy and legal framework in Zimbabwe does not prescribe a specific definition for ASM. 
However, common references associate the practice with low production volumes, small size 
claims and informality. In 2002, the Ministry of Mines used an output criteria, defining small 
gold producers as those producing “less than 15kgs of gold per year” (Maponga and Meck, 
2003, 350). Government reports show that the colonial state used output and employment to 
distinguish between small, medium and large scale mines. It is notable that the output 
threshold for small miners was higher during the colonial period than afterwards. This is not 
surprising considering the colonial state’s bias towards big players as opposed to the post-
colonial state which felt obligated to promote entry of the lower echelons of society into this 
sector.  In the colonial era, small-scale miners were almost always white males who were 
small capitalists employing labour and whose practices were only partly informal.  
 
This thesis rather distinguishes between small registered works/claims and informal 
unregistered producers and traders as opposed to medium to large scale corporate owned 
ventures. There is a strong intersection between small registered works and informal/illegal 
activities. Generally, ASM is associated with the informal/illegal activities at the lower end of 
the mineral industry spectrum. This chapter starts by reflecting on the growth and extent of 
ASM in Zimbabwe and especially Chegutu before moving on to discuss specific categories of 
this and how these have interacted with Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis.  
 
3.	  ASM	  Mining	  a	  World	  Wide	  Phenomenon	  
 
ASM is not unique to Zimbabwe; it is a worldwide phenomenon, especially in mineral rich 
developing countries. The majority of the world’s ASM miners are involved in gold mining 
but there is also a significant involvement in mining alluvial gemstones and diamonds 
particularly in the DRC, Sierra Leone and Madagascar. Within development thinking, early 
conceptualisations on ASM focused on definitional and technical issues in trying to 
distinguish ASM from large scale commercialised mining. The sector was generally viewed 
as a problem that needed addressing. Since the 1990s, policy attitude in most countries has 
shifted gradually from ostracising the sector as unwanted to that of acknowledging its 
potential contribution to the economy and poverty alleviation especially for women and 
children (Hilson, 2009, 1). The political logic has been that “…thousands of artisanal and 




(Danielson, 2003, XIV). ASM miners are viewed as “people seeking economic refuge” 
(Shefa et al, 2009, 51).  
 
Table 3: Evolution of the Development Community's Approach to ASM 
Period Approaches for dealing with ASM 
1970s Definitional issues 
1980s Technical issues 
Early 1990s Towards integration of technical, environmental, 
legal, social and economic issues 
1990s Special attention on legalisation of ASM sectors 
Mid- to late 1990s Relation between large mining companies and ASM 
gender and child labour issues 
2000s Community-related issues and sustainable 
livelihoods 
Source: Hentschel, 2003, 13. 
 
In 2003, estimates of the number of people employed globally as ASM ranged from 60 
million to 100 million (Hentschel et al, 2003: 5). Maponda and Meck note that, “Local 
nomenclature such as galamseys (Ghana), makorokoza (Zimbabwe) and garimpeiros (Brazil) 
has evolved around the world, (as) clear indication of the universality of artisanal and small 
scale mining” (2003, 349). In West Africa ASM has stimulated urban – rural migration. 
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa most of the people involved in ASM are rural inhabitants. 
Hilson (2009) notes the two narratives on how ASM fits into the region’s de-agrarianisation 
“puzzle”. On one hand the sector is viewed as being characterised by “rush-type” activities, 
chaotic and entrepreneurially driven. This views ASM as subsidiary to farming and 
representing diversification of the rural income earning portfolio.  Artisanal and small scale 
miners according to this view are seen as fortune seekers. One the other hand, ASM is 
regarded as an alternative means of livelihood rapidly replacing rural farming as the main 
economic activity.  This view argues that “...despite being fuelled by poverty, artisanal 
mining is more than a ‘rush activity’: that is, a deeply rooted industry” (Hilson, 2009, 3).  
 
ASM accounts for more than 20 percent of the world’s non-fuel mineral production. It is this 
pervasiveness and inability to wish ASM away that saw the shift in attention towards 
legalising ASM in the 1990s. Proponents of legalising ASM argue that the sector forms part 




is argued that “by not extending rights to the extra-legal economy, the institutions of the state 
are denying economic freedom to what is in fact the overwhelming majority of the world’s 
people, who subsist in a state of ‘legal apartheid’” (Shefa, et al., 52). Formalising is seen as 
the key to unlocking ASM’s full potential. Largely ad hoc approaches to formalising and 
legalising ASM in Africa have however been top-down. Proponents argue that this should not 
be the case, rather, legislation should carefully assimilate local values and norms (Siegel and 
Veiga, 2009).  
 
In arguing for the formalisation and legalisation of ASM, the development of western 
capitalism is often cited. “...(C)apitalism succeeded in North America, Europe and Japan 
because entrepreneurship was integrated (formalised) into one property system, thus releasing 
potential that is dormant in dead capital” (De Soto, 2000), but the applicability of this to 
Africa is questionable. In the US, the main reason  
...why gold helped build American West was that, in the absence of a strong government, miners 
formed hundreds of extralegal local and regional claim associations with elaborate regulation for 
marking territories, registering claims and administering justice. In California, after the gold rush in 
1849, this included at least 800 separate property jurisdictions, each with its own governance system 
developed by local consensus (De Soto, 2000, 53).  
The US mining laws drafted in 1872 in order to have legitimacy adapted these pre-existing 
property rights systems. Notably however, this happened when capitalism was long 
established without qualification in the USA and was supported by a strong state system.  
In most of Africa, ASM is taking place where central government is weak and in situations of 
armed conflict. Perpetual armed conflicts tend to undermine the development of orderly 
property systems, since access is regulated by the rule of the gun rather than rule of law. The 
uncertain nature of the accumulation process thus inhibits long term developmental planning 
because individuals and companies resort to looting since there are no long term guarantees.  
 
In fact ASM is also a feature of developing countries today. Moreover, this coincides with 
situations where global capital has thrived as well.  Bayart (2000b) has shown how 
historically global capital can link up with local networks to accumulate in a conflict 
situation.  However in these places, there is an intriguing connection between ASM and big 
global capital. In Ghana for example, concerns have been raised over the increasing 
involvement of Chinese companies and individuals in ASM perceived to be a preserve for 




technology and capital in return for a significant share of the proceeds (Modern Ghana, 25 
November 2009; GhanaWeb, 5 April 2013). In Zimbabwe the informal economy comes with 
a strong and coercive state. At times the state uses force to drive away informal activity but 
law enforcement has been selective and inconsistent, and in most instances, small miners 
would be driven away only to be replaced by syndicates aligned to powerful individuals 
connected to the state. The police and military also participated directly in ASM illegally.   
 
The acceptance of ASM as necessary for poor people’s survival has had to confront negative 
environmental and health effects, exploitative labour practices and use of child labour. 
Studies and media coverage on countries where ASM is rife such as the Philippines have 
raised awareness of the health hazards and child labour problems associated with ASM.  
ASM is said to be responsible for one third of the world’s mercury pollution. In countries 
where mercury usage is rampant, government efforts, often with the help from foreign 
agencies, increase awareness among miners and encourage safer mining practice.  One such 
intervention in Zimbabwe has seen the establishment of a central processing centre in 
Shamva. This was celebrated by UNECA (2002) as symbolising best practice, inspiring the 
agency to fund similar centres in Ghana and elsewhere (Childs, 2008). However it has been 
observed that gold processing centres where these centres have been established have usually 
been unable to meet the overwhelming demand by miners, resulting in small miners reverting 
back to mercury amalgamation.  
 
4.	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  ASM	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
	  
Gold mining and trade predates the advent of colonial Zimbabwe. Pre-colonial mining only 
consisted of small works, what would qualify in the modern era as artisanal and small scale 
mining. This focused mostly on the extraction of gold and iron. Since agriculture and 
livestock production were the economic mainstay, mining was only done as a subsidiary 
activity. Gold dust was traded for goods such as beads, bracelets, ceramics and cloth as well 
as guns and ammunition. According to Miller et al. quoted in Masiya et al. (2012, 290), “This 
trade provided a new means of capital accumulation and consumer demand and resulted in 
the stimulation of economic specialisations such as gold mining.” Thus in the long run 
mining had significance in the pre-colonial political economy. Gold trading was central to the 
establishment and development of pre-colonial Zimbabwe policies such as the Great 




mines was mostly vested in rulers. The Mutapa Empire collected gold as a form of tax from 
the several vassal chiefs and no one was allowed to extract gold without a license from the 
emperor (Schmidt, 1988). Gold production, it is alleged, was restricted in the later periods of 
the Mutapa Empire, as a way to manage foreign interests (in particular the Portuguese) in the 
internal politics of the Empire. By the advent of colonialism, 4000 “ancient” workings were 
said to have existed. Several of the modern era gold mines were to develop from the old 
workings sites.  Gold was largely mined out given the limited technology and may have been 
of little importance after the 17th century when Mutapa came to an end, making trade less 
significant. 
 
The establishment of colonial rule saw the death of indigenous black mining. Ownership of 
means of production by Africans was discouraged as a way to force them into wage labour. 
This approach was not entirely successful as most indigenous Africans opted for selling 
agricultural commodities. Only minimal river bank panning remained as a continuation of 
pre-colonial indigenous mining.  
 
Though the colonial period was characterised by a robust white-dominated small scale 
mining sector, this only stabilised in the second decade of the 20th century.   The initial focus 
was mostly on large scale mining and it took the BSAC a long time to accept that the 
scattered nature of the colony’s mineral deposits often supported the logic of small-scale 
mining. Following this admission, legislative and policy changes were instituted. This 
included royalty exemptions, capital financing and technical support. The development of 
road and railway enabled the importation of equipment, modern methods of mining and an 
easier link between the mines and the markets. Small mines operated by either individuals or 
syndicates increased in number from 20 in 1904 to 400 in 1923 (Anderson, 1961). With the 
decline of the international gold standard, 1935 represents the peak of small-scale mining 
with 1650 registered small miners contributing nearly 32 percent of national output (Ibid).  
 
Despite the obvious importance of small-scale mining, colonial policy remained biased 
towards large scale and international capital. Large scale mining continued to contribute the 
bulk of mineral output.  Small mines were restricted to a few specific minerals namely, 
chromite, emeralds, industrial minerals, tantalite, tin and gold but did remain significant 
compared to neighbouring countries like South Africa and Zambia.  Especially during times 




adaptability, were important. They were easily able to employ cost-cutting measures outside 
the purview of the state. Exploitation of cheap, non-contractual black labour was central.  
  
Post-1980 policy was far from being decisively sympathetic to black small miners48. 
However, several factors favoured growth and entry of numerous black miners. As observed 
earlier, Zimbabwe’s geological conditions favoured small works as opposed to large scale 
gold mining and now there were no racial barriers operating against blacks. The nature of the 
gold trade allows for ease of manoeuvre around the sometimes rigid regulatory frameworks 
for small miners. The sector thus provided necessary conditions for aspiring black miners. 
Moreover, to a certain degree, there existed a sentiment in ZANU-PF that “the land and 
minerals belong to us” (Interview, David Chapfika, 5 September, 2012). Registered claims 
increased from 1 000 in 1983 to 10 000 by 1990 (Masiya et al, 2012, 293). Liberal reforms of 
the early 1990s aimed at loosening regulation in the ESAP period, and the increasing 
unemployment that followed, also led to further growth of ASM.  
 
As a means of mitigating rising unemployment, government policy shifted from the 
ambivalence of the 1980s towards supporting if not encouraging ASM, especially in gold 
mining. In 1993, Zimbabwe hosted a world summit on artisanal and small scale mining which 
came up with what is now known as the Harare Guidelines on Small-Scale Mining. The 
declaration provided commitments for “poverty-reduction-orientated development 
assistance” for ASM and has been cited as a model for other countries (Dreschler, 2001; 
Hilson and Van Der Vorst, 2002; Hinton, 2006). The Harare summit was part of a global 
awakening towards embracing ASM and several related summits and conference have been 
held since. Throughout the 1990s, the Ministry of Mines, working with donors, promoted 
ASM and emphasised the need to recognise it as a poverty alleviation activity49. Gold prices 
for small-scale miners were deliberately kept at favourable rates to minimise smuggling and 
encourage registration. While growth of ASM was marked in the 1990s, the post-2000 
expansion of ASM was phenomenal.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This was typical of the continuity-structured post-1980 state as with the neglect of community agricultural 
experiments.  
49 The Canadian International Development Agency and various German and Swedish agencies worked with the 




5.	  Post-­‐2000	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Further	  Growth	  of	  ASM	  
	  
From 2000 onward, growth of illegal and informal ASM accelerated. Shoko (2002) estimates 
the number of those involved at 500 000. These figures would make Zimbabwe about the 
world’s fourth highest ASM country by number of participants after China (3-15 million), 
Tanzania (550 000) and India (500 000) (Maponda and Meck, 2003; Hentschel, 2003, 18). 
Zimbabwe’s economic plunge thereafter accelerated the rate of Zimbabwe’s economic 
decline. Agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and medium and large-scale mining declined 
rapidly.  Unemployment ranged between 90 and 95 percent.  
 
The government’s response to the worsening economic situation was to institute price 
controls, fixing foreign exchange, pegging the gold price and mandatory surrender of foreign 
currency, among other things. These interventions often lacked economic realism. This 
triggered serious market distortions which rendered the country’s payment and exchange 
system dysfunctional. The outcome was a thriving parallel/informal market. Literally 
everything ceased to be available on the formal market from meat to fuel to foreign currency 
and gold. Parallel gold trade/smuggling was fuelled by the rising unemployment on one hand 
and the state’s failure to pay miners on the other. Though the government required miners to 
surrender foreign currency earnings, it was often impossible for miners to access foreign 
currency from banks and other government facilities to finance import of capital goods.  
 
The year 2008 represents the lowest point for Zimbabwe’s formal gold mining sector. This is 
reflected in the graph below. By end of November Metallon Gold which accounted for 55 
percent of Zimbabwe’s annual gold output suspended operations on its five mines, leaving 
thousands of workers in a quandary. The company cited non-payment of US $18.3 million in 
lieu of gold deliveries to RBZ. By the time gold trade was liberalised in 2009, gold miners 
were owed more than US $30 million by the RBZ (Zimbabwe Independent, 18 June, 2010). 
At the time of writing, RBZ was failing to redeem gold bonds it issued to gold miners for 
unpaid gold deliveries. It is thus not surprising that between 2000 and 2008 gold deliveries to 








Figure 16: Growth of Artisanal and Scale Mining in the 2003-2009 
 
Source: Reports from RBZ and UNIDO. 
 
While official gold output declined, ASM increased and with it rampant smuggling. In the 
light of hostile state interventions, miners had to either suspend operations or channel gold 
into the parallel and informal market. ASM by its small-scale nature is more adaptable to 
smuggling. The graph above shows that, while official gold output was declining due to the 
scaling down and closure of formal mining operations, artisanal mining was on the increase 
as seen by the rise in the number of ASM participants. It is thus safe to say that formal figures 
portray an exaggerated picture of receding gold output; rather most of the gold was 
channelled towards the parallel market. By 2008 some two million Zimbabweans were 
dependent on ASM according to UNIDO (2007) and perhaps more today. It is no wonder that 
RBZ estimates that between 2002 and 2007 gold worth US $400 million (15 tonnes) was 
smuggled out of the country annually. 
 
Dollarisation and the formation of a coalition government brought some economic and 
political stability from 2009. Inflation fell back to single digits averaging five percent 
between 2009 and 2012.  Yet unemployment remains rife; as a result ASM continues to 
proliferate. Cases of national roads being dug up and bushes burned due to panning activity 
abound in the area (Mambondiyani, 2008; Karimakwenda, 2012). It remains one of the few 
real avenues for upward mobility and in some instances survival. The graph below shows that 
the relative contribution of legally recognised small miners increased in 2012. This research 
shows that prior to 2009, ASM channelled gold to the drastically changed parallel market. 
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that more and more ASM miners are selling gold through official channels. Thus monthly 
contribution of small scale producers grew from 125 kilograms (six percent) in January to 
429 kilograms (31 percent) in December. 
  
Figure 17: Small Mining Contribution to Mining Output in 2011 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. 
 
At the government level, there is neither will nor capacity to arrest the spread of unregulated 
ASM. Even capacity to manage the registered and semi-formalised small gold mines is 
absent. Policy implementation has tended to be haphazard, inconsistent and election driven. 
In some instances government ministers have expressed uneasiness at the uncontrolled nature 
of small-scale mining (Karimakwenda, 2012). As will be observed below government has 
been quick at the same time to celebrate the sector’s contribution to the national economy 
(Newsday, 21 May, 2012).  
6.	  Artisanal	  and	  Small	  Scale	  Mining	  in	  the	  Chegutu	  Area	  
 
Following the devastating effects of land seizures and de-industrialisation, artisanal and small 
scale mining has become very important for Chegutu town. The increasing unemployment 
has pushed thousands into ASM gold mining and “sex panning50.’ Approximately one fifth of 
those involved in ASM are former mine employees.  To add to this, a combination of 
unreliable rainfall, poor prices for crops like cotton, failure by government to pay for maize 
deliveries and lack of inputs and other supply side constraints pushed rural farmers to venture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




more and more into gold panning, which hitherto has been a seasonal and complementary 
economic activity.  
 
ASM has become an important economic activity for both the rural and urban population. 
This of course is a pattern observable nationally in the 2000s. A 2007 M.A. study  of 
Totororo area in rural central Zimbabwe showed a similar trend (Mawowa, 2007). During the 
crisis period, Chegutu has thus exemplified the national economy’s increasing mineral 
dependence. Thus government’s policy emphasis on the centrality of the peasantry and 
subsistence farming for the rural population may in fact be evading the reality.  By 2012 
mining accounted for the largest share of Zimbabwe’s GDP at 17 percent and dominated the 
country’s exports. Of this mining output, approximately 40 percent was coming from small-
scale miners.  
 
Traditionally ASM has been mostly a rural activity, but in Chegutu, this seems to have 
changed during the crisis period. In fact, ASM in the area is dominated by Chegutu urban 
residents, 68 percent (136) of 201 arbitrary polled miners. There is also a high participation 
of young men below the age of 35 who accounted for 71 percent of the sample. The 
proportion of young men between the age of 20 and 35 is even higher among gold panners, 
100 percent at one visited site. Some of these young people form part of syndicates headed by 
powerful and senior individuals who are either politicians or businessmen. Within the 201 
individuals sampled, 30 percent were former mine workers and farm workers from the 
Chegutu area and beyond. Of note is the significant involvement of boys in their teenage 
years. The distribution of miners by age, place of permanent residence and work background 
thus suggests a strong correlation between growing informality, increased ASM and growing 





Figure 18: ASM Participants by Place of Permanent Residence 
 
Source: Survey by Researcher, 2011. 
 
ASM in Chegutu takes three distinct but interrelated forms.  
i. Formal/registered small scale mines/small works 
ii. Panning (Chikorokoza) on gold bearing sites (known as auriferous reefs), abandoned 
mines, old workings and dumps  
iii. Panning along riverbeds 
Riverbed panning in Chegutu has taken place along the Mupfure River mostly by women just 
as Beach (1984) wrote about 17th century Zimbabwe. River panning has been in decline due 
to strict policing by the Environmental Management Agency and growing preference for 
other forms of mining. In 2006 the government reversed the early 1990s legislation which 
facilitated the practice and thus making riverbed panning illegal. Rural District Councils were 
banned from issuing permits for such mining activities. It is two other forms that are more 
common and were the main focus of this research.  
6.1	  Registered	  Small	  Scale	  Miners	  
 
Formal small scale gold mining often takes the form of small claims not exceeding 20 000 
square metres usually operated as family workings, co-operatives, syndicates or individual 
claims. Registered family owned claims are the most common type of small mines. Small-
scale mining activities must be registered in accordance with the Mines and Minerals Act. 
This law is not specific to small-scale mining but encompasses procedures for the registration 
of all mining activities. Other relevant laws include the Environmental Management Act, the 
Precious Metals Act and the Gold Trade Act. According to the Zimbabwe Miners Federation 
(ZMF) which represents small miners, there are 20 000 registered small mines in Zimbabwe. 











At least 5000 of these are in the Chegutu and Mhondoro area. Small miners either conduct 
actual mining (ore extraction and/or old mine dump mining) or operate a gold processing 
mill. It is not unusual for a small-scale miner to do both. 
 
The procedure for establishing a small mine and/or a mill is similar to that of establishing a 
big mine. It involves prospecting (obtaining a prospecting license), sampling, pegging, 
making an environmental impact assessment (EIA), claim registration and issuing of mining 
certificate. Prospecting for small mines takes a much shorter period than medium to large 
mines. Sometimes though, application for a small mine follows a gold rush, thus skipping the 
prospecting stage. A mining certificate is renewable annually for a fee. On January 27, 2012 
the government of Zimbabwe issued Statutory Instrument 11 of 2012 in which mining fees 
were revised upwards. This is likely to push most operations to operate and trade informally 
according to numerous interviews. The relevant fees for small-scale gold miners are captured 
below. 
Table 4: Mining Fees Published on 27 January 2012 
Fees Initial fee New fee 
Registration application  US$5000 
Block Inspection US$10 US$1000 
Annual fee per block US$10 US$1000 
Prospecting US$30 US$500 
Site Rent US$5 US$500 
Gold buying license US$ US$5000 
Milling License US$ US$8000 
Elution Plant  US$5000 
Analysis of Ore Sample US$10 US$20 
Total Start up  >US$26000 
Source: Government of Zimbabwe 2012. 
 
In addition to these fees, miners pay for the pegging of claims (US $200 per block [500 by 
200 metres]), US $300 per report for quarterly reports to EMA,  customer license fees of US 
$1000 per annum, EMA fees of US $150 per quarter, cyanidation and affluent discharge fee 
of US $674 per annum, VAT (five percent on bullion sold), Chegutu Rural District Council 
annual rates charged at US $1000 for up to 100 employees and a US $20 contribution to the 
Minerals Department Policing Committee. To this one adds payments made to the Zimbabwe 




For example, affluent discharge fees are paid to both RDC and EMA. On paper, the total 
start-up cost of establishing a small mine and a mill exceeds US $30 000. Thus from the 
outset, it appears improbable that the poor can register and operate small claims as a way out 
of poverty.  
 
The legislative changes were justified as necessary to discourage speculative holding of 
claims and endless prospecting. This new policy has been referred to as “use it or lose it.” 
Previously, the law allowed holders of Exclusive Prospecting Orders to hold most of the 
mineral-rich lands for a long period of time without developing them. This resulted in most of 
the country’s EPOs being held by an oligopoly of big mines. Aspiring ASM operators thus 
found it difficult to secure land legitimately. The challenge presented by unlimited EPOs does 
not only affect ASM miners but local councils as well in terms of revenue collection. The 
case of ACR and Chegutu Rural District Council (CRDC) is a case in point. ACR is a 
resource exploration company with strong interests in Zimbabwe. Media reports suggest that 
ACR has strong ties with some top ZANU-PF officials. The company once held a 
prospecting license for the controversial diamond claims in Marange until it was muscled out 
despite a court ruling affirming its rights51. Since being kicked out of Marange, the company 
seems to have aggressively pursued gold interests, especially in the Chegutu area.  ACR 
exploration targeting mostly (though not only) old mines and dump sites is on-going and the 
company so far controls four old mines in the area.  
 
ACR exploration has been cause for anxiety among miners and illegal gold panners as well as 
tension with the local government. The Chegutu RDC is suspicious about the company’s 
activities in the area. The tension emanates partly from the way in which EPOs are 
negotiated. An EPO is issued by the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development without 
the involvement of local councils although mining forms part of the local council’s tax base. 
Often, medium to large scale mines undermine the stated rights of the local government and 
only engage the central government. During interviews, some local government officials 
questioned why the company seems to be “prospecting forever.” It was pointed out that the 
company is doing cyanidation, suggesting there is actual mining taking place. “ACR is into a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Some commentators have suggested that ACR’s failure to secure rights for Marange diamonds was entangled 




lot of things; they have links with Dande Holdings52… they say they are prospecting but they 
keep changing their car fleet and bringing new graders. In Pickstone … a school fell within 
their interest area so they had to build another elsewhere to replace it” (Interview, Mr. 
Sithole, Chegutu Rural Council, 14 March 2010). According to CRDC, ACR was not 
remitting anything to the local authority, and, as long as it was not clear what the company 
was actually doing, it was difficult to demand revenue.  
 
As to the hundreds of small miners around Chegutu, they have varied histories. In some 
cases, upon the closure of old mines, claims were issued to former workers at the mine. Such 
was the case with Falcon Gold in Chakari less than ten kilometers from Chegutu where eight 
claims were awarded to former employees who then formed themselves into a cooperative 
with outsiders. News reports suggested that the cooperatives were established by a former 
minister, Paul Mangwana (Newsday, 7 October, 2010, 5). Most of the small mines have been 
in operation for less than 10 years. Some had been closed in the 1990s only to re-open in the 
2000s. Several claims that had been unused only started to be worked after 2000. While 
individual claims and syndicates have been on the rise, cooperative ventures once promoted 
in the 1980s and 1990s appeared to be on a decline.  
 
Table 5: Selected Small Scale Mines in Chegutu 
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52 Dande Holdings is a company with diverse interests reportedly linked to Vice-President Joyce Mujuru and 
David Batau, a prominent ZANU-PF aligned businessman and former MP and other top ZANU-PF officials. 
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PaSangarwe Mill  Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism Official 
>20 Unknown 
Source: Survey by Author 2012. 
 
While on paper, financial requirements for one to enter small mining appear daunting, this 
seems not to be the case in practice. It is common for small miners to start with seed capital 
as little as US $500. Once one has a claim, it seems always possible to find one’s feet. Not all 
who enter small mining go on to establish a successful business. In fact the majority, it 
seems, fail to take off into something meaningful. However, successful cases appear with 
significant enough frequence to warrant attention. Take for instance one Tino who received a 
claim from his mother in 2002 at the age of 18 (Interview, 2 September 2012). Tino’s mother 
secured three gold claims in 1985 which she decided to hand over to her three sons.  The 
claims emanated from a widow but were only given to the male children in a family of seven, 
reflecting the patriarchal if contradictory nature of the Zimbabwe society55. As ASM has 
shifted from being survivalist, male dominance of the sector has increased despite 
government programs to promote women’s participation in mining.  
 
Though the claim has always been available for Tino, it was only in 2002 that he started 
working it. Tino cited two reasons. Firstly, it was in 2002 that he turned 18, which 
symbolically is viewed as attaining manhood. The mother, a former freedom fighter who had 
benefited from a small scale mining initiative by government in the 1980s, then saw fit to 
give him an opportunity. Secondly, hitherto gold mining had not been strongly attractive as 
noted by the indifferent success up to then of his brother Gari who had been a miner since 
1993. However, “…from 2002 onwards we could see that Gari’s small mine was rewarding” 
(Tino, September, 2012). Yet even then Tino was only forced into mining and was never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Started in 2002 but was only fully operational from 2008. 




really interested. The lack of interest, difficulties in financing and the incessant police blitz 
against ASM miners meant that at best Tino’s business operated in fits and starts. Even legal 
claims suffer from police shakedowns. Unable to commit fully to mining, Tino doubled as an 
informal trader. From time to time police would storm small mines, confiscate movable 
equipment and processed gold if any. In fact, the police’s violent clampdowns forced Tino’s 
younger brother who was operating the other small mining claim to switch to teaching.  
 
It was from the year 2008 that Tino started to focus exclusively on his small claim. Ironically, 
the period of Tino’s take-off was the time when Zimbabwe’s economy and the formal mining 
sector were in free fall. Over 50 percent of the small mines observed started or resumed 
operations in 2008. As observed earlier, this was at a time when most medium to large scale 
mines were closing down. To resume operations, Tino got a US $500 financial boost from his 
elder brother Gari. Since then he has relied on his brother for advice and financial assistance. 
The continued reliance on his more successful brother does not mean Tino has not been 
growing his business. Since 2008, the number of employees for Tino’s small mine has grown 
from four to 15 by August 2012. All his staff are on written and signed contracts. This 
however does not mean they enjoy benefits that come with being on formal contracts as 
prescribed by the law. The manager earns US $500, but he is not only working for Tino, in 
fact he is rendering services such as producing the environmental reports for several other 
small mines. By working together, the small mines are able to access and afford certain 
technical skills they require.  
 
Though the majority of small miners tend to start from a very small capital base, this is not 
always the case. Mills require relative large start-up capital. The cost of putting in place a 
mill means that, even where costs to do with regulatory requirements can be circumvented, 
they remain high or prohibitive. There are several gold millers around Chegutu, five of which 
were covered by the researcher. It was striking to note that four of the mills were established 
after the year 2000 and three only after 2004.  Typically, though the current registered 
operations are new, all are established at old mining sites. Perhaps due to the capital intensity 
of milling, mills are likely to attract external parties such as someone from the Zimbabwean 
diaspora, a more established business person or a politically connected individual. These 
people are neither coming from the ranks of small miners nor gold panners from the area. 
Among the three mills listed in the table above, one is reportedly owned by a former gold 





One of the millers, Catsk Milling Company, is located in the Gadzema area about seven 
kilometres west of Chegutu town. Catsk is a registered as a small mine, under the name Catsk 
Private Limited. It is located where the Soprano mine was formerly located. Catsk Mining 
Company has three main operations, namely milling gold ore, gold recovery through 
cynidation and hiring out of compressors to other small miners. Compressors are hired by the 
undercapitalised small miners to drain seepage water from deep shafts. Catsk planned to start 
actual mining in 2011 but this had not materialised at the time of writing. Though registered, 
the company operates as a quasi-formalised entity. There is no proper documentation of 
accounts and it was impossible to reconcile production, income and expenditure figures since 
the operation’s inception. 
 
Like most small mines, Catsk has no access to bank loans. Banks require collateral and the 
cost of domestic borrowing is generally too high. In spite of the talk of indigenisation and 
economic empowerment targeting the mining sector, no support went the way of small mines. 
The estimated capital base of the project stood at US $100 000 as of 2010. Funding for the 
project was made possible through personal savings and progressive capitalisation. None of 
the profit has been reinvested. The area covered is 10 000 square meters.  According to 
Artwell Muzamindo, the milling company’s manager, it is not possible for a small mine to 
operate without a license. Though the operation started in 2008, according to the manager, 
they had not really started making a profit. The challenge of meeting electricity costs is acute 
for small miners without any preferential treatment. They thus have to rely on diesel powered 
generators which cost four times more than ZESA electricity. 
 
Catsk Mine is a family-run business, owned by a medical doctor based in South Africa. It is 
managed by the owner’s brother. Artwell’s story is very similar to that of most young 
Zimbabweans. After finishing school, he worked as a secondary school teacher from 2002 to 
2004. By this time Zimbabwe’s economic crisis was deepening, prompting him to look for 
employment outside the country. Assisted by a relative who was in Botswana, Artwell found 
a job there where he worked at a carpentry shop until 2007. In early 2008 he returned to 
Zimbabwe to manage his brother’s mining interests. Having started with 16 employees in 
2008, Catsk employed 22 people by December 2012, all of them males. Of these two are 
family members and are in management. Below the manager is a mill manager, a supervisor 




However, literacy levels are very low among the ordinary employees, some of whom cannot 
even write. Among these, the supervisor earns US $150, security guards US $135 and the 
general hand US $100 per month.  The company owned two mills, two vehicles, three 
compressors and one generator. 
 
Cyanidation is a very important aspect of the mill operation and accounts for about 70 
percent of the earnings. This process presents some environmental hazards and for that reason 
is strictly policed by the EMA. The initial EMA report on the mill identified the following 
concerns, namely contamination of ground water from mercury and cyanide, soil erosion and 
siltation of nearby river streams, dust pollution and lowering of ground water. To reduce 
these effects, the mill relies on water from the Chegutu town and recycles water. The mine 
has a settling pond designed to retain water from the separator. The captured water is pumped 
back to separator and mill for reuse. Fine sand from the processing is placed in cyanide 
resistant tanks for further processing. Sulphur is sprinkled on the slime dump for 
neutralisation of cyanide. Samples are taken to an analytical lab at Rio Zim in Eiffel Flats for 
cyanide analysis. The sands are then disposed to tailing dams and levelled and grass is 
supposed to be planted. The company is also required to do landscaping and re-vegetation but 
none of this is happening, in fact.  
 
The methods of small mining are far from safe and it is likely that accidents that take place 
and environmental hazards caused are often not recorded. Cyanide protective clothing and 
respirators are required but seldom provided. There seems to be stricter enforcement of safety 
and environmental standards for those small miners that are not politically connected. Such 
application and adherence is not uniform. The December 2012 report of a 37 year old miner 
found dead floating in a cyanide tank at Ivan Hoe Mine near Kwekwe is probably just the tip 
of an iceberg. Post-mortem results showed that he had died from inhalation burns and 
drowning in the cyanide tank (Newsday, 11 December 2012). Inhalation burns occur when 
someone breathes dangerous gases, suggesting that the deceased had inhaled a toxic 
substance before slipping (perhaps after losing consciousness) into the tank.  Other 
employees at the mine were quoted as saying, “The only reason he inhaled the dangerous gas 
was because he was not wearing a respirator” (Ibid).  Ivan Hoe Mine is owned by a well-





6.2	  Chikorokoza	  –	  Gold	  Panning	  
 
In March 2010, an open space close to the usually quiet low density suburb of Hintonville in 
Chegutu was turned into a war zone. Gunshots could be heard at night as paramilitary police 
battled gold panners (makorokoza).  According to interviews, while digging, construction 
workers had accidentally discovered a gold stone weighing over 300 grams on the site. This 
happened in November 2008. The construction work was halted and secretly, the workers, 
together with their superiors, started to dig for gold. It is not known how much was extracted.  
Eventually, the information about the clandestine operation leaked out. The result was chaos 
as hundreds of gold panners and local residents flooded the football pitch size area, digging 
for gold. This is an all too familiar story of gold panning and smuggling in post-2000 
Zimbabwe. As is nearly always the case in such situations, there are conflicting versions as to 
how this started.  
 
The state owned Herald newspaper reported that Exor, a fuel company, was constructing a 
service station. It was in the process of digging a foundation that the workers discovered 
gold. While there is no conflict as to how the gold was first discovered, what differs in the 
accounts is what was being constructed and who the owner was. This will be analyzed in 
greater detail below. It is clear that whoever was responsible continued to give the impression 
to Chegutu council and public that construction work was on-going. Some within Chegutu 
town council professed to have wondered about the slow progress and reduced activity at the 
site. It was only in the beginning of 2010 that the clandestine operation leaked out to the 
public and triggered a gold rush. Though it is difficult to establish the source of the leak, it is 
understood that panners from Kwekwe were the first to flock the area, triggering the locals to 
join in. Two of the construction workers were from Kwekwe. In a matter of days, the small 
area was host to hundreds of what the Herald described as “hard core gold dealers” from far 
and wide. 
 
The coinage “hard core panners” refers to nomadic career panners. These are believed to be 
violent and often operate in groups.  Police attempts to disperse the panners were met with 
resistance. "It's better to search for this gold than to steal. They should give us a chance so 
that we make money as well," one unidentified panner was quoted as saying in a public 




...panners assaulted two policemen from Chegutu Police Station who had descended on the area to 
conduct investigations. Although the policemen were armed, they failed to control the situation as the 
panners attacked them with stones, shovels, knives and clubs. The policemen fled the scene before 
returning with reinforcements... Several panners took cover in nearby bushes, playing hide and seek 
with the police (Herald, 10 March, 2010).  
Fighting between the police and gold panners has become commonplace in Zimbabwe during 
gold rushes.  
 
What is intriguing in this case is that the area is less than a kilometre from a police camp. 
Resistance against the police can also be seen as a form of protest against police double 
standards in that, while officially the area was being sealed off, police were secretly allowing 
other panners access and were also extracting gold ore themselves. Curiously, out of the 
hundreds of people who flooded the area, only ten were arrested (Herald, 8 March, 2010). 
The arrested ten appeared in Chegutu court and were each fined US $20. By the end of March 
2010 the police spokesperson for Chegutu was quoted as saying, “… although some people 
were still going to the site to search for gold, the situation was under control.” However, it 
soon emerged that “some policemen were clandestinely involved in gold panning after 
chasing away the panners…” This study observed vehicles being loaded with what was 
apparently gold ore in sacks at night. The ore was being ferried to mills around Chegutu for 
processing as one miller admitted. In a matter of few days, the area was turned into a maze of 
trenches and pits.  
 
Gold panning tends to follow disused mines and in accidental discoveries. An accidental gold 
discovery can occur while one is cultivating in a field or conducting other activities that 
involve digging as in the above case. This often triggers a gold rush which dies out once the 
gold ore has been exhausted. The rush tends to disregard the land owner’s rights and results 
in serious environmental degradation. Scars from such gold rushes are visible in many places 
in rural Chegutu and Mhondoro. Rags to riches stories are common amongst participants of 
gold rush. Sometimes a rush can be triggered by a discovery made using metal detectors 
which have become common. The panning that occurs upon discovery of an old disused mine 
shaft tends to last longer and often leads to a stable small mining operation but often is 





Gold panners often operate in small bands of usually three to five (but up to 10) people, 
known as a “syndicate”. Proceeds from gold panning are shared equally between syndicate 
members after the processing of ore. Syndicates are very mobile; in fact they operate as 
nomadic panners moving from one gold rush to another. In several cases however, syndicates 
are more than a group of panners working together as equals. What appears to be a loose 
coalition of panners is often linked to and supported by a powerful political or business 
person referred as the “sponsor”. Through his/her connection to the state’s coercive 
apparatus, the powerful individual provides the syndicate members with protection from 
police harassment. Protection by the police from rival groups is also provided when 
necessary. By the virtue of their financial muscle, the sponsor often meets costs associated 
with the panning and processing. Upon processing of gold ore, the sponsor first recovers 
his/her costs before sharing the net earnings. The sponsor takes 50 percent of the sale price 
with panners sharing the other 50 percent among themselves. It is common for the sponsor to 
be the owner of the mill to which ore is taken for processing and to be a holder of a gold 
buying license, thus controlling the production and trade process. Gold panning production 
and the trade chain can thus be described as oligopolistic, controlled by a few powerful 
individuals.  
 
Syndicates vary from organised and permanent ones to impromptu alliances of convenience. 
Impromptu syndicates normally arise where locals gang up against “foreigners” (those from 
other districts). It is also common for panners to organise against the police. Syndicates can 
also be mobile or stationary. Exploiting a connection with the regional mining commissioner, 
the sponsor is often able to register a claim under his name soon after a gold rush confirms 
the richness of a site.   Syndicates are distinguishable from individual miners who may have 
made illegal mining a permanent vocation or those who engage in the practice infrequently. 
Permanent panners operating individually are mostly local youths but they can also be 
migrants. 
 
A typical sequence of a gold rush usually starts with someone discovering an old shaft or 
pebble of gold while working on a piece of land.  The discoverer often hides the discovery 
and starts mining secretively. Where it is difficult to disguise, the discoverer may make a 
false claim that they hold a mining lease. In situations where the discovery is made in 
someone’s property, conflict may result. It is possible for the discoverer secretly to mine for 




property. However in both situations, it often comes to light that, contrary to claims, the 
operator has no mining right. This then leads to a scramble which can see hundreds of 
panners from far and wide as well as local people filling up the place within days. Violent 
clashes amongst the panners themselves and between the panners and police often follow. 
Common conflict lines among panners range from ethnic identity (Shonas versus Ndebeles), 
place of origin (locals versus foreigners), political affiliation (MDC versus ZANU-PF) and 
personal rivalry.   It is common for members of the same syndicate to turn against each other 
in the event of a big gold discovery.  
 
The violent clashes and the police reaction inevitably draw media attention and thus the 
attention of powerful individuals. In some cases, the rush quickly reaches a peak, the gold 
gets exhausted and the scramble dies down. However, quite often, where the scramble carries 
on for weeks and with continuous reports of rich finds, syndicates start to compete for sole 
ownership of the site. The conflict thus takes on the dimension of a fight amongst the elite 
over mining rights. Sponsors, relying on their privileged access to the state, obtain a mining 
license to support their claim. There are several cases where more than one group or 
individual hold a license for the same claim. This contest for sole ownership can be 
prolonged, leading to the continuation of illegal panning. It is possible for one 
syndicate/individual to muscle out the other and, through the help of police and/or private 
security, establish a small mining operation. A visit to one site of gold rush and illegal gold 
panning studied in 2007 (see Mawowa, 2007) revealed that by 2012 the site had been 
successfully transformed into a stable small mining operation. Reports suggested that the 















Figure 19: Typical Gold Rush Process 
 
 
6.3	  Gold	  buyers	  
	  
Gold buyers are an integral component of the artisanal and small gold mining industry. It is 
safe to argue that gold buyers are its life blood without which gold panners cannot be. For the 
better part of the period under review, Zimbabwe’s central bank, the RBZ, was the legislated 
monopoly buyer of gold, until gold buying was liberalised in 2009. Prior to 2009, gold buyers 
would only be licensed as agencies of RBZ’s gold buying arm, Fidelity Printers. However, 
illegal gold buying flourished, mostly because RBZ was unable for most of the time to pay 
for gold deliveries. Miners had a choice of either trying to sell to RBZ and be threatened with 
having to close shop due to non-payments or selling to the flourishing parallel market. The 
latter prevailed. From interviews, it is safe to estimate that up to 80 percent of gold produced 
in 2008 in Chegutu among small miners and gold panners went into the parallel and illegal 
markets. 
 
Gold buying in the studied area appears to be controlled by a few powerful business and 
political figures. Unless one chooses to buy gold illegally, the licensing fee structure prohibits 
ordinary people from holding a buying license. The cost of a gold buying license was US 
$2500 before being increased to US $5000 in February 2012. Interviews suggest that, prior to 
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dealers. This, according to respondents, was not because the license was expensive; rather 
“there was fear that once you have a license you would be under close scrutiny by RBZ 
surveillance unity” (Interview, Munya, 6 January, 2011). This was not often chosen as a route 
since almost all the gold was sold to the parallel market. Before liberalisation, the licensed 
buyers themselves would only remit a small portion (approximately ten percent) of gold to 
RBZ “just so as to be seen to be trading and retain the license” (Interview, Farai, 10 January, 
2011). It seems however, that since dollarisation and liberalisation, most gold buying is done 
by licensed buyers or their agents. 
 
In a sense, gold buying represents upward mobility through Chikorokoza. Most gold buyers 
did not just start as buyers but were once Makorokoza. One must observe that what are here 
referred to as gold buyers are not strictly speaking independent buyers. In all the cases dealt 
with, these were in fact agents of license holders. The tendency among license holders seems 
to be to recruit panners for their experience in the industry. Munya’s example below 
illustrates this point. It also shows how gold buying is controlled by powerful people in either 
business or politics.  
I finished my O Levels56 in 2004. I am from Mhondoro. For a few months in 2004 I worked for MCC57 
which was contracted to mine Zimplats’s open pit. After that I went into Chikorokoza (gold panning) in 
Kwekwe from 2004 to 2005. I decided to go into Chikorokoza because my contract had ended and 
since that seemed lucrative. From Kwekwe I came closer home to Pickstone and continued gold 
panning. From 2007 up until 2008 I started buying gold as an individual. I did not have a license 
though. In 2009 I was employed by my friend Tawanda, a young brother to Tichaona Mharadzi a 
licensed gold buyer, small mine and mill operator. He briefly stopped and I started to work for Harare 
guys, Mathew and John Boka, sons to the late businessman Roger Boka58. The two are also running 
their father’s business. They stopped and as usual I am unemployed. Tawanda stopped because the 
person who used to fund him stopped and he got employed by his brother. 
Since unit profit margins are very small (five percent), profitability is dependent on trading in 
high volumes. Typically a powerful business man acts as a sponsor of a syndicate, runs a gold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ordinary (‘O’) Level is a subject based general certificate of education awarded in Zimbabwe after 
successfully completing four years of secondary schooling. This is preceded by seven years of 
primary/elementary education. The minimum basic requirement for most low and semi-skilled jobs and further 
education is five passed ‘O’ Level subjects including English and Mathematics. For university entry and other 
jobs and training a further two years of secondary education referred to as Advanced (‘A’) Level is required.  
57 MCC is a South African owned mining contractor. It was responsible for all the drilling, blasting, loading and 
rock hauling operations for Zimplats’ open pit operations. MCC is also operating open-cast mining for other 
platinum producers such as Aquarius, Lonmin, Xstrata and Platmin Limited. 
58 The late Roger Boka was a famous Zimbabwean Businessmen and former leader of Black Empowerment with 
strong political connections. He was the first black Zimbabwean to own a commercial bank and establish a 




mill and a mine and several other businesses, and uses his/her financial muscle to acquire a 
buying license and employ several agents. In one such case, the buying license holder 
employs six agents, two in Chegutu, two in Kadoma (30 kilometres away from Chegutu) and 
the other two in Chinhoyi (100 kilometres from Chegutu). The six agents are each given US 
$10 000 daily for purchase of gold. This adds up to US $60 000 daily and translates to a daily 
profit of $3000 at the minimum. The agents buy and surrender daily to the buyer. The boss 
then resells to buyers either in Harare or South Africa.  
 
Where buying is done without a license arrests may occur, but in all the cases seldom lead to 
conviction and long-term imprisonment.  Moreover, they tend only to affect the agents who 
are released upon negotiation with the police since the principal buyer is usually a highly 
connected individual. However, where the buyer is an independent individual, arrests can 
actually lead to conviction.  “I was once arrested and received a conviction sentence of five 
years for dealing in gold without a license. I appealed the sentence and I am out on bail” 
(Interview, Munya, 2011). Munya is now working as an agent for a prominent licensed gold 
buyer. 
 
7.	  Religion	  and	  Gold	  Panning	  	  
	  
An interesting dimension in Zimbabwe’s illegal gold panning is the role of religion. 
Superstition is rife in gold panning with several stories of someone first identifying a rich 
gold field in a dream. It is however the role of the mapostori, a religious group with a long 
history of entrepreneurship (Murphree, 1967; Kileff, 1979; Mackay and Motsi, 1988) that 
cannot go unmentioned. Though most literature use the term vapostori, mapostori is the most 
commonly used term in Zimbabwe. Quite often, a mysterious discovery is linked to a 
prophecy by members of an apostolic sect known as mapostori. Through supernatural powers 
it is said that mapostori are able to identify a place rich in gold. Several gold rushes in 
Chegutu have had a fair share of their own supernatural explanations involving the 
mapostori.  Members were said to discover gold in the Sherwood area using metal detectors 
recently. According to the Herald of 11 January 2012, it was discovered that a group of 
mapostori had hit an El Dorado when they were noticed buying a fleet of cars. The report 
explains that gold panners in the area became suspicious and tracked down the sect members, 
thus discovering the goldfields. One possible explanation for the prominence of mapostori in 




white apparel, the sect has long dominated cross-border trade, home based industry, and 
roadside currency trade well before the informal sector became significant or popular in 
Zimbabwe. The sect is known for using open areas rather than churches for their services. 
This allows mapostori to gather surreptitiously while actually hunting for gold with metal 
detectors.  
 
Gold discoveries are widely viewed as God’s answer to Zimbabwe’s economic problems. 
This partly is used to justify the panners’ resilience in the wake of police’s violent 
clampdown. Popular preachers and “miracle workers” have promised gold to their 
congregants. “Zimbabwe is headed for a gold rush that will see people in most parts of the 
country picking up the precious mineral from the ground as God begins to offer divine 
solutions to the country’s challenges,” declared Emmanuel Makandiwa, a prominent prophet 
and founder of the hugely popular United Families International Church (The Herald Online, 
3 January 2013). He went on to say, 
The Lord is setting Zimbabwe free. Divine solutions are coming. The Lord told me ‘Tell Zimbabweans 
to change their focus.’ Everyone is saying diamonds, diamonds, but I see another precious mineral for 
Zimbabwe . . . gold will be picked up from the ground. Mysteriously gold will be appearing 
everywhere.…As I was praying I saw a wind blowing and I saw gold coming to the surface. People are 
going to be picking up gold without any drilling… Those people who have been looked down upon 
will be picking up gold like they are picking up stones. The Lord told me ‘This is for my people’ 
(Quoted in The Herald Online, 3 January, 2013). 
Hardly a week after Makandiwa’s prophecy, media reported gold nuggets raining in the 
prophet’s home area. The prophet’s spokesperson was quoted as saying, “What is happening 
here is very strange as each time a heavy wind blows, villagers are picking grains of gold in 
their yards” (Newsday, 10 January 2013).  
 
Zimbabwe’s Mines and Mining Development Ministry’s reaction is hardly that of seeking to 
restrict these activities. In the case of the reported finds in Makandiwa’s home area cited 
above, an official from the ministry suggested that since the area was rich in gold deposits 
“…that is possible; the gold will be very small. It’s alluvial. Do you know that even here in 
Harare we are sitting on top of gold? (sic)” (Quoted in  Newsday, 10 January 2013). The 
Permanent Secretary, Mupazviripo, noted that in such cases, government would send 
geologists to ascertain the claims. Later on, it turned out that none of the claims was true and 
no such miracle had taken place. False claims of gold finds have been common in Chegutu 




Though the prophecies sometimes turn out to be untrue, followers are encouraged to give to 
the “man of God” in acknowledgement of divine providence.  In the end, the men of God 
have become richer. 
 
8.	  ASM	  Accumulation	  Networks	  
 
Small scale mining, gold panning and gold buying are three closely connected components of 
artisanal and small scale gold mining. The interconnection helps in dealing with Zimbabwe’s 
economic crisis and state measures that tend to counter viability. State measures regarded as 
anathema to ASM include multiple requirements with which one is forced to comply, 
multiplicity of fees, police heavy-handedness in dealing with miners and official red tape, 
among other things. For example, having a license is not enough for a miner to transport ore 
to a mill; a transportation permit is also required. Though the state places these multiple 
requirements, its capacity to police them is limited. Successful application of the law would 
have to rely on the goodwill of parties involved, such as the duty placed by law on miners or 
buyers not to deal with unlicensed parties. A further obligation is placed upon licensed 
dealers to report unlicensed dealers.  These requirements are literally ignored. Registered mill 
operators cannot insist on licenses before processing ore from miners because they supply the 
bulk of ore they process. There is thus a web that sucks in both state and non-state actors, 
comparable to Reno’s shadow state (1998), whose effect is to subvert the activities of the 
formal state. This section looks at the local informal networks that support ASM. 
 
Evidence shows that there is no mutual exclusivity between small mining, gold panning and 
gold buying. Participants can engage in two or all of the three activities simultaneously. To a 
degree, panning represents the lower end of the ASM industry. For those who start off as 
makorokoza, registering a claim may constitute part of a pipedream and is seen as upward 
mobility. There are remarkable cases where panners end up as buyer/agents or registered 
claim holders. In nearly all these cases, the registered miner or buyer maintains strong ties 
with, and is involved in, gold panning. Registered small scale mining, panning and gold 
buying has thus come to constitute one seamless regime of crisis accumulation. This is 
remarkable since, prior to the 2000s, gold panning was hardly associated with success and 
social decency. In fact the activity was denigrated and it was hardly prestigious to be 




rely on finding their own methods of ore processing, often exposing themselves, the 
environment and society to mercury contamination.    
 
By working together and controlling a significant portion of the gold production and value 
chain, participants are able to overcome financial and legal barriers imposed by authorities. 
For example, mill operators are prohibited from processing ore from unlicensed individuals 
or companies. Buyers are only allowed to buy from sellers with a legal mining license. These 
measures are meant to stop the illegal gold panning but are never followed. One gold buyer 
suggested that insisting on a license before purchasing would be self-defeating since “…if I 
insist on licenses I won’t get business so I just buy” (Interview, Munya, 6 January 2011). 
Inspectors from the police are paid to keep a blind eye. Alternatively, panners make 
arrangements with registered claim holders without the knowledge of mill operators. Where 
the mill operator is the sponsor of the syndicate it is even easier to accept gold ore without 
worrying about having a license. Sometimes the sponsor has a registered claim elsewhere and 
the license is used to misrepresent the source of the ore.  
 
Figure 20: Informal Accumulation Network Diagram 
 
 
There are several instances where claims are held for either speculative reasons or so as to 
use the mining license to sell gold sourced illegally into the formal channels. The Chegutu 
RDC CEO provides an illustration, “In 2008 we had 120 miners registered in our books. We 
visited the purported mining sites only find that no mining was taking place. Some of these 
miners even held EIA certificates” (Interview, Mr. Sithole, 2010). An analysis of ore receipts 
documentation at two mills in the Chegutu area seemed to confirm the CEO’s suspicion. Ore 




millers, “We accept ore on condition that they produce a valid certificate from EMA and the 
ministry of mines. It is not our business to worry about whether they are cheating or not” 
(Interview, Mill Manager, 2010). The EMA certificate and mining license is being abused to 
enabled holders to buy gold and resell as if from their own registered mining operation. It is 




This chapter has explored the ASM sector in Chegutu. It exemplifies the chaotic manner in 
which accumulation has been taking place in the 2000s, the massive informalisation and 
pervasiveness of the party state. A look at the composition artisanal miners shows how the 
sector served a tripple function, patronage, livelihood and accumulation. The ASM in 
Chegutu shows a bruring of lines between informality and formality. It brings to question the 
most common huristic tools of analysis of informality which view the sector as exclusively 
survivalistic. The role of the state in managing this process has been contradictory. For 
examples, the several exhobitant fees charged on ASM discourage formalisation and fly in 
the face of the indigenisation and empowerment rhetoric. These contradictions are discussed 
more in the proceeding chapter.  
In fast-growing Chegutu, service delivery collapsed during the period in question and the 
local government was barely managing financially. However, it seems a significant amount 
of wealth was held by private individuals who had access to the limited job opportunities, 
ASM and other informal market activities such as trade in currency and basic commodities 
cross border and fuel trade. Thus private health providers and liquor shops continued to 
operate relatively well in spite of the difficult context. There is a clear case for stressing the 
theme of economic adaptation. The following chapter attempts to analyse the vertical 





Chapter	  Eight:	  Tapping	  into	  the	  Chaos:	  ASM	  and	  Crisis	  Accumulation	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
In Zimbabwe, the connection to the state and political power has become critical in analysing 
ASM. The state’s attitudes towards the sector have been contradictory and so have been the 
outcomes.  On one hand, artisanal and small miners have been harshly treated by law 
enforcers, while on the other hand they have been encouraged either overtly or tacitly. It 
seems there is method in the state’s ostensibly chaotic dealings with the ASM. Laws are 
applied and enforced selectively and inconsistently, making miners vulnerable and dependent 
upon the protection of a powerful political figure. In return, the powerful individual gets a 
portion of earning from gold mining, if not direct shares or ownership through a syndicate. 
How this operates has been explained already with reference to syndicates. While some 
operators have been victims of chaos and selective (mis)application of rules, some have been 
able to find a way to accumulate successfully regardless. 
 
2.	  ASM	  and	  State	  Schizophrenia	  
	  
In May 2012, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Mines, Obert Mpofu, was quoted addressing panners, 
The term makorokoza (illegal gold panners) should be banished because they contribute gold to the 
country. They are actually national heroes... It is painful that many of the children are in jail after being 
found with gold, yet they are contributing to the economy. If you are found with gold, you should be 
protected even by the police... police stations should only be used for safekeeping the panners’ gold ore 
at night. We have discussed the matter as Zanu-PF at the highest level and if it was up to us the panners 
in the jails would be released” (Newsday, 21 May, 2012). 
Following these comments, the Ministry of Mines announced that it preferred to call the gold 
panners “artisanal miners.” “That is the term we now use; there is no more use of the word 
makorokoza or gold panners in our Ministry” (Prince Mupazviripo, Secretary for Mines and 
Mining Development, Herald, 28 May, 2012). “We can’t punish those who are trying to earn 
an honest living, so in our ministry the word is banned” (Ibid). More gold buying centres 
were to be established to allow gold producers to sell their minerals “on a no question asked 
basis.” 
 
The above populist rhetoric often coincides with talk of elections. It is hard to imagine that 




people are panning everywhere. Between 2005 and 2009, police have on several occasions 
cracked down on not only panners but also registered small miners. In 2006, government 
enacted the Environmental Management Act which most panners and small-scale miners 
perceive to be targeted at curtailing their activities. Interviews with EMA officials in Chegutu 
indicated a bias towards policing small miners and gold panners as opposed to big mines. At 
the same time, in between these violent election campaigns, formal meetings have been held 
involving officials from the Ministry of Mines, police, gold panners, small scale miners and 
buyers with a view to regularise the sector. In those meetings, the ministry promises to 
review legislation so as to “empower the historically disadvantaged small scale miners,” and 
to regulate illegal gold mining and trade (The Midlands Observer 3 June 2003 and 27 May 
2005, 1).  In Chegutu since 2006, government has been running a mining empowerment 
program where hundreds of women have been awarded gold mining claims in the Gadzema 
area. Small miners in the area pay US $20 each to a mineral policing department on whose 
district committee they sit and from whom they are entitled protection.  At the time of writing 
the uncontrolled panning of gold continued with gold rushes being reported everywhere, and 
the pattern was a national one. 
   
The notion of the schizophrenic state was first applied to post-colonial Zimbabwe by Ibbo 
Mandaza in 1986, borrowing it from Yash Tandon (1984). Tandon describes the post-colonial 
state as schizophrenic, that is “…split into two … political leaders sometimes display 
schizophrenic tendencies when they feel impelled on the one hand to respond to the 
democratic demands of the people, and on the other hand feel the pressure of international 
market…” (Tandon, quoted in Mandaza, 1986: 14). It can also be viewed as schizophrenia 
between modern, admired policies learnt from the books and the discourse that comes from 
local practice.  In post-2000 Zimbabwe, and to a great extent during much of the post-
colonial history, state schizophrenia appears to have emanated from three fronts, namely, the 
ruling elite’s own acquisitive instincts, people’s popular demands and the logic of the market. 
The result of this has been persistent policy vacillations. It is also true to say that among the 
powerful state actors in Zimbabwe, and especially since 2000, there has been a policy 
preference dichotomy between agrarian and authoritarian populists on one hand and 
technocratic realists on the other. The notion of the schizophrenic state may aid in 





3.	  Militarised	  and	  Party-­‐Based	  Accumulation	  
	  
From time to time, police indiscriminately raid ASM miners (registered and unregistered). 
Methods used are brutal and miners are often killed or injured in the process (Mawowa, 
2007). Reporting on a police blitz in central Zimbabwe, the Midlands Observer alleged that 
ten people had been killed (12 May, 2007). Between 2006 and 2007, 26 000 miners were 
arrested during operation Chikorokoza Chapera (literally meaning ‘gold panning has ended’) 
(Zimonline, May 14, 2007).  In Chegutu this clampdown destabilised several small mines and 
by the time of writing some had not recovered. If accounts by miners and police at Chegutu 
police station are to go by, more than 3000 were arrested from the Chegutu Mhondoro area 
alone during the same period. These operations were carried out by members of the military 
police, soldiers and the prison service jointly.  
 
In a fashion similar to the much publicised human rights abuses in the diamond fields of 
Marange, police have fought with gold panners, sometimes exchanging live ammunition, 
while panners have fought among themselves. In one area in Mutoko, a well-organised 
security network involving the entire community has been established to deter would-be 
police surveillance.  “A group of youths always keeps watch of police or people who might 
be security agents” (Herald, 6 December 2010).  A password is then sent to warn people that 
danger is lurking. “It’s all about protecting the little that we were given by God…We have 
serious water problems but our main problem is the police” (Ibid). Violence among gold 
panners themselves often takes on a tribal and/or ethnic dimension. “The people started to 
fight this man saying that ‘you Shonas here are exploiting our resources’ while we are 
suffering’,” the Daily News (18 December 2012) quoted one Phiri about an incident at a gold 
rush site in Matebeleland. The Shonas were accused of having more mining claims in the area 
than the local Ndebele-speaking people (Ibid)59.  
 
Yet panners and small gold miners remain resilient. In essence the police’s violent behaviour 
against panners masks the state’s involvement in illegal gold mining activity. If one looks at 
the state’s contradictory attitudes towards panners, the involvement of powerful figures, the 
heavy-handedness of law enforcers in dealing with panners and the inconsistencies in dealing 
with small miners, it is plausible to suggest that there are multiple centres of power operating 
and these are driven by different interests. Such a conclusion makes sense whereby on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




numerous occasions police are commanded to raid a panning site or a syndicate only to be 
withdrawn, without a clear explanation (Interview, Chegutu Criminal Investigation 
Department (CID) informant, 2 May 2011). It has also been common for rival ZANU-PF 
aligned groups to fight each other over a gold claim or gold rush site.  
 
The state’s ambivalence towards ASM appears to have created opportunities for rent-seeking 
for the law enforcers. Far from treating illegal gold panning as unwanted, the police perceive 
policing gold panning and small miners as an opportunity to subsidise their meagre salaries, 
which could only buy a loaf of bread during the crisis period, however having been increased 
to US $300 since dollarisation. Some members of the Zimbabwe police in Chegutu exhibit 
opulence irreconcilable with official salaries. During the gold rush near Chegutu’s 
Hintonville suburb site discussed above, only ten were arrested, despite thousands of panners 
having been involved. Far from deterring miners, police were forming and joining syndicates 
with miners. Policemen would drive away panners and guard the area only to allow bands 
aligned with themselves to access the area at night and share the proceeds. Some panners 
interviewed alleged that the police went as far as mining actively. The networks involving the 
police start from the panning site, and continue through the ore milling plant to the selling of 
gold. Gold millers and small miners are made to pay in gold so as not to be disrupted by the 
police. What is intriguing is that rents to the police are not only paid where the miners are on 
the wrong side of the law, so that the miner is shaken down steadily to ensure uninterrupted 
activity.  
 
In my MA thesis, a similar pattern was observed:  
In a typical case of instant taxation, far from cracking down on illegal gold mining the police are now 
cashing in on miners by managing access to mining sites. At the time of this research a tunnel in 
Bhamala, had become the new centre of gold rush and was heavily guarded by the police. The police 
were charging $3 million (equivalent to a policeman’s monthly salary) in July 2007 — approximately 
RSA R200 per hour spent in the tunnel. Panners, grateful to the police for managing access, thus 
creating order and averting violent conflict (among themselves), pay and enter in groups (syndicates) of 
eight to ten each turn. So lucrative has been this arrangement that police officers started to compete. 
They operated in two day shifts in order to accommodate each other… Spending as much as twelve 
hours manning the pit translates to ZW$36 million. When shared among ten officers each can take 
home an untaxed ZW$3, 6 million60 more than a police officer’s monthly salary (Mawowa, 2007: 99).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The high rate of inflation and exchange rate make this figure vague. With a July 2007 parallel rate of Z$15 




Opportunities created by gold panning policing were such that police were reportedly 
deserting their official duties to guard gold rush areas. Similar tendencies have been reported 
amongst traffic police. In a fashion comparable to the period toward the end of the Mobutu 
era in the DRC, police man roadblocks looking for excuses to penalise motorists and demand 
bribes61.  In some cases, police go on to share earnings from gold panning rents with 
superiors, who are responsible for deployment but are too senior to be in the field.   
 
One ex-liberation fighter took to the local paper complaining about police involvement in 
gold panning.  
I am writing in connection with corruption happening at Gaika Mine. I am a war veteran. The recently 
posted Support Unit Police boss is making hefty amounts of money through the Amakorokozas. He is 
said to be charging about ZW $3 000 000 per syndicate and getting a monthly lump sum of ZW $50 
000 000. This is a circle involving some ruling party members, it’s so boring when I am making a 
living from the only ZW $1 000 000 gratuity I am being paid … (War Vet, Kwekwe, in the Midlands 
Observer, December 2, 2005). 
One cannot help noticing the emphasis, “I am a war veteran,” and the writer signs off as 
“War Vet.” On a close scrutiny the ‘war vet’ seems to be saying “I must not be left out, being 
also a war vet and member of ZANU-PF.”  “How can I continue to survive on a meagre ZW 
$1 000 000 when others are making as much as ZW $50 000 000?” Again the salience of the 
party-state in accumulation is evidenced in the language of the letter.  
 
There is thus greater police presence where artisanal and small scale mining activities are 
concentrated. In these areas, raids have been common and often refined gold and gold ore is 
confiscated. Several miners allege to have lost gold or gold ore while being raided. Officially 
this gold is unaccounted for. Indications are that the recovered gold is seldom declared and in 
most instances, police submit falsified gold recovery returns. Yet even the declared returns 
tend to disappear, often weakening a prosecution’s case against an alleged illegal gold dealer.  
Beyond police involvement, access to ASM conflates with ZANU-PF politics of 
indigenisation and party and liberation war-based notions of entitlement.  
	  
It is often the case that those who are linked to ZANU-PF or ex-liberation war fighters are 
regarded as more deserving of access than those who are not.  We have already encountered a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 In one such instance, this writer was stopped by police while driving to eastern Zimbabwe in May 2009. The 
police thoroughly inspected my driver’s license and the vehicle. Upon finding no reason to penalise me, they 





Chegutu miner who had received a claim from his mother, an ex-liberation fighter. Police 
tend to approach known ZANU-PF interests in mining in a particular way. Where an 
apparently illegal mining activity involves identifiable ZANU-PF members or high profile 
party figures, clearance from authorities is first required by police before action can be taken. 
In Chegutu, ZANU-PF youths, often used during the violent political campaigns, have been 
instrumental in guarding and controlling access to perceived rich gold claims to the exclusion 
of suspected MDC elements.  
 
Since the late 1990s, as ZANU-PF political fortunes waned, patronage and coercion have 
played a dominant role. This of necessity entails greater reliance on the security sector.  It 
also leads to the coalescing of powerful interests around politically extractable rents. This 
more than anything probably explains the elevated role and proliferation of semi-
autonomous62 ZANU-PF-aligned youth militias. It may be that the militias started as solely 
an instrument of political violence against opponents of the ruling party, but since 2008, these 
groups have featured prominently in gold panning rushes. In Chegutu reports identify one 
such group connected to one Mai Pfute, a ZANU-PF councillor. It is reported that this group 
of gold panners cum youth militias has benefited from an empowerment project distributing 
small mining claims. The group however was reportedly responsible for politically motivated 
abductions in 2012 (SW Radio Africa, 5 December, 2012). The militia groups tend to target 
extractable rents from flea markets63 to gold panning.  
 
The case of the Sherwood area in Kwekwe, which hit the headlines at the time of writing, 
underscored the growing salience of ZANU-PF youth militias in Zimbabwe in disorderly 
accumulation in ASM. Early in 2012, a gold rush hit the area after reports of a massive, 100 
kilogram plus pure gold nugget being found  (Newsday 1 October 2012). Gold buyers from as 
far as South Africa encamped near the site (Telephone Interview, Silas, 8 January, 2013.) 
However, the rush quickly became a political affair, with the local ZANU-PF youths clashing 
with police and struggling to control and restrict access to party members.  
Announcing the takeover of the area at a rally attended by hundreds of panners who had been chased 
away from the fields by police, Zanu-PF Midlands provincial security officer Owen “Mudha” Ncube 
said the gold deposits in Sherwood belonged to his party. NewsDay said Zanu-PF has started compiling 
registers of people who will be allowed to enter the fields to mine the gold. Cornelius Mpereri, a close 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Meaning that they are often linked to a powerful political figure but not entirely under control. 
63 An example of this is the Chipangano gang in Harare, which terrorises flea markets and commuter taxi ranks 




ally of Emmerson Mnangagwa, tipped as a possible successor to Mugabe, and Josphats “Gold” Sibanda 
have registered the Sherwood Block mining claim, it added (Mail and Guardian, 12 January 2012).  
Earlier, Mudha was quoted as saying, “We are waiting for a certificate to be issued before we 
start the mining process. Our youths, war veterans and their children will be allowed in to 
mine” (Newsday, 1 October 2012). 
 
The case of Sherwood provides a glimpse of the vertical dynamics at play. Just after the 
discovery, the Midlands provincial police spokesperson Inspector Patrick Chademana was 
quoted as saying, “We want sanity to prevail while we identify the proper owners of the 
mining claim” (Herald, 11 January 2012). The claim was yet to be owned and curiously, 
while the youth were sloganeering, top officials within the party were busy registering the 
gold rush site as their claim. It is usually the case that when senior political figures have 
established interests, police deal harshly with panners.  Those who disregarded the party’s 
directive to stop visiting the site and “follow due party process” were arrested (16 of them). 
These included a losing parliamentary candidate (Masango Matambanadzo). Their charges 
included assaulting a gold panner and attempting to force their way into the gold field. “They 
also allegedly stole US $11 000 from one of the panners identified as Wonder Ferill” (Ibid). 
Upon close analysis, the arrested panners belonged to another, and clearly less influential, 
faction of the same party. They had felt entitled to pan the gold field because they were also 
ZANU-PF.  
 
In October 2010, a local MP, Eric Navaya, and his son fired gunshots using 303 rifles in a 
dispute with a mining syndicate in the area over gold claims (Newsday, 13 October, 2010: 1). 
The leader of the syndicate went to report the incident to the local police “but was told they 
should resolve the issue amicably among themselves” (Ibid). The news report went on to 
note, “Contacted for comment… Navaya confirmed he fired his gun... but to scare away 
baboons in the fields” (Ibid).  However, in the same news article the MP claimed to have 
applied for the very same mining claim.  
After applying for the mining claim, I then went (away)… only to find somebody mining on the same 
piece of land I had identified when I’m still waiting for the response from the ministry… I made a 
report to the police that there was a dispute over the area that is being mined after which I suggested 
that mining activity be stopped until the issue was resolved and the place be (sic) guarded by police. 
The police however said they did not have manpower. I then suggested having my own employee to 




According to the report, the licensed owners could no longer access the gold ore because the 
place had been placed under guard.   
 
The politicised nature of gold panning makes it difficult for police to stop the activity even 
where there is the will to do so. Zimbabwe’s Minister of Education David Coltart suggested 
panning was out of control. 
Panners are being allowed to do this with impunity by local ZANU-PF leaders, under the guise of 
indigenisation. I find it ironic that the very same people allowing this rampant abuse of the 
environment by allowing gold panners to operate without interference from police are the ones 
responsible for deterring efforts to create good jobs for the people. Illegal gold panners are currently 
being allowed to operate without any interference from the police, when in the past they have been 
arrested and jailed for at least five years. But it has been reported that ZANU-PF is allowing illegal 
panning as an election campaign tactic, in order to get votes (in SWRadio Africa, 31 October 2012). 
 
The lack of clarity often exposes miners and other gold dealers to manipulation by fraudsters. 
Police who are not on duty have been accused of harassing and demanding payments from 
miners without the knowledge of their superiors. It is also common for individuals to seize 
another person’s claim in the name of ZANU-PF or working for a powerful figure. The Daily 
News of 26 July 2012 reported a court case where an individual claiming to be President 
Robert Mugabe’s right-hand man demanded and successfully extorted gold from Tolrose 
mine near Chegutu town. For expediency, the rightful owner is accused of being anti-ZANU-
PF and thus undeserving of a claim. The sustainability of this mode of accumulation is thus 
difficult to ascertain. Once a new government that enforces the rule of law emerges, it is 
possible that the gains of chaos will be reversed.  
 
4.	  The	  Role	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  Central	  Bank	  	  
 
The role of the RBZ in small gold mining activities and trade was far more pronounced than 
any other state institution. Violent police campaigns against artisanal and small miners 
namely “Operation Murambatsvina” (drive away filth) in 2005, “Operation Mari Yawanda” 
(too much money) in 2006 and “Operation Chikorokoza Chapera” (panning is finished) in 
2007 and 2009 were in fact at the behest of Zimbabwe’s Central Bank. Attacks even on 
registered small miners as well as illegal panners often followed strong statements by the 
bank’s authorities against the miners. Operation “Chikorokoza Chapera” in 2006 for example 




million of gold was being smuggled out of the country per month. This also led to the 
enactment of the Environmental Management Act, widely described as a progressive piece of 
legislation by most environmental groups.  As noted above, the motivation of the law was 
primarily to deal with environmental damage caused by the panners and small miners. 
Several miners who lacked EIAs and EMPs had their gold and equipment confiscated and 
licenses withdrawn. Over the years, the apparent bias against small-scale miners of this 
legislation has become apparent, along with a failure to police big mining companies equally. 
 
Though the bank claimed to use a carrot and stick approach, the latter was more prominent. 
On the whole, measures to curb “illegal” gold mining trade never succeeded. From 2000 to 
2008 gold deliveries to the bank declined tenfold. The wide gap between the price offered by 
the parallel market and the bank’s fixed rate discouraged miners from selling gold to the 
bank. According to miners, RBZ prices were simply not possible to effect. In July 2007 RBZ 
was buying at ZW$1.2 million per gram while the parallel market buyers were paying $3 
million per gram. The RBZ offer price was even lower than the local buyer’s purchase price 
from illegal miners, yet RBZ expected the buyers to sell to it. RBZ had constantly to rely on 
police and military to force miners to surrender gold to Fidelity Printers.  Things of course 
changed after official dollarisation and liberalisation of gold trade.  
 
Selling gold at the parallel market as opposed to the central bank had the benefit of assured 
quick returns. This is perhaps the single most important reason why panning and informal 
small scale mining remained strong when formal gold mines were closing. Most of the 
closures are due to non-payment by the RBZ and the general collapse in the national payment 
system. For example, in 2008 Metallon Gold, which by then accounted for 55 percent of 
Zimbabwe’s gold output, halted operations at its mines due to non-payment of approximately 
US $18.3 million in lieu of gold deliveries to the RBZ. In addition, several small producers 
were owed US $17 million by the bank (The Standard, 1 July 2007: B1). This made 
recapitalisation and importation of plant and equipment impossible.  Sometimes Zimbabwe 
dollar payments were made too late, by which time their value was severely eroded by 
inflation.    
 
RBZ’s handling of gold panning activities was contradictory at best. The bank pronounced 
itself a sworn enemy of illegal gold panning, yet it licensed several buyers and went on to 




“decentralisation of gold buying.” The bank employed 176 custom millers and 38 agents by 
July, 2004 (RBZ, July 2004: 20). Though it justified buying from “illegal” miners as 
necessary in order to “reduce grey market activities,” by so doing the bank was in fact 
tolerating the so-called illegal miners. From interviews conducted during the field work, it is 
possible that up to 80 percent of gold bought by RBZ licensed buyers in Chegutu came from 
what the bank considered illegal sources. Most of the buyers who were either members of the 
secret intelligence services of the state or surrogates for senior ZANU-PF officials made 
themselves wealthy overnight through under-declaring their earnings to the RBZ. One of the 
RBZ buyers now runs a gold processing mill, has a syndicate and employs several agents in 
Chegutu. The practice according to one informant was only to sell a portion (15-20 percent) 
to Fidelity Printers and sell the rest to lucrative external buyers. In reality though, and despite 
the bank’s efforts, prior to dollarisation in 2009, most of the buyers remained unregistered. 
Ironically, the RBZ had no problems accepting gold from these buyers during the rare times 
when they sold to the bank.  
 
As part of its measures to increase gold deliveries, in April 2005 RBZ licensed several firms 
linked to high profile political individuals. ZW $500 million was allocated to these firms. In 
return they were expected to “surrender 150 kilograms of gold a month to the Reserve Bank’s 
Fidelity Printers and Refineries” (The Independent, 9 September, 2005).  However, only 39.2 
kilograms was delivered to the bank in the seven months from April 2005 instead of the 
anticipated 1050 kilograms. The bank responded by cancelling the buying license for the 
companies. Surprisingly, two days after the cancellations the concessionaires delivered 90 
kilograms of gold in a bid to retain their licenses. Commenting on this, the Mines and 
Minerals Ministry noted that it was hard to control smuggling of gold because “there were 
many politicians involved in the ‘game’” (The Independent, 9 September, 2005). Thus RBZ 
measures were hamstrung by the acquisitive interests of powerful figures. 
 
Even after dollarisation and liberalisation of the gold trade, cases of smuggling implicating 
powerful figures continued, to the bank’s chagrin. In December 2009 a permanent secretary 
in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism was accused of promoting environmentally 
destructive gold panning activities. This ironically happened when the official was showing a 
video to a parliamentary committee on the effects of illegal gold mining.  
Margaret Sangarwe had just finished giving evidence before the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 




involvement in illegal gold mining... Zimbabwe Women in Mining official, Febi Jabulani, led the 
charge, telling MPs that Sangarwe — who is her neighbour — was dealing in illegal gold at the Grange 
Farm in Chegutu. When I went to her mill at her farm, there were a lot of makorokoza (illegal gold 
panners). “We wanted to chase them, but she went and came back with a police vehicle that was full of 
makorokoza. She was there and the makorokoza wanted to attack me” (NewZimbabwe.com, 11 
December, 2009). 
Even more ironic is the fact that, after Sangarwe’s presentation, 28 000 panners were arrested 
by police countrywide during operation, “Chikorokoza chapera.”  
 
Though seemingly fighting illegal gold dealing, RBZ seems to have had far from clean hands. 
Its company, Carslone Private Limited, was accused of improper conduct during a 
parliamentary committee hearing on a government clampdown.  
One miner wept while describing police brutality to MPs last Friday. She said her company was closed 
down by the police on grounds that she was violating the Environment Management Act. Within 
weeks, the company had been re-opened and parcelled out to gold panners who go on to hand over the 
proceeds to the RBZ-owned Carslone Private Limited (NewZimbabwe, 11 December 2009). 
The hearing ended up being conducted on camera after a request by the RBZ. The bank's 
Finance, Intelligence Inspectorate Evaluation and Security Chief Mirirai Chiremba, thought 
to be very wealthy, had told the investigating committee, “I do not want to say anything that 
will cause instability in the country (in the presence of the media)” (NewZimbabwe, 11 
December 2009). 
  
5.	  Upward	  Mobility	  	  
 
A specific research question in this study was to ascertain cases of upward mobility that can 
be linked to ASM during Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis. This question has been 
partly answered in looking at horizontal and vertical networks impacting gold panning and 
small-scale mining. One of the many ways to gauge upward mobility is by observing whether 
participants have systematically acquired or invested in any assets, movable or immovable, 
and whether this is linked to involvement in gold panning, mining or gold buying. Through 
interviews, it was possible to determine whether those involved in ASM have developed such 
assets. The outcome was mixed. 
 
There is a high incidence of “rags to riches” stories among gold panners where a gold digger 
picks up a gold nugget.  One is impressed upon hearing stories of how people’s lives have 




not the complete story. Quite often, in fact 22 out 27 (81 percent) of such cases when 
followed up in this study, proved to be a case of “rags to riches and then back to rags again.” 
During interviews, cash amounts and gold amounts allegedly handled by panners seemed 
unbelievable when compared to most of the panners’ material conditions. Panning is an 
unpleasant and dangerous activity so that one is tempted to ask, “Having handled so much 
money, why are you still panning?” During the research, several examples were witnessed 
whereby young people reportedly made a killing from panning only to spend the money on a 
motorcycle or high maintenance vehicle. In a few situations the money is spent on a physical 
asset such as a house or outbuilding.  
 
Panners are associated with reckless spending behaviour and to a certain extent this was 
found to be true. One car dealer in Harare indicated that there were receiving a lot of 
customers from the Chegutu area and suggested that this has to do with rampant gold panning 
in the area.  In Chegutu, a well-known gold panner Koti Koti exemplifies this tendency and is 
known to drive “…around with a blue Nissan Hard Body double cab and spend(ing) money 
recklessly” (Interview, Mr Sithole, 14 March 2010). According to Sithole, “Panning is like a 
lifestyle. It is never viewed as growing” (Ibid). It is fair to say that lavish consumerism is not 
restricted to gold panners but is a societal tendency. Panners are however noticeable through 
their ability to part easily with cash. Of panners surveyed, 90 percent did not have active bank 
accounts. Some panners cited the very uncertain nature of their business as the reason for 
spending wantonly, “for we don’t know what tomorrow holds” (Interview, Gora, 7 May 
2010).  
 
The common perception that panners are wasteful and fail to seize opportunities presented by 
a rich gold find is not however entirely true. In fact, in 50 percent of the “rags to riches and 
back to rags again” situations, the gold panners actually attempted to invest in something 
meaningful and sustainable. What appears to be the case is the lack of financial acumen 
rather than the lack of desire to invest in something more sustainable. There is a tendency to 
use earnings to buy used vehicles for the transport business. However, roads in Chegutu and 
most parts of Zimbabwe are so bad that it is very difficult and expensive to maintain a 
vehicle. Moreover, most of the vehicles are manufactured in Japan so that the cost of 
servicing and replacing worn out parts is high. The vehicle, supposedly meant to bring 
income, becomes a liability. Subsequent earnings from panning end up going towards fixing 




an opportunity presents itself. This combined with opulent spending often quickly evaporates 
gains made from a rich find.  
 
Registered small miners appear more stable than panners. There were a few impressive cases 
of upward mobility. The rate of turnover was also high, attributed mainly to operation 
“Chikorokoza Chapera,” RBZ policing and non-compliance with EMA. However, those that 
remained in the business appear to have met with relative success, carefully exploiting both 
horizontal and vertical networks. Two of the successful small mines covered were owned by 
former gold panners. In one case, earnings from panning were used to invest in a mill.  When 
analysed closely, these cases were not entirely ones of humble beginnings. Most (although 
not all) successful small mines are linked to the patronage of some politician, often 
instrumental in obtaining access to the mine site originally.  
 
Catsk Milling Company for instance does not have an apparent powerful figure behind it. It 
has relied on building local networks amongst the panners and the police. Thus even where 
vertical networks are not as strong, local connections remain necessary to deal with state 
imposed bottlenecks. The poor documentation available to me makes it difficult to gauge the 
growth of Catsk Milling Company. According to the manager, as much as US $100 000 
could have been ploughed into the milling business since it started in 2008. The number of 
people employed has increased from eight to 25 by December 2012. The owner of the mill 
who is based in South Africa receives all the earnings from the gold recovered through 
cyanidation. Operational costs are covered by returns from the actual milling. Gold recoveries 
from cyanidation thus constitute what may be the profit, some of which is reinvested, but 
difficult to estimate since this is deliberately under-recorded to evade police inspectors.  
 
Perhaps the most remarkable case of upward mobility is one of Coloursell furniture shops. 
The Coloursell furniture shop was established in 2008 but grew rapidly into a modern 
furniture retail chain with over 20 branches across Zimbabwe64. The company’s head office is 
in Kadoma, 30 kilometres away from Chegutu. It is one of the very few businesses with a 
nationwide outreach headquartered outside Harare and Bulawayo. The owner was one of the 
few individuals licensed and funded by RBZ to buy gold in 2005. From then on he seems to 
have accumulated wealth exponentially, establishing a mill, a small mine and a fuel station. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




He has at least six agents buying gold worth at least US $60 000 in a single day, 
approximately US $2000 in profit. The owner is said to have strong political connections. 
The growth of a nationwide furniture chain in a crisis economy where other similar 
businesses were closing down is phenomenal. His physical assets such as houses, according 
to one of his buyers, are numerous.  
 
Figure 21: Coloursell Furniture Shop in Chegutu 
 
Source: Author during Field Research in 2011. 
 
There are several other similar cases of upward mobility. The story of Tino cited above is 
another example. His business grew from a meagre US $500 seed capital, continuous support 
from a brother and reinvesting earnings. After starting with eight employees in 2008, the 
number of employees doubled in less than a year.  Tino’s gross monthly income is 
approximately US $14 000 and his operating profit of about US $4000. The casual employees 
are paid US $80 a week, close to what government civil servants earn. They work in eight 
hour daily shifts but have weekly targets. The mine captain earns US $500 per month from 
Tino’s mines but, because he also works for two or more miners simultaneously, his earnings 
are much higher. Other than mining-related assets, Tino has two houses in Chegutu and a 
stand, something which an ordinary Zimbabwean civil servant can only dream of. He has a 




two children, Tino boasts that he has never defaulted on paying US $400 in maintenance. 
Tino is convinced a small mine is more rewarding than Chikorokoza which he once tried. 
 
According to Tino, there are several small miners who are more successful than himself. 
Tino’s brother Gari, who started in 1996, is one such case. His fortunes drastically improved 
from 2002 onwards. At the time of writing, Gari owned three houses, two in Chegutu and one 
in Kadoma, operated four mills, had five compressors, ran a transport business (five 
commuter omnibuses), owned two company vehicles, one truck T 35, two tractors, two 
vehicles for personal use, two others for his wife. In addition Gari sends his child to a 
boarding school and looks after the extended family. The transport business started with three 
small buses which have since increased to five. Besides mining, Gari is also involved in 
farming, cultivating cotton and maize. This research found that most gold miners and/or 
buyers were the main breadwinners not only in their immediate families, but also extended. A 
commonality among successful small miners is that proceeds are invested in other economic 
activity, mostly the farming and transport sectors.   
 
6.	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Outcomes	  
 
What has been the socio-economic impact of ASM? An obvious negative impact is the 
environmental damage caused by gold panning. Areas in and around Chegutu have become 
an eyesore with large erosion-like gullies left by gold scrambles. ASM is not entirely 
unsophisticated and formal compliance with EMA is usually observed. All the small mines 
listed in table four above submitted quarterly environmental reports. Complying with EMA 
does not however mean effective environmental management. It can be observed that even 
though EMA is visible and engaging closely with miners, its capacity to effectively police the 
land is limited. For example the agency is ill-equipped to deal with the threat of ground water 
pollution posed by cyanidation and management of tailings. The Parakava River in the area 
has been affected by siltation. Mining closure plans and rehabilitation of vegetation plans are 
hardly enforced. The net benefit of small scale mining may thus be in the negative. The lack 
of protective clothing and non-enforcement of this means many workers of small mines are 
exposed to both physical and health risks.  
 
In some cases, fields have been destroyed due to out-of-control panning activity. Since the 




rural Chegutu, there have been reports of livestock dying from suspected water contamination 
due to artisanal and small mining activity.  
These illegal gold panners have put cyanide in water and other drinking sources for livestock. As a 
result a lot of cattle and birds in the area have been killed. They steal and kill cattle for food and I can 
also confirm that Sandamu has so far lost 10 dogs to these people who are trying to force her out as she 
has been trying to take legal action against them” (Anonymous police officer, Newsday, 7 October 
2010: 5).  
The spokesperson for the police in the area reportedly claimed to be unaware of any panning 
activity in the area (Ibid). Panners have been accused of deliberately lighting fires to get rid 
of bush, grass and trees that get in the way of their metal detectors. 
 
Without doubt, ASM has been associated with a surge in spending thus creating opportunity 
for retail businesses. Also in Chegutu, it seems the prevalence of small mines has triggered 
some small shops to supply inputs such as mercury, compressors (for hiring), elusion plants 
(for gold processing after cynidation) and vehicle spares shops, among other things. These 
economic inputs however seem to lack clear signs of sustainability so far. Moreover, 
spending from small mining and panning remains largely consumption orientated. Where 
there is a high intensity of small-scale mining activity, liquor shops tend to be the first to be 
established.  The small scale mines have strong external linkages and weak local linkages less 
likely to benefit the immediate periphery. In terms of being a part of the local revenue base, 
in 2010 only three of the 70 miners documented by the Chegutu RDC paid at least half of 
rates (Interview, Mr. Sithole, 14 March 2010). The miners resisted paying rates to the 
Chegutu RDC because they felt the council charges were excessive with no evidence of 
provision of roads and water as required.  
Figure 22: Typical Grocery Shop Close to a Small Mine. 
 






In Pickstone, one of the areas close to Chegutu where panning and small-scale mining is 
prevalent, a shanty town has developed. The prevalence of HIV and AIDS, syphilis and other 
sexually transmitted diseases is reportedly high. Because human settlement in these places 
developed spontaneously and without any form of government support, there are no social 
services, no water or sewerage. Exposure to health risks is high. This might explain why 
Chegutu became the worst hit town in Zimbabwe at the time of the cholera epidemic in 2008. 
A media report on Chegutu noted, “prostitution has become so rife in the town because of 
unemployment. Young women are peddling their flesh for as little as US $2 to gold panners 
known as makorokoza” (Resident quoted in the The Zimbabwean 19 February 2009).  
 
In 2003, 46 percent of Zimbabwe’s artisanal and small scale miners were women. From this 
study, more than 95 percent of observed participants were men. Rather than being involved in 
the mining itself, women were mostly involved in prostitution and selling retail goods at 
some of the ASM sites.  In 2007, government poured ZW $50 billion in support of the 
Women in Mining Initiative. However in Chegutu’s Gadzema area where the women were 
allocated claims, women are hardly involved in the actual mining. The few women who are 
directly involved in the digging feel compelled to do so. They also complained about 
maltreatment by law enforcers. “I mine only because I have to and it is so hard to survive 
when the government treats us like criminals.” 	  In fact, according to one beneficiary, they are 
leasing claims, allowing men to dig and extract ore and share the output. It appears the claims 
were given to elite women who can afford to hire panners to work the claims. Interviews with 
some of those very miners confirmed that the government loans have been poorly 
disseminated with severe delays in disbursement, causing the actual value of such assistance 
to be miniscule. By far, most workers who need assistance have never had any access to, nor 




This chapter shows in great detail the political economy of crisis and ASM in Chegutu and 
the relationship between political power and accumulation. As the economic situation 
worsens, the party-state patronage system has become more entrenched. This has become 
clearer with the indigenisation and empowerment policy where party affiliation is the single 




manifests itself as a localised capitalist oligarchy. This has serious ramifications for social 
stratification. “When one can accumulate wealth overnight, one can pass from one class to 
another. Overnight one can wake up a land owner, though this can be an illusion as long as 
the property rights are not secured” (Mawowa, 2007). 
 
The patronage accumulation attending this period has however not excluded possibilities for 
upward mobility among the somewhat independent miners. It is these possibilities that 
suggest that, in spite of Zimbabwe’s serious economic crisis, some things still continued to 
work and, indeed as formality declined, new accumulation paths emerged. While the impact 
at household level is visible through investment in children’s education, acquisition of 
movable and immovable assets and probably improved livelihoods, broad developmental 
impacts appear to be very limited. This is particularly true for the public sector, as seen by 
deterioration of services such as health, roads, water provision and waste management, 
among other things. Yet as these services were declining, private alternatives were emerging, 
for example private schools and health facilities. This is by no means to suggest a happy 
affair, but the growth of private facilities suggests the existence of an expanding market. A 
parallel market for fuel, currency and other basic commodities which were in short supply 





PART	  FIVE:	  CONCLUSION	  




This thesis set out to investigate the impact, opportunities and constraints presented by 
Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis on mining activities and the state’s attitudes and 
actions towards these mining activities. Two case studies have been discussed extensively in 
Parts Three and Four, namely platinum mining and ASM gold mining both situated in the 
Chegutu-Mhondoro area.  The case studies discussion was preceded by a theoretical and 
conceptual discussion which pitched the thesis within the discourse of political economy. A 
detailed history of mining in Zimbabwe since 1890 was also covered.  
 
Reliance on coercion as a driver of accumulation and political power retention places the 
police, military and party youth militias at the centre of politics and economy. These play a 
pivotal role in the process of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003) and selective 
enforcement of laws. Nothing is cast in stone; all depends on the whims of those wielding 
force despite some progressive legislation. As a result, whereas in other places, ASM and the 
informal sector as a whole has been characterised by a system of norms extra-legal or 
otherwise (Siegel and Veiga, 2009), this has not been the case in Zimbabwe. Since patronage 
and coercion are at the core of political reproduction and where legitimacy can no longer be 
acquired through free and fair elections, a decentralised but party legitimised form of 
“accumulation by dispossession” and Third Chimurenga rent-seeking sustains a broad array 
of elements within the patronage system thus enabling the system to reproduce itself.  
 
It may be this particular aspect of Zimbabwe’s political economy of crisis that explains why 
Zimbabwe has ebbed to such levels of economic decline, epitomised by the second highest 
hyper-inflation in history, without descending into anarchy. Indeed political analysts have 
wondered about this resilience. It may be that the official state metamorphosed into Reno’s 
shadow state, feeding off the thriving shadow economy. It made no sense that members of 




the price of one loaf of bread. But when office allows one to access rents from the extra-legal 
economy, it remains worthwhile.  
 
This regime of accumulation is not restricted to the often-chaotic ASM. Attempts at 
accumulation by dispossession are found in the way ZANU-PF is implementing the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act in the corporate platinum sector. In Part 
Four, the researcher has shown how the liberation war entitlement discourse is used to 
legitimise accumulation by dispossessing and disqualifying artisanal gold miners who are not 
ZANU-PF members. This did not merely mean that ZANU-PF members get access to 
resources necessarily; much depends on the political hierarchy and whether ZANU-PF 
grassroots interests do not interfere with those of senior party officials. Indigenisation and 
empowerment in the platinum sector is underpinned by the entitlement discourse. While the 
law requires companies to “sell” 51 percent to indigenous Zimbabweans, ZANU-PF leaders 
have in fact tried to grab shares. In the final analysis, I revisit the notion of economic history 
of liberating “ourselves” and what this means in the context of Zimbabwe’s current 




The thesis relies on a case study of the Chegutu area. Chegutu is generalised to mean the area 
covering Chegutu town and its rural periphery (approximately the area within a 50-kilometre 
radius from Chegutu town).  The area’s being traditionally an agricultural and mining hub 
provides a spatially specific opportunity to look at the impact of Zimbabwe’s crisis on 
mining, the sector’s interaction with the state, emerging accumulation paths and outcomes. 
Despite Zimbabwe’s economic decline and the collapse of the mining sector, platinum 
mining and ASM thrived during this period. This is intriguing since Zimbabwe’s mining 
sector’s decline represents a paradox in that it happened when global mineral prices were 
rising and the sector was booming globally. Why platinum and ASM were exceptions thus 
becomes a subject for investigation. Though the importance of industrialisation in the long 
run is acknowledged, minerals remain strategic in Africa’s development and present an 
important point of departure.   
 
Since the story of mining in Zimbabwe represents a confluence of informality, state policy 




economy as the preferred heuristic tool. It thus borrows from a combination of conceptual 
and theoretical approaches that help to unpack conflict, politics and capitalist development. 
Political economy of conflict, most notably Reno (1998), and primitive accumulation present 
useful lenses through which to analyse the violence currencies of Zimbabwe’s crisis. What 
appears to be a multiplicity of centres of power and coercion spread across and within the 
state, ZANU-PF as the dominant political party and its structures, the police, military and 
youth militias makes the political economy of conflict especially relevant. These groups have 
promoted accumulation by dispossession.  Zimbabwe has retained a strong unitary state and 
with it unity of coercion. This presents a limitation for most political economy of conflict 
approaches since these are predicated on the proliferation of warlordism, breakdown of 
central authority and the emergence of a shadow state and a shadow economy. The historical 
role of the contemporary Zimbabwean state in moderating and promoting primitive 
accumulation may thus aid in unlocking this shortcoming.  
 
To be sure, in Zimbabwe, it is possible to talk of a shadow economy and shadow state, but 
this does not negate the continued existence of strong centralised authority. What appears to 
be the case however is that the central authority has adapted to a shadow economy through a 
system of patronage that relies on several conduits of coercive power. These conduits of 
power are not always coordinated but subordinate themselves to a central authority, namely 
the party and the state. The party and state are important in that they provide the discourse 
dominated by legitimation ideologies that promote and define the “Third Chimurenga”. 
These ideologies create an “us and them” dichotomy which serves a dual function of 
qualifying on one hand while disqualifying on the other.  What I find interesting in this study 
is that “accumulation by dispossession” by ZANU-PF supporters and political elites seldom 
happens without these ideological justifications. It may be that, the party and state, by their 
custodianship of the legitimation ideology, have been able to adapt to and sustain a network 
patronage necessary for their political reproduction via the shadow economy.  
 
Zimbabwe’s crisis and the way the state responded to it points to some unresolved questions 
relating to the nature of the country’s capitalist development. The development of colonial 
capitalism was such that it excluded the majority of blacks from economic opportunities. 
Development was hinged on cost minimisation, profit maximisation and protectionism. 
Exploitation of cheap labour was central. In order to force blacks into the cheap labour 




alienating Africans from the land (Phimister, 1975) and limiting African opportunities for 
independent economic activities. When these measures produced limited outcomes, the 
colonial government resorted to migrant labour and chibaro (forced labour) (van Onslen, 
1980). Blacks were excluded from operating mines. Despite the colonial bias towards big 
capital, small scale mines were a preserve for the domestic white rural bourgeoisie. The 
uneven development produced contradictions that made this mode of accumulation 
unsustainable in the long run (Bond, 1997). For example, while capitalist development was 
based on exploitation of cheap labour, which undermined the development of a dynamic 
labour market and skilled labour necessary for industrial development, and restricted 
domestic consumption. These contradictions were worsened by the imposition of 
international sanctions after 1965 which restricted then-Rhodesia’s access to the international 
market.    
 
By independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited an acutely unequal society. The nature of the 
political agreement signed in 1979 limited the scope for radical changes in the economic 
base. The post-colonial state had a somewhat suspicious relationship with white-dominated 
capital. Public policy vacillated between appeasement of the interests of national and 
international business, redistributive welfarism in the form of providing universal health care 
and education and promotion of the interests of a rapidly growing educated class. Actual 
economic growth in the 1980s was very slow, prompting the adoption of liberal reforms in 
the 1990s. Mining investment increased in this period in response to ESAP reforms but job 
losses attending the reforms drove thousands into ASM. By 1999, gold production peaked 
despite the increasing economic difficulties. Over most of the period from 1980 to 2000, 
opportunities for blacks remained limited. Blacks could take over the state but with the 
prevailing rule of law post-1980, they actually found the road to wealth and success, beyond 
what state office or professional qualifications allowed, a very steep and difficult one.  
 
Starting with the unbudgeted war veterans pay outs in 1997 and the costly intervention in the 
DRC’s civil war, the occupation of white-owned farms in 2000 created a spiral of economic 
decline. Successive disputed elections created a crisis of legitimacy and government’s 
militant approach to managing the economy through price and exchange controls, printing of 
money and harassing businesses only compounded the situation. From 2002 onwards 




paper money and foreign currency. By 2008, Zimbabwe recorded the second highest inflation 
in world history. The mining sector came to a standstill.  
 
However, within this deteriorating situation, new possibilities arose. The land seizures in 
2000 appear to have set in motion a new regime of crisis accumulation (Scoones, 2011). 
Under the Third Chimurenga, accumulation no longer needed to happen by the book. 
Accumulation by dispossession dominated the new order. Those with connections to the state 
manipulated the crisis, raising informality and state measures such as printing of money and 
trading in fuel or foreign currencies. Smuggling of diamonds, gold and other minerals was 
rampant. 
 
In spite of the decline, Zimbabwe’s platinum sector remained efficient and viable. This is best 
illustrated by the performance of Zimplats which made profits of nearly US $1 billion during 
the period. Part Three shed some light on Zimplats’s survival strategy in this difficult 
political and economic context. Zimplats successfully managed to adapt to Zimbabwe’s 
political context, negotiating relatively good deals and engaging with local chiefs and 
politicians to ensure survival in an age of radical nationalism and policy uncertainty. The 
company was able to negotiate a winning deal in light of the government’s attempt to force 
the company to dispose majority stake to indigenous Zimbabweans. Carefully managing 
power networks through dispersing with political and economic rents was thus crucial.  
 
ASM also has typified Zimbabwe’s disorderly regime of accumulation. Superficially 
consisting of subsistence tactics in the realm of informality, ASM also links up to the state 
and offers some real opportunities for accumulation. This thesis makes use of fieldwork on 
ASM in Chegutu to make this point. It shows the importance of horizontal and vertical 
networks. It illustrates how patronage, accumulation, politics and violence dominate this 
sector. Some medium-sized business ventures are emerging out of informal mining.  Informal 
and sometimes illicit mining activity has provided capital finance for other economic 
activities – a role that would be played by banks in other contexts. 
 	  
3.	  State,	  Mining	  and	  Accumulation	  	  
	  
Developments in Zimbabwe during this period do not support the hopes of proponents of 




1990s, the post-2000 Zimbabwe state adopted a radically commandist approach. However 
this commandism, unlike the kind inherited from the colonial state in 1980, was not 
developmental. Instead, it was characterised by a partisan and populist redistributive rhetoric 
rather than support for improved productivity.  Those who see “...state interference in 
commerce as more violent than the effects of what Mark Duffield earlier called the ‘illiberal’ 
consequences of so-called laisssez-faire in the hinterlands,” may well find a scapegoat in this 
instance (2001). This authoritarian populism partly derived legitimacy from the reality of 
colonially inherited economic imbalances.  
  
Patronage and coercion tilts the balance of forces in favour of the security sector. It also leads 
to the coalescing of powerful interests around politically extractable rents. The economy as a 
result is being (re)organised to sustain patronage and coercion and the accompanying political 
project. To this extent, both indigenisation and economic empowerment and accumulation in 
ASM can be viewed as an attempt to sustain patronage through dispossession and 
accumulation gate keeping.  The marriage of politics and economy is buttressed by the 
marriage of the party and the state. ZANU-PF structures shared offices (and functions) with 
government departments.  
 
The conflation of the state and party is also seen in national events and holiday celebrations 
such as the Independence Day, national heroes’ burials, Defence Forces Day and Unity Day. 
During these events party slogans are chanted, party colours and regalia are worn and 
political opponents are verbally attacked. Since the formation of the inclusive government, 
some of these party events were separated from the state due to protests from the new 
political partners in government. Yet this researcher encountered situations where losing 
ZANU-PF candidates in local council elections remained de facto councillors. Local residents 
still referred to them as if they were official councillors. ZANU-PF structures, besides relying 
on youth militias, tend to be closely aligned to senior police and other national security 
organs who, for the most part, view themselves as appendages of ZANU-PF.  
 
It is argued here that the 2000 land grabs added a spin to this relationship between the party 
and state. By side-lining the rule of law and allowing the party to spearhead the violent 
seizures of farms, manage access to “empowerment” and ASM opportunities, the state lost 
the ability to consistently enforce laws, especially against the interests of party members and 




shifted to the party from the state and now is seemingly slipping away to the military, as 
epitomised by the establishment of the Joint Operation Command (JOC) (Mugabe’s think 
tank comprising of the army, intelligence, prisons service and police), and its increasingly 
central role in policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, the state has been 
maintained as an instrument of both economic and political reproduction. The co-governing 
MDC has seemingly failed to alter the reality of ZANU-PF dominance in the state.  
 
During the crisis period, membership or some sort of association with ZANU-PF and its 
several instruments of coercion became central for viable accumulation. Within ZANU-PF 
itself, accumulation battles manifest themselves in the form of court battles over the 
ownership of grabbed farms, gold claims and rush sites, economic crime charges and counter-
charges, verbal and violent militia clashes at accumulation sites, and most recently, violent 
clashes during party primary elections. Increased economic and political contestation in an 
unregulated context has made recruitment and hiring of militias a necessity for senior party 
members. Political mafia groups such as Chipangano: ZANU-PF youths in Harare’s Mbare 
area, Chipinda’s gang of gold panners doubling as ZANU-PF youths in Kwekwe, or Mai 
Pfute’s gang of ZANU-PF youth cum gold panners in Chegutu have emerged and to some 
degree have become self-sustaining. War veterans can go to Zimplats premises and threaten 
to close the mine or spearhead worker unrest demanding compliance with indigenisation laws 
or employment of “locals”. In some cases where patrons ceased to sponsor them, the gang 
takes it upon itself to demand rents from informal traders and other economic actors in return 
for conducting their business. In gold panning, these militias have often doubled as 
employees and militias. 
 
This to some extent represents the bastardisation of the acquisitive culture that scholars on 
Zimbabwe (Raftopolous, 1996; Ranger, 1980) have historically associated with Zimbabwe’s 
political elites. Thus an historical understanding should assist in entangling Zimbabwe’s post 
2000 political economy.  The nationalist politics not only intersected but in fact emerged 
from struggles by the African elite for access to white preserved privileges. Raftopolous 
(1996) notes that during the formative years of anti-colonial struggle, “the desire for upward 
mobility” was at the heart of nationalists’ grievances, most of whom had acquired education 
and professional training only to be frustrated by the limited opportunities. This inclination 
among the nationalists leadership remained even despite the leftist rhetoric in the 1970s and 




features characteristic of petty-bourgeoisie politics in (other) independent, neo-colonial 
Africa …” (1980). 
 
The state that emerged after 1980 thus lived up to its billing as a “contradictory site of both 
accumulation (not necessarily productive) and hegemonic construction” (Moore, 2004a, 407), 
governed by what Fanon (quoted in Saul, 1979, 353) describes as a petty bourgeoisie or 
‘intellectual elite engaged in trade’ doubling as rulers. Zimbabwe’s ruling elites “became 
umpires in the accumulation game in which they had vested interest” (Mawowa, 2007, 43). It 
is no wonder a handful of Zimbabwe’s ruling elites managed to accumulate substantial 
wealth in spite of a 1984 leadership code which prohibited those in the party leadership from 
involving themselves in business and acquiring property. The rhetoric encapsulated in the 
code had an effect of discouraging black business entrepreneurship among the general 
populace while simultaneously leaving unhindered the colonially derived white capital. In 
fact, tacit alliances formed between members of Zimbabwe’s ruling elites and white capital.  
 
Despite the indigenisation rhetoric over the years, the commitment of Zimbabwe’s statecraft 
to the development of an independent black entrepreneurship is far from convincing. Therein 
lays the paradox of the authoritarian populist redistributionist policies of the 2000s. 
Raftopolous and Compagnon go as far as arguing that the Zimbabwe “Government fears that 
an autonomous black private sector would provide alternative power-bases” (2004, 20). 
Approaches to correcting historically generated racial imbalances remain top down in nature 
and lack a sincere strategy to broaden the local entrepreneurial base beyond a narrow, 
parasitic and politically aligned business class. This is apparent in both the state’s attempt at 
indigenisation and empowerment in the platinum sector and the contradictory policies and 
attitude towards ASM. 
 
The fomenting of affirmative action voices in the late 1990s only led to the intertwining of 
the ruling party and indigenisation pressure groups. The tendency has been to use politics to 
pursue economic interests. Membership of indigenisation organisations became an important 
platform for aspiring ruling party politicians (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 361) “in 
actual fact aspiring towards bourgeois status” (Mawowa, 2007: 20). This has been combined 
with the use of “struggle credentials to legitimate ... and de-legitimate others in competition 
for power and resources” (Kriger, 2006, 1151). CSOTs and other apparently more democratic 




struggle credentials logic. Politics of recognition thus tend to occupy the core of 
accumulation and (re)distribution modalities in post-colonial Zimbabwe. Perhaps it is fair to 
conclude that the acquisitive nature of Zimbabwe’s ruling class and its hegemonic interest 
make it incapable of delivering meaningful and broad based economic empowerment.  
Expecting those in ZANU-PF to be neutral —“umpires in an accumulation game in which 
they had vested interests”— would be asking for too much. 
 
4.	  Crisis	  Accumulation	  and	  Development	  
 
The question considered here is that of the transformative effects and accumulation outcomes 
of an “overtly destructive and anti-development process,” and the pervasive informalisation 
attending the period. “Creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1959) would give us some room 
for optimism, but outcomes are not predetermined.  “… If one realises that fundamental 
socio-economic transformation is not a picnic, then the question is about who controls the 
coercion of accumulation, and how they can minimise the devastation and maximise the 
benefits” (Moore, 2008: 3). Moore has attempted to understand the violence of this period as 
part and parcel of the process of primitive accumulation. Primitive accumulation relies on 
force and use of non-market modalities (Marx, 1972) and this may well explain the economic 
dimensions of Zimbabwe’s violence and the party and state’s involvement in it. As Moore 
puts it, “…if capitalist development needs violence, why not have states rather than warlords 
direct it?” (2008, 2). Herbert Ndoro distinguishes between productive and non-productive 
informal activities. Productive informal activities “have the capacity to internally generate 
savings which will constitute investible surplus providing a basis for expansion leading to 
structural transformation in the wider economy eventually rendering the term ‘informal’ 
inappropriate” (1996, 30).  
 
This evolution is observable in what is covered in this work, where a mining site starts as a 
site for a gold rush, is normalised to a registered claim and in some cases becomes a small 
mine and gold processing mill that employs more than 50 people, with considerable 
investment and a degree of mechanisation. In some instances the venture diversifies beyond 
mining to include other business activities such as semi-commercial agriculture, furniture, 
transport, fuel and other retail business. This growth trend is significant in so far as it casts 
some light on opportunities and development potential for the sector. Epistemology and 




the form of either technical and financial support or mitigating negative environmental and 
health effects. Where upward mobility has taken place without support from external 
agencies, the plausibility of this emphasis is put into question. In some cases, gains won in 
gold mining have provided seed capital for other economic activities.  
 
Placed within a national context, this typifies all unregulated economic activities that have 
come out of the Zimbabwe crisis. Basic commodities which were in short supply were sold at 
the parallel market at inflated prices. This included foreign currency, basic foodstuffs such as 
bread, maize meal, cooking oil and sugar market65, airtime voucher cards and fuel among 
other things. The ZANU-PF party and the state parasitised this informality. In 2007, for 
example, ZANU-PF’s Bulawayo leadership was accused of selling cell phone lines from the 
state owned cell phone company Net-one on the parallel market. Cell phone lines were sold at 
between Z$6-Z$8 million on the parallel market compared to the Z $300 000 official price 
(Chronicle, 13 July 2007, 2). In a journal article on the roadside currency trade, I have shown 
how senior political and security figures were involved (Mawowa and Matongo, 2011).  
 
At a time when fuel took more foreign currency than any other commodity (Gono, 2005, 16), 
those connected to the state got access ostensibly for priority programs like public transport 
and agriculture, only to sell it at inflated parallel market prices. As one informant put it, 
“With fuel in short supply the war vets/CIOs (Central Intelligence Organisation operatives) 
now owning farms around Chegutu, though spending all their time sitting here (at a bar), 
claim government fuel ostensibly to use at their farms, only to sell it here through these 
‘NOCZIM66 guys on the black market” (Interview with a fuel dealer, July 2007). As a result, 
“NOCZIMs,” proliferated in Chegutu and across the country where fuel was sold at 
exorbitant parallel market rates, despite shortages in official channels. A similar trend 
occurred in the RBZ allocation of foreign currency at the very cheap ‘official’ rate. This 
limited currency was accessed by party ‘heavies’, who in turn made huge profits by selling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The state’s system of distribution of goods in short supply was so skewed and easy to manipulate to ensure 
benefits, seemingly, for members of the party elite. For example, in 2005 the state run Grain Marketing Board 
was selling grain to millers at a lower price than it was purchasing from farmers. In a mode of appropriation 
defined by patronage lines, only those millers connected to the party could easily access this cheap grain. It soon 
emerged that most of these were disguised millers who accessed this grain from the GMB only to repack and 
resell the very same grain to the GMB at a profit. 
66 ‘NOCZIM’ was local lingua franca for illegal and parallel market fuel dealers, derogatorily derived from the 
National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), which is officially responsible for all national oil 




the same money at the higher parallel market rate. In 2007 Mutumwa Mawere67 observed that 
“Selected individuals can benefit from buying foreign exchange at Z $15,000 to US $1 and 
then sell the same US $1 at Z $25,000 or more” (2007).  
 
The shop floor stewards of this system, such as fuel attendants, bank tellers or supervisors in 
a retail shops among others, moved from rages to riches in an instant due to their placement. 
Some benefited from being employed as fronts for powerful figures. This scenario is similar 
to what ensued in the ASM sector, where a powerful figure used someone as a front to run a 
syndicate or small gold mine. It is also true of police officers who “policed” ASM. In such 
cases, official salaries cannot explain the assets accumulated due what is obviously the most 
trying economic period in Zimbabwe’s history. Perhaps the most successful case cited in this 
thesis is that of the owner of Coloursell furniture chain. He greatly benefited from being 
appointed a gold buying agent for the central bank and became a renowned gold miner and 
furniture businessman. As observed in this study, cases of upward mobility are not only 
limited to those with direct connections to the state or the coercive apparatus. Some have 
been able to manipulate the system, making use of local networks. The majority of 
accumulation cases, however, have been linked to state influence. 
 
As a direct response to the proliferation of artisanal and small scale gold mining, retail, 
housing and other markets develop, leading to the establishment of related businesses. 
Typically however, these hardly last for long and tend to follow gold rush cycles. This has at 
times left ghost structures in former gold rush sites. At the lower levels of society evidence of 
both accumulation and dis-accumulation run concurrently. Price stabilisation, which came 
with dollarisation, might provide opportunities for more sustainable accumulation assuming 
they move into more stable business ventures.  
 
5. Crisis-Born Accumulators:	  Possible	  Limitations	  of	  Crisis	  Political	  Economy	  
The mode of appropriation that has dominated the crisis period in Zimbabwe expresses itself 
more eloquently in the unfolding social configurations. These configurations have been 
contradictory in many ways. This reflects the chaotic manner in which accumulation has 
taken place over the past ten years or so. The first contradiction stems from the growing lack 
of distinction between party or political office and accumulation. Political office corresponds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Mawere is a Zimbabwean businessmen and former owner of two mining companies in Zimbabwe. He was 




with accumulation more and more. The party state thus collapses into a localised capitalist 
oligarchy. Overnight one can wake up a landowner but property rights are not necessarily 
secured. In the long run, the lack of legal consistency and continued reliance on coercion as 
opposed to a system of property rights may undermine and reverse the upward mobility 
which was instigated.  
 
A triple-layered socio-politico-economic stratification can be envisaged in the case of 
Zimbabwe’s crisis political economy. One has at its apex a class, somewhat difficult to define 
but combining business, public, private and political office, be it in party or government — 
‘comrades in business’ (Capps, 2007, 30) involved in both legal and illegal accumulation 
activities.  It is this class that has been most interested and involved in most indigenisation 
and empowerment deals. Thus Vice-President Mujuru is opportunistically but accurately 
reported to have, “castigated greedy politicians and leaders who are grabbing everything for 
themselves under the guise of indigenisation” (The Standard, 24 February, 2013).  
 
Below the ‘power elite’ is a stratum that could tentatively be labelled a ‘middle class’. This 
group does not meet the conventional definition of middle class. One would think here of 
business managers and public servants, positions which come with the requisite qualifications 
or learning this group lacks. However, this group’s function in Zimbabwe’s political 
economy of crisis imitates that of a “normal middle class” or the conventional “new petty 
bourgeoisie” of Poulantzas (1975, 209). It includes the registered small scale miners and 
claim holders who can be independent individuals or family units. Connected to them is the 
linkman or front man, who manages illegal deals for the elite. Sometimes this is a managing 
partner. This can also be a locally based gold buyer, a party ward chairperson or youth leader. 
This group is also identified by its location, at or close to, the resource site where it represents 
the big chief who may prefer to be absent. In a few cases members of this group have ended 
up being serious accumulators in their own right. The lower stratum consists of gold panners 
and militia on one hand and subsistence farmers who double as part-time panners on the 
other. 
 
It is also possible to talk of a crisis born accumulating class as an outcome of Zimbabwe’s 
crisis political economy. This may be equivalent to what Zimbabwe Independent columnist 
Muckraker has termed a “vulturine class” (Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007). This 




lot of ZANU-PF members and war veterans getting farms, thus moving from landless to 
being landed. At the time of writing, news reports suggested that the Zimbabwe government 
was moving to register 99 leases for resettled farmers, thus confirming this process (The 
Herald, 4 March 2013). Whether or not this process presents a widespread movement of 
people from one class to another en masse is not yet clear. Only 131  leases were reportedly 
issued (Ibid).  
 
Access to once criminalised and legally restricted activities such as trade in foreign currency, 
corrupt activities around goods in short supply and ASM presented opportunities for upward 
mobility, in some case from one class to another. The selective enforcement of laws on 
criminalised economic activities has widened access to rents by those connected to ZANU-
PF. This class dependency on the party and the coercive apparatus has seen it becoming more 
involved in the affairs of the party and aspiring for political office. The ZANU-PF party’s 
primary elections conducted to choose party candidates for the national elections confirms 
this shift (The Standard, 2008; NewZimbabwe, 2008). For the ruling elite and their network 
of beneficiaries, the economic utility of political office has become starker than ever. In that 
regard, political contests have collapsed into a form of what Bayart has famously called la 
politique du ventre (the politics of the belly) (Bayart, 1993 and Bayart et al, 1999, 8). It is 
notable that those within what may represent ZANU-PF’s old guard have enacted a 
requirement that one ought to have served the party for at least five years to qualify as a 
candidate for primary elections. The new crisis-born class of accumulators is thus an 
emerging reality. 
 
By gate keeping accumulation in both ASM and platinum mining through coercion, the party 
in effect asserts itself as custodian of the country’s mineral wealth. Ideally minerals are 
owned by the state as a representative of the people, but this is subverted to mean that the 
party holds title. The actual leaser of mining rights thus is the party rather than the state. With 
respect to small miners and gold panners, what starts off as a free-for-all gold rush is often 
regularised by way of a powerful elite taking over and registering the claim. A certain group 
of gold miners are superficially described as permanent nomadic panners, but in fact they are 
proletarians at the behest of the politically connected accumulators. The gold obtained is 
often sold to the very same powerful elites. This makes more sense when one considers that 
quite a significant number of these miners are former mine and farm workers who have not 





Included in this category are youth who find gold panning as their first job. For that reason, 
the ‘real’ capitalists are the members of the ruling elite who have control of the means of 
production through the party-state. The elite member can either choose to operate more 
directly at the mine through a syndicate or have bands of nomadic miners to mine for him and 
pay wages effectively through the purchase mechanism without entering a formal work 
contract. The artisanal gold miners have little or no control over both the selling price and 
access to means of production. The real capitalist permits the illegal miners to access “his” 
resource without hindrance thus making them a labour force of a new type. To make this 
plain, one may argue that if the panned gold was not reaching the employer (ruling elite or 
those connected to the part state) they would have been more purposeful in curbing these 
activities.  
 
These unregulated “illegal” modes of accumulation and appropriation are subject to reversal 
and reordering. With questions of property rights still unresolved, gains of the current process 
are not beyond reversal. With the MDC repeatedly promising to reverse the order, bring to 
book and return business to normalcy, a new political order may be set to banish the system. 
This partly explains the tendency by war veterans, pro-ZANU-PF business people and other 
beneficiaries to coalesce increasingly around the political establishment. Thus, while the 
unregulated nature of accumulation has favoured the new party state club of accumulators, it 
is not necessarily going to be good for them in the long run. Historically primary/primitive 
accumulation has been characterised by hook, crook and violent dispossessions, but this has 
been followed by institutions to support, regulate and protect legally and coercively these 
gains. Whether or not the current political dispensation where MDC and ZANU-PF are 
sharing power will deliver the requisite compromises to institutionalise and protect gains of 
Zimbabwe’s “political economy of crisis” remains uncertain. 
 
Continued reliance on accumulation by dispossession would most likely discourage long term 
economic planning and the emergence of an orderly accumulation regime. This has become 
clearer with the indigenisation and empowerment policy, where accumulation by violent 
dispossession or the threat thereof have been the main means of redistributing wealth to 





6. Conclusion: An Economic History of Liberating Ourselves? 
 
This thesis thus answers in part the question about Zimbabwe’s economic history of 
liberating “ourselves.”  A careful reading of this history betrays a narrow focus geared toward 
benefitting a few already-rich political elites. This is consistent with ZANU-PF’s modus 
operandi. The paradox is that while preaching empowerment, ASM workers are victimised 
and laws are haphazardly applied. In order to be meaningful about Zimbabwe’s crisis 
political economy, a historical understanding of the evolution of nationalist politics and how 
this articulated with emerging African capitalists’ contests for entrepreneurship is important. 
To be sure, the Zimbabwean government and ZANU-PF have never favoured independent 
black entrepreneurship. As Raftopolous and Compagnon (2004) have pointed out, they fear 
doing so and losing power. It is not surprising that the populist rhetoric falls short of 
broadening the local entrepreneurial base beyond a narrow, parasitical, unsteady and 
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Ownership of Selected Key Mines in Zimbabwe, 2011 
Company Size Mineral % 
Indigenous 
% Foreign Note 
1. Zimplats  Large Platinum   100  
2. Mimosa Large Platinum   100  
3. Unki Large Platinum   100  
4. Todal Medium Platinum  40 60 ZMDC joint venture; also see note 
5. Amari Large Platinum  50 50 ZMDC joint venture; also see note 
6. Ruschrome Large Platinum  50 50 ZMDC joint venture; also see note 




Large Diamonds 22 78  
9. River Ranch Medium Diamonds 20 80  
10. Mbada 
Diamonds 
Medium Diamonds 50 50 ZMDC joint venture 
11. Candille 
Diamonds 
Medium Diamonds 50 50 ZMDC joint venture 
 
12. Metallon Large Gold  100  
13. RioZim  Large Gold/ Coal/ 
Nickel 
100  Listed 
14. Duration/ 
Clarity 
Large Gold  100  
15. Freda 
Rebecca 
Large Gold 15 85  
16. Caledonia Medium Gold  100  
17. Casmyn Medium Gold  100  
18. Falgold Medium Gold 15 85 Listed 
19. Golden 
Valley 
Medium Gold 100   
20. Pan African 
Mining 
Medium Gold 15 85  
21. GAT Medium Gold/ 
Pyrites 
100   
22. Carslone Medium Gold 100  RBZ 





Company Size Mineral % 
Indigenous 
% Foreign Note 
24. Zimasco Large Chrome 27 73  




Large Nickel 47 53 Listed; BNC is owned 20% by 
Government of Zimbabwe through Climax. 
 27. AA Mines Large Asbestos 100   
28. Hwange Large Coal 43 57 Listed; Hwange is owned 43 percent by 
the Government of Zimbabwe.  






100  ZMDC is owned 100% by the Government 
of Zimbabwe 
30. ZISCO Medium  Iron Ore 40 60 ZISCO is owned 40 percent by the 
Government of Zimbabwe. 
31. Dorowa 
Minerals 
Medium Phosphate 100  Dorowa Minerals is ownded by IDC 
through Chemplex which is owned 100% 
by the Government of Zimbabwe.  
 32. Alaska 
Dolomite 
Small Dolomite 100   
33. Samrec 
Vermiculite 
Small Vermiculite  100  
34. Kadoma 
Magnesite 
Small Magnesite 100   
35. ACR Exploration Gold/ 
Phosphate/ 
Nickel 
5 95 Exploration 
36. Liberation 
Mining 
Small Coal 100   
37. Tuli Coal Small Coal 100   
38. Northern Coal Small  Coal 100   
39. Lisulu Mining Small Coal 100   
Source: Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe, Individual  Mining Houses, 2010 
Notes:  
State, State owned enterprises and indigenous people hold mineral rights totaling 50 percent to 60 percent of total mineral rights 
Unki and Zimplats ceded ground to ZMDC in return for empowerment credits and to facilitate new entrants into the platinum sector. ZMDC 
has gone on to create these joint ventures with this ground. 
Source: Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, 2011. 
	  
 
  
	  
